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S. Hrg. 108-875

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
r\^ PROPOSALS TO REORGANIZE THE UNITED
STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG. 108-875

Implications for The Department

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON AKMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 16 AND 17, 2004

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS

DEPOSITORY

JAN 2 B 2006

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS DEPT.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2005

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800

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S. Hrg. 108-875

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
rA^ PROPOSALS TO REORGANIZE THE UNITED
STATES INTELUGENCE COMMUNITY

Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG. 108-875

Implications for The Department

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 16 AND 17, 2004

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

SUPERINTENDINT 0^ DOCUMINTS
DEPOSITORY

JAN 2 S ZOOB

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS DEPT.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2005

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone; toll free 1866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800

Fax; (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN WARNER,
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
JOHN CORNYN, Texas

Virginia, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JACK REED, Rhode Island
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
BILL NELSON, Florida
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Implications for the Department of Defense and Military Operations of
Proposals to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community

august 16, 2004

Page

Schlesinger, Dr. James R., Former Secretary of Defense, Chairman, The
Mitre Corporation 8

Carlucci, Frank C, Former Secretary of Defense, Chairman Emeritus, The
Carlyle Group 17

Hamre, Dr. John J., Former Deputy Secretary of Defense, President and

Chief Executive Officer, Center for Strategic and International Studies 20

Implications for the Department of Defense and Military Operations of
Proposals to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community

august 17, 2004

Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by Dr. Stephen

A. Cambone, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 91

McLaughlin, Hon. John E., Acting Director of Central Intelligence 101

Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 107

(III)

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
PROPOSALS TO REORGANIZE THE UNITED
STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

MONDAY, AUGUST 16, 2004

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in room SH-
216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman)
presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Roberts,
Sessions, ColHns, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Ken-
nedy, Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton,
and Clinton.

Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff director.

Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional
staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Thomas
L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Paula J. Philbin, profes-
sional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic
staff director; and Creighton Greene, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Alison E. Brill, Andrew W. Florell, and
Bridget E. Ward.

Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling, assistant
to Senator Warner; Darren M. Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Russell J.
Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Sharon L. Waxman,
Mieke Y. Eoyang, and Jarret A. Wright, assistants to Senator Ken-
nedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Wil-
liam K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assist-
ant to Senator E. Benjamin Nelson; Mark Phillip Jones, assistant
to Senator Daj^on; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clin-
ton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER,
CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. The committee meets this afternoon to re-
ceive testimony from three very distinguished former public office-
holders, all of whom have performed service that eminently quali-
fies them to provide to the committee, and to the Senate as a
whole — indeed Congress — their views. Former Secretaries of De-
fense (SECDEF) James Schlesinger and Frank C. Carlucci, and

(1)

former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre are with us today.
We welcome each of you back before this committee.

Your views on the various recommendations for reform of the
U.S. InteUigence Community, particularly the recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission and the proposals of President Bush, are criti-
cal to this committee's understanding of how those recommended
changes will impact the Department of Defense (DOD) and future
military operations.

I note that the committee also invited former SECDEF Harold
Brown to testify. He was unable to join us today, but, without ob-
jection, I shall place his statment in this record. It is a very inter-
esting letter. I'm not sure but I think it was provided to each of
you.

[The information referred to follows:]

August 9, 2004

The Honorable John Warner

The Honorable Carl Levin

United States Senate Committee on Aimed Services

228 Russell Senate Office Building

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Warner and Ranking Member Levin,

Thank you for the invitation conveyed in your letter of August 3"*, 2004. I regret that
commitments in California will prevent me from appearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on August 16*. But perhaps you would find it helpful to have this brief statement of
my views, wiiich I wouW appreciate your entering in the record.

I believe that the 9/1 1 Commission has performed a great service in its description of the
events leading to the destruction of the World Trade Center towers and the attack on the
Pentagon, and in its analysis of failures in intelligence and in other elements. The prescriptions
of the commission, and those of President Bush, are considerably more problematic.

The president's proposal seems to me to add another layer of review without giving it
substantial authority to make decisions. That risks removing the customers for the intcUigence
product fiuther from the producers as well as, by burying sensitive operations deeper, reducing
the likelihood of adequate policy review. Better coordination and rationalization of the
intelligence community's plans, budgets and activities, which I agree is needed, could be as
appropriately done to the degree implied in the president's proposal, as I understand it, by the IC
(Intelligence Community) Staff that reports to the DCI, or by a Deputy to the National Security
Advisor, without adding this extra layer. As it happens, I believe that the DCI, through the IC
staff, ought to play a larger role than is now the case in drafting a unified intelligence program
that extends out over a five-year period. Such a program would then be worked on jobtly by the
IC staff and the Undersecretary of Defense for InteUigence, with disagreements resolved by the
DCI and the Secretary of Defense or, if that feils, by the President.

The Commission's proposed organization has some attractive elements. Joint Centers to
cover regional and functional areas of mtcrest, into which all sources would feed information,
make sense (Though there are some overlap problems: would Iran be deah with by the non-
proliferation center, the Middle East Center, or the terrorism center?). Dual hatting may also be
attractive, though only if it is done by delegation of line authority by both agency heads. I find
very strange the thought that the head of one agency (the NHD) should have the authority to hire
and fire sub cabinet officers in a different department (e.g. an Undersecretary of Defense, an

Assistant Secretary level bureau chief — INR — in the State Departn^nt). Ami there are
loose ends whose magnitude and importance equal or exceed the intelligence issues. One is the
relation between intelligence and operations. The Conjmission report notes this, but appears to
assume that the specialized centers do the job. But the operations resulting from a policy
decision, whose inputs mclude but are not limited to intelligence, may or will be diplomatic
(State), military (Defense), covert (CIA), paramilitary (Defense or CIA), economic (Treasiay
and many others). That connection cannot be made by the DCI, the IC, or an MID; it is an NSC
function.

A related and perhaps even more important omission from both proposals is the issue of
support for military operations, mentioned in your letter. Not only is the battkfield-rclated
intelligence derived from national as well as tactical and organic collectors vital to military
operations. The effectiveness ofU.S. forces relies on secure communications; every unit's
survival depends on that NSA function. And the prospect of cyberwarfare, both military and
economic, both defensive ar)d offensive, heightens the importance of that fiinction, the
intelligence conponcnt of which is a very modest part. Moreover, neither proposal deals
adequately with finding the proper balance between the need for domestic intelligence on the
terrorist threats and the civil liberties that define American fiieedoms. Nor does either grapple
effectively with the problem of a bias toward prosecution over prevention, mherent in any law-
enforcement agency such as the FBI.

I rnention these issues to illustrate the main point that I would like to make. The issue of
organizing the government for a world in which there is a major threat to the U.S. fix)m
terrorism, arising from the Civil War within Islam and its interaction with U.S. goals and
policies, is a serious and difficult one. But that is not the only potential conflict (North Korea,
the Taiwan Strait, for example) and intelligence is not the only tool. I believe it would be a
grave mistake to decide on a major reorgani2ation of the national security structure in the few
hectic and partisan months immediately before a presidential election, based on the
recommendations of a group that, no matter how eminent and bipartisan, was chartered for
another purpose and added this as a chapter in its report, or based on an axlministration proposal
devised as a hasty response to a political threat. 1 would note that neither the National Security
Act (1947), nor its major Amendments (1949, 1958) nor the Goldwater Nichols Act (1986) was
adopted during a presidential election year. I hope your committee, and the Congress as a whole,
as well as the Bush Administration or a Kerry Administration, can give these issues the time and
thought that they deserve.

Sincerely yours.

Harold Brown
Counselor, CSIS

Chairman Wakner. The findings and recommendations of the
9/11 Commission have captured the interest of our President, Con-
gress, and perhaps most important, the American people. We are
privileged to have with us today three individuals who have been
attending a number of the hearings on behalf of the families, and,
indeed, one who was a survivor of the attack. Mrs. Loreen Sellitto,
of Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism, you lost your 23-year-
old son in Tower 1; Mary Fletchet, Voices of September 11, you lost
your 24-year-old son in Tower 2; and Rosemary Dillard, a critically-
injured Pentagon survivor.

The Commission has given the Nation— and, indeed Congress—
a roadmap, a series of recommendations to move forward. It's now
the responsibility of Congress, working with the administration, to

thoroughly examine and evaluate these recommendations and to
enact those changes which will strengthen — and I emphasize
"strengthen" — our Intelligence Community (IC).

The hearings we are conducting this week, together with the
many hearings that other committees in both the Senate and the
House have conducted or are conducting during the recess period,
are an important part of this process. I commend the President,
both for the swift action he has taken to embrace certain elements
of the Commission's recommendation, and also for the many things
he has done to make our Nation safer since the fateful day in Sep-
tember 2001.

Of the 41 recommendations made by the Commission, some have
already been enacted over the past several years, more will be done
through executive order. As the Commission noted: "in the nearly
3 years since September 11, Americans have been better protected
against terrorist attack." But we must constantly. Congress and
the administration, work to improve it. It's not going to stop. Such
legislation as we may enact will have to continue year after year
to work on it.

Our focus, however, today is on the DOD. As our witnesses know,
the DOD is home to the largest portion of the IC, and DOD is sec-
ond only to the President as the largest consumer of the intel-
ligence produced by the IC. We must not lose sight of these facts
as we consider the way ahead. My overriding concern, as I examine
changes to our IC, is, what changes will best help the warfighter —
the soldier, the sailor, the airman, and the marine — who is fighting
today and tomorrow and in the future to keep the terrorist threat
far from our shores? How can we better provide the necessary in-
telligence to these warfighters?

I think we can all agree that the U.S. Armed Forces are the fin-
est in the world. One of the reasons for that is, we have a very pro-
fessional military intelligence organization. An organization starts
with the combat support agencies (CSA), the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Na-
tional Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), which feed through
the regional joint intelligence centers to the unified commanders,
and then to the lowest-level tactical unit on the ground. This intel-
ligence structure is an essential part of our military operations.

This has not always been the case. This committee was very
deeply involved in overseeing the military actions in Iraq. It was
not that long ago when national-level intelligence support to the
warfighter was deemed by many of the professionals as somewhat
inadequate. The military's experience during Operation Desert
Storm was a watershed event. General Schwarzkopf testified before
this committee, in June 1991, and told Congress that responsive
national-level intelligence support for his mission in the first Per-
sian Gulf War was "unsatisfactory."

Since then, the Department, together with other elements of the
IC, has painstakingly built the intelligence and operational capa-
bilities that we saw so convincingly demonstrated on the battle-
fields of Afghanistan and Iraq. As we examine ways to reform our
IC in this process we're in now, we must ensure that we do nothing
to break or degrade those aspects of the IC that are working well
now.

We simply must not make any changes which could, despite the
best of intentions, hinder the ability of our troops to successfully
fulfill their missions. As members of this committee, it is our re-
sponsibility to ensure that the quality and timeliness of intelligence
support to our regional combatant commanders and our deployed
forces, as well as our Nation's leaders, is in no way degraded. We,
in this mission here, seek to make it better.

The commissioners correctly pointed out that our intelligence
structure failed to connect the dots, in terms of observing and then
fusing together the indicators of the significant threat from al
Qaeda in the recent years and months leading up to the actual at-
tack on our Nation on September 11, 2001. Most agree that the
most significant problems were an unwillingness to share informa-
tion, on the part of some agencies, and a structural inability to
combine domestic and foreign intelligence. The recommended solu-
tion, however, is to recognize the entire community, not just to
focus on parts that were unsatisfactory. We must examine the rea-
sons for these dramatic proposals by the 9/11 Commission, and un-
derstand how the recommended solutions do or do not address the
problems identified in the Commission's report.

As I've considered the recommendations of the Commission and
the unique challenges for our military forces in fighting the global
war on terrorism, a number of questions come to mind. What is the
essence of the problem: organization, budget authority, effective
leadership, or the appointment authority? How can the National
Intelligence Director (NID) and the SECDEF establish a more ef-
fective partnership to achieve success at all levels — national, re-
gional, and tactical military operations?

Under current law, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),
certainly on paper, in the statute, has significant budgetary author-
ity over all elements of the IC. How has this authority been exer-
cised, or not been exercised, in the past? Is there a view that that
current statutory authority is inadequate? What should be the role
of the SECDEF, in the budgets and operations, as he now performs
them, on behalf of the agencies which consume constantly about 85
percent of the National Foreign Intelligence Program? Were the
SECDEF to be excluded in some means, how can we assure that
the requirements of the Department, the combatant commanders,
and the warfighter be addressed?

These are sobering questions, and they're questions that require
careful consideration. Clearly, we must seize this opportunity to act
if we deem it necessary, but we also have a responsibility to ensure
our actions are prudent, carefully analyzed, and thoroughly de-
bated. Legislation of a similar importance to our national security
structure, such as the National Security Act of 1947 and Gold-
water-Nichols Act of 1986, were considered very carefully over a
period of time before Congress acted. I am confident that we. Con-
gress, can act, if we deem it necessary, during this session of Con-
gress.

I have committed publicly that I, personally, am not engaged in
a turf war with any other committee or any other part of this sys-
tem. I, personally, will do everything I can, working with my col-
leagues here in the Senate, most particularly on this committee
and the Intelligence Committee on which I am serving, to try and

strengthen and to pass such legislation as we deem essential to
achieve that strengthening.

Thank you.

Senator Levin?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me join you in welcoming our witnesses today. They are
very important witnesses. They've made major contributions to the
security of this Nation. We're grateful to them for that service, as
well as for being here.

This is the first hearing of the Armed Services Committee on the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the implications of
those recommendations for the DOD and military operations.

We have suffered from massive intelligence failures in the last
several years. First, as reported by the 9/11 Commission, the IC
failed to share information necessary to connect the dots in a man-
ner that might have warned us of the coming terrorist attacks. Sec-
ond, as reported by the Intelligence Committee, much of the intel-
ligence analysis and the evidence in the possession of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) leading up to the war in Iraq was over-
stated, or unsupported, or exaggerated, or mischaracterized.

The 9/11 Commission performed a valuable service to the Nation
in evaluating the intelligence problems preceding the attacks and
recommending changes intended to improve our future intelligence
and national security. Its identification of the huge failures of the
intelligence agencies to share information with each other before
September 11 is very similar to the findings of the joint investiga-
tion of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees that was re-
leased in July 2003. Those findings led to significant reform of the
IC, including the creation of a new Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC).

The 9/11 Commission recommends the creation of a similar Na-
tional Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) which, like the TTIC,
would be responsible for the fusion and analysis of terrorist intel-
ligence. The main difference between the proposed NCTC and the
recently established TTIC would be the NCTC's additional duty of
joint planning, including operational tasking of counterterrorist op-
erations, including, apparently, those conducted bv military forces
under the DOD.

The 9/11 Commission also recommended that we create the posi-
tion of an NID within the Executive Office of the President, with
authority over the national intelligence budget and the hiring and
firing power over the leader of the national intelligence agencies,
including agencies that reside within the DOD.

Although the President has agreed to the establishment of an
NID, he apparently does not support placing the proposed director
in the Executive Office of the President, or giving him control over
the national intelligence budget, or the hiring and firing power over
the leader of the national intelligence agencies. Without such au-
thority, the 9/11 Commission argues that the new NID would not
have the power needed to manage and oversee the IC effectively.

Similarly, while the President has agreed to the establishment of
the NCTC, he apparently does not support the Commission's rec-

ommendation that the head of the NCTC "must have the right to
concur in the choices of personnel to lead the operating entities,"
and that he should have the authority to jointly plan for and assign
operational responsibilities to other agencies, and should be subject
to Senate confirmation.

The DOD has expressed concern that some of the proposals of
the 9/11 Commission could make us less secure by confusing the
chain of command for military operations and by separating
warfighters from the tactical intelligence that they need on an ur-
gent basis. Our committee has a special responsibility to weigh the
impact of these proposals on the DOD and its military operations
in light of these concerns. While we are clearly involved in a dif-
ferent kind of war than the Cold War, the lines between what
might have been characterized in previous times as national or
strategic intelligence and intelligence that is more tactical have be-
come much less clear and distinct.

In trying to draw such lines, we should not overlook the fact that
the military is involved directly in the war on terrorism. Tactical
intelligence requirements of the combatant commanders include
having information on al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden and the
Taliban. That intelligence is essential in the war on terrorism. In-
deed, combatant commanders are heavily engaged in the part of
the war on terrorism, and that intelligence, therefore, is not just
"national intelligence," it is clearly tactical, critically-needed-ur-
gently intelligence.

Regardless of what responsibilities that we choose to give to the
proposed NID and the NCTC, and wherever we decide to place
these offices on the organization chart, we must take steps to avoid
the shaping and exaggeration of intelligence information to support
the policies of an administration. Independent and objective intel-
ligence is a matter of vital national importance. Objective, unvar-
nished intelligence should inform policy choices.

Policy should not drive intelligence assessments. We must take
steps in any reorganization to minimize the potential for politiciz-
ing intelligence. In that regard, placing the NID in the White
House may be problematic, because this placement would seem to
increase the likelihood of politicization rather than to decrease it.

I look forward, Mr. Chairman, as I know all of us do, to hearing
the witnesses' testimony. Again, we're very grateful to them.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.

Dr. Schlesinger, we invite you to lead off. I'd like to say to the
committee that I had the privilege of knowing Dr. Schlesinger for
many years. We served together in the DOD in 1972, 1973, and
1974. I was fortunate to work with you when you were in DCI. In
all these many years, we have maintained a close personal and pro-
fessional contact, so it's particularly enjoyable to see you here
today, and you have extraordinary experience on which to address
these issues.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SEC-
RETARY OF DEFENSE, CHAIRMAN, THE MITRE CORPORA-
TION

Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am grateful to this
committee for providing this opportunity to comment on the nature
of intelhgence and on the reforms proposed by the 9/11 Commis-
sion.

The 9/11 Commission has given us a detailed and revealing nar-
rative of events leading up to September 11. It has also proposed
a substantial reorganization of the IC, changes that do not logically
flow from the problems that the Commission identified in its nar-
rative. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to examine the Commis-
sion's proposals with care, lest in our haste, we do more harm than
good.

The Commission has rightly observed that the events leading up
to September 11 represented a failure of imagination, yet one
should not assume that changing wiring diagrams is a sure-fire
way to stimulate imagination. Imagination always has an uphill
fight in bureaucratic organizations. Creating an additional bureau-
cratic layer scarcely leads to bringing imagination to the top.

Mr. Chairman, in these brief remarks I shall attempt to discuss
the issue of intelligence reform under three headings. First, the in-
herent problems of intelligence. Second, why control of intelligence
from outside of the DOD is a particularly bad idea. Given the evo-
lution of U.S. technology and military strategy, it would not, follow-
ing your remarks, Mr. Chairman, be of help to the warfighter.
Third, to draw some implications for intelligence reform.

First, intelligence is inherently a difficult business. Intelligence
targets naturally seek to conceal what they are doing, and have a
strong tendency to mislead you. A central problem in intelligence
is to discern the true signals amidst the noise. The relevant signals
may be very weak. Without question, there is a great deal of noise.

Countless events are being recorded each day, and countless
events are failing to be recorded, or are deliberately hidden. More-
over, false signals are deliberately planted. We may talk glibly
about "connecting the dots," but that is far easier ex post than ex
ante. It is only in retrospect that one knows which dots were the
relevant dots among the countless observations and the unobserved
phenomena, and how those relevant dots should be connected.
Prior to that, one has only a mass of observations and possible evi-
dence subject to a variety of h3rpotheses and interpretations.

Mr. Chairman, if I may?

[The information referred to follows:!

One way tickets

4 Arab looking
men in aisle seats

Paid Cash

Dr. SCHLESINGER. These are the dots that we can observe in ad-
vance. They are of different phenomena, they are of different size.
There are hidden dots amongst them. After the event, certain dots
stand out, as would be these four dots. But not in advance. Then
when we look back, we can easily see, there is Mohammed Atta,
and here are one-way tickets, and there are four Arab-looking men
in aisle seats, and here they paid cash. After the event, we can see
that very clearly.

I'll slip this up there for now. I'll come back to that later.

Mr. Chairman, even if there are no preconceptions or initial bi-
ases, organizations will drift toward a structured theory of an issue
under study. Thus, an organization, any organization, develops a
concept of reality. Over time, that concept likely will harden into
a conviction or mindset that discounts observations or evidence in
conflict with the prevailing concept, and highlights observations
that seem to be supportive as evidence. Evidence to the contrary
is regularly shaken off. Thus, the quality of analysis becomes criti-
cal in providing good intelligence. That is why reducing competition
in analysis is the wrong way to go, especially in quest of the false
goal of eliminating duplication. Centralization of intelligence analy-
sis is inherently a dubious objective when there is a wide range of
consumers of intelligence with a variety of interests, responsibil-
ities, and needs.

Second, intelligence is increasingly interwoven with military op-
erations. The advance of military technology and its embodiment in
our military forces have made intelligence ever-more integral to our
military strategy and battlefield tactics and to this country's im-
mense military advantage. That military advantage is reflected in

such rubrics as information superiority, information dominance,
battlefield awareness, and net-centric warfare. In brief, it relies
upon rapid detection of targets through sensors, the rapid commu-
nication of those target locations to command centers, the assign-
ment of precisely guided weapons to those targets at the discerned
locations, and damage assessment, again communicated to com-
mand centers, to determine whether additional weapons delivered
are necessary. In all of this, the accuracy, the immediacy, and the
believability of intelligence are crucial.

Thus, in recent decades, intelligence, when wedded to command,
control, and communications (C^), has become the core of America's
battlefield dominance and military superiority. In short, C-cubed-
I (C^I) has, in itself, become almost a powerful weapons system.
But commanders in the field must have confidence that the intel-
ligence assets will be available with certainty and that information
will be reliably and quickly disseminated. It is for this reason that
plucking intelligence away from C^ has become increasingly un-
wise. C^ and intelligence should be designed and operated as an in-
tegrated whole.

It has taken many years to persuade our military commanders
that national assets will reliably be available to them in the event
of conflict. This started in the 1970s, but did not really reach fru-
ition until the Gulf War, in 1990-1991. Following your comments,
Mr. Chairman, on that Gulf War, if one talks to those who partici-
pated, like General Horner, he is still irate about the failures of the
national assets to be delivered to him in a timely way.

Sustaining that confidence of our military commanders that na-
tional assets will be designed and exercised with their wartime
needs in mind remains crucial. In the absence of such confidence,
the temptation for our combatant commanders will be to try to de-
velop intelligence assets under their own control, even if those as-
sets are inferior.

To possess intelligence assets of one's own is a time-honored goal
for virtually all major decisionmakers. That is why intelligence as-
sets are so widely distributed. That is why the perennial quest for
greater centralization has been both delusory and invariably ne-
gated.

To shift control over crucial intelligence assets outside the DOD
risks weakening the relative military advantage of the United
States, and, at the same time, creates the incentive to divert re-
sources into likely inferior intelligence capabilities which would
further reduce the available forces.

But that is not the end, Mr. Chairman. The question would be,
where does one draw the line? Take one critical example: Now cen-
tral to information dominance and to our military operations is the
Global Positioning System (GPS). It is an information system not
normally regarded as part of the IC. Nevertheless, it is critical for
effective intelligence operations and, thus, to the effectiveness of
our military forces. Does budget control over GPS also pass to an
NID?

In a complex system of systems, the perceived need to move fur-
ther, beyond what historically has been defined as intelligence, will
not cease. Historic intelligence and non-intelligence systems are

now Siamese twins. King Solomon had a comparatively easy task
in proposing to split the baby in half.

Third, intelligence management, like intelligence, itself, is an in-
herently difficult business. There are countless questions. Which
are the ones to bring to the attention of the decisionmakers? There
are countless observations. Some are relevant signals, most are
noise. Where are the missing signals? Only in retrospect can one
be sure of the answer. Regrettably, we are not clairvoyant. Predict-
ing the future is especially fraught with difficulty.

To speak of the failure of imagination is really to acknowledge
the limitations of the human intellect. Individual analysts will all
have their slightly different interpretations of what is going on.
Their viev/s must be selected and combined. Though we regularly
urge ourselves to think outside of the box, that is mostly an exhor-
tation. The problem with thinking the unthinkable is that nobody
believes you. Analysts will temper their views within the range of
acceptability. Those who stretch receptivity likely will be viewed, or
dismissed, as worrywarts, zealots, or, even worse, oddballs. That
does little to enhance one's status in the organization, or one's ca-
reer.

As mentioned earlier, organizations also have their inherent lim-
its. Different organizations will gravitate towards different ways of
organizing reality, based upon their range of responsibilities and
also on their interests, in a narrower sense.

Most individuals make themselves comfortable in their own orga-
nizations by not challenging a prevailing consensus. It would be an
immense help if management were to encourage criticism,
contrarian views that challenge the prevailing orthodoxy. One way
of doing this is to establish a devil's advocacy organization within
the larger organization to challenge the predominant beliefs. But it
is an imperfect solution; at best, an ameliorative. The individuals
assigned to such an organization will have to be protected, at the
top, from subsequent retribution.

Mr. Chairman, we should always bear in mind that intelligence
assessments, hopefully objective, will then rise through the political
hierarchy to inform the judgments of decisionmakers. Politics,
under normal conditions, is typically an engine to soothe and to re-
assure. It reflects that political imperative known as optimism.
Until the Nation is aroused, alarmist views are treated with dis-
belief.

I recall an episode in 1950 when an intelligence analyst, examin-
ing the indicators, had concluded that Chinese troops had already
been introduced, in large numbers, into North Korea, as the United
Nations command advanced towards the Yalu. The recipient — he
was peddling this tale around Washington, and ultimately reached
high into the Department of State — of his briefing listened very po-
litely. When it was over, he responded as follows, 'Toung man,
they wouldn't dare."

Moreover, national perspectives frequently are dominated by po-
litical axioms, and intelligence failures — so-called — are quite fre-
quently the failures of prevailing political axioms. In 1990, Iraq's
neighbors reassured themselves that, "An Arab state would never
attack another Arab state." In 1973, a prevailing political axiom in
Israel, an axiom which affected the intelligence, was that their

Arab neighbors would never dare attack, as long as Israel had air
superiority. Of course, I should mention the conviction — inter-
national, as well as national — that, without question, Saddam Hus-
sein has weapons of mass destruction.

The process of fashioning such a political axiom is strongly abet-
ted that, over time, any caveat coming up from lower levels in the
IC gets stripped away as information moves up the political hier-
archy.

Mr. Chairman, I trust that Congress will remember Hippocrates'
injunction, "First do no harm." In altering the structure of the IC,
it is essential to deliberate long and hard, and not to be stampeded
into doing harm.

On page 339 of the report of the 9/1 1 Commission, the commis-
sioners wisely state, "In composing this narrative, we have tried to
remember that we write with the benefit and the handicap of hind-
sight. Hindsight can sometimes see the past clearly, with 20-20 vi-
sion, but the path of what happens is so brightly lit that it places
everything else more deeply into shadow."

Mr. Chairman, our understanding of past events becomes perfect
only in hindsight, if then. There will never be any corresponding
perfection in intelligence organizations, which necessarily must op-
erate with foresight. Reform may now be necessary. Yet in the vain
pursuit of a perfect intelligence organizations, do not shake up in-
telligence in a way that does do harm and, in pursuit of this will-
of-the-wisp perfection, damage, in particular, those military capa-
bilities that we alone possess.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger follows:]

Prepared Statement by Dr. James R. Schlesinger

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am grateful to the committee for pro-
viding this opportunity to comment on the nature of intelHgence and the reforms
suggested by the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission has given us a detailed
and revealing narrative of events leading up to September 11. It has also proposed
a substantial reorganization of the Intelligence Community (IC) — changes that do
not logically flow from the problems that the commission identified in its narrative.
It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to examine the commission's proposals with care,
lest in our haste we do more harm than good. The commission has rightly observed
that the events leading up to September 11 represent "a failure of imagination." Yet,
one should not assume that changing wiring diagrams is a sure fire way to stimu-
late imagination. Imagination always has an up-hill fight in bureaucratic organiza-
tions. Creating an additional bureaucratic layer scarcely leads to bringing imagina-
tion to the top.

Mr. Chairman, in these brief remarks, I shall attempt to discuss the issue of intel-
ligence reform under three headings: first, the inherent problems of intelligence; sec-
ond, why control of intelligence from outside of the Department of Defense is a par-
ticularly bad idea, given the evolution of U.S. technology and military strategy; and,
third, to draw some implications for intelligence reform.

1. Intelligence is inherently a difficult business. Intelligence targets naturally seek
to conceal what they are doing — and have a strong tendency to mislead you. The
central problem in intelligence is to discern the true signals amidst the noise. The
relevant signals may be very weak and, without question, there is a great deal of
noise. Countless events are being recorded each day — and countless events are fail-
ing to be recorded or are deliberately hidden. Moreover, false signals are delib-
erately planted. We talk ghbly about "connecting the dots," but that is far easier
ex-post than ex-ante. It is only in retrospect that one knows which dots were the
relevant dots, among the countless observations and unobserved phenomena — and
how those relevant dots should be connected. Prior to that, one has only a mass of
observations and possible evidence — subject to a variety of h5T)otheses and interpre-
tations.

Even if there are no preconceptions, or initial biases, organizations will drift to-
ward a structured theory of an issue under study. Thus, an organization — any orga-
nization — develops a concept of reality. Over time, that concept likely will harden
into a conviction or mindset that discounts observations or evidence in conflict with
the prevailing concept and highlights observations that seem to be supportive as evi-
dence. Evidence to the contrary is regularly shaken off.

Thus, the quality of analysis becomes critical in providing good intelligence. That
is why reducing competition in analysis is the wrong way to go — especially in quest
of the false goal of eliminating duplication. Centralization of intelligence is inher-
ently a dubious objective, when there is a wide range of consumers of intelligence —
with a variety of interests, responsibiUties, and needs.

2. Intelligence is increasingly interwoven with military operations. The advance
of military technology and its embodiment in our military forces have made intel-
ligence ever more integral to our military strategy and battlefield tactics and to this
coimtry's immense military advantage. That military advantage is reflected in such
rubrics as "information superiority," "information dominance," "battlefield aware-
ness," and "net-centric warfare." In brief, it relies upon rapid detection of targets
through sensors, the rapid communication of those target locations to command cen-
ters, the assignment of precisely-guided weapons to those targets at the discerned
locations, and damage assessment, again communicated to command centers, to de-
termine whether additional weapons are necessary. In all of this, the accuracy, the
immediacy, and the believability of intelligence is crucial.

Thus, in recent decades, intelligence, when wedded to command, control, and com-
munications, has become the core of America's battlefield dominance and military
superiority. In short, C^I has in itself almost become a powerful weapon-system. But
commanders in the field must have confidence that the intelligence assets will be
available with certainty and that information will be reliably and quickly dissemi-
nated. It is for this reason that plucking intelligence away from command, control,
and communications has become increasingly unwise. They should be designed and
operated as an integrated whole.

To illustrate the now-enhanced role of intelligence in the system-of-systems that
under girds U.S. military advantage, I have included as a backup an illustration
from Vision 2020, with which you likely are familiar. It illustrates the crucial role
of information superiority in binding together the seversd aspects of military engage-
ment to achieve battlefield dominance.

It has taken many years to persuade military commanders that national assets
will reliably be available to them in the event of conflict. This started in the 1970s,
but did not really reach fruition until the Gulf War in 1990-1991. Sustaining that
confidence of our military commanders that national assets will be designed and ex-
ercised with their wartime needs in mind remains crucial. In the absence of such
confidence, the temptation for our combatant commanders will be to try to develop
intelligence assets under their own control, even if they are inferior. To possess in-
telligence assets of one's own is time-honored for virtually all major decision-mak-
ers. That is why intelligence assets are so widely distributed. That is why the peren-
nial quest for greater centralization has been both delusory and invariably negated.

To shift control over crucial intelligence assets outside the Department of Defense
risks weakening the relative military advantage of the United States — and at the
same time creates the incentive to divert resources into (likely inferior) intelligence
capabilities, which would further reduce the available forces.

But that is not the end. The question is: where does one draw the line? Take one
critical example. Now central to information dominance and to our military oper-
ations is the Global Positioning System (GPS). It is an information system, not nor-
mally regarded as part of the IC. Nevertheless, it is critical for effective intelligence
operations — and thus to the effectiveness of our military forces. Does budget control
over GPS also pass to a Director of National Intelligence? In a complex system-of-
systems, the perceived need to move further beyond what historically has been de-
fined as intelligence — will not cease. Historic intelligence and non-intelligence sys-
tems are now Siamese twins. King Solomon had a comparatively easy task in pro-
posing to split the baby in half.

3. Intelligence management, like intelligence itself, is an inherently difficult busi-
ness. There are countless questions. Which are the important ones to bring to the
attention of the decisionmakers? There are countless observations. Some are rel-
evant signals; most are noise. Where are the missing signals? Only in retrospect can
one be sure of the answer. Regrettably, we are not clairvoyant. Predicting the future
is especially fraught with difficulty.

To speak of the "failure of imagination" is really to acknowledge the limitations
of the human intellect. Individual analysts will all have their slightly different in-
terpretations of what is going on. Their views must be selected and combined.

Though we regularly are urged to "think outside the box," that is mostly an exhor-
tation. The problem with "thinking the unthinkable" is that — nobody believes you!
Analysts will temper their views within the range of acceptability. Those who
stretch receptivity likely will be viewed — or dismissed — as "worrywarts, zealots, or
even worse, oddballs." That does little to enhance one's status in the organization
or one's career.

As mentioned earlier, organizations also have their inherent limits. Different or-
ganizations will gravitate towards different ways of organizing reality — based upon
their range of responsibilities and, also, their interests in a narrower sense. Most
individuals make themselves comfortable in their own organizations by not chal-
lenging a prevailing consensus. The only solution within an organization is to estab-
lish a Devil's Advocacy organization to challenge the prevailing beliefs. But, it is an
imperfect solution, at best an ameliorative, and the individuals assigned to such an
organization will have to be protected at the top from subsequent retribution.

Mr. Chairman, we should always bear in mind that intelligence assessments,
hopefully objective, will then rise through the political hierarchy to inform the judg-
ment of decisionmakers. Politics, under normal conditions, is t3T)ically an engine to
soothe and to reassure. (It reflects that political imperative known as optimism.)
Until the Nation is aroused, alarmist views are treated with disbelief. I recall an
episode in 1950, when an intelligence analyst, examining the indicators, had con-
cluded that the Chinese had already introduced large numbers of troops into North
Korea, as the United Nations command advanced. He was pedaling this tale around
Washington and ultimately reached high into the State Department. The recipient
of his briefing listened very politely. When it was over, he responded as follows:
"Young man, they wouldn't dare."

Moreover, national perspectives frequently are dominated by political axioms —
and intelligence failures, so-called, are quite frequently the failures of prevailing po-
litical axioms. In 1990, Iraq's neighbors reassured themselves that "an Arab state
would never attack another Arab state." In 1973, a prevailing political axiom in
Israel (which affected intelligence) was that their Arab neighbors would never at-
tack as long as Israel had air superiority. Of course, I should mention the convic-
tion, international as well as national, that "without question, Saddam Hussein has
weapons of mass destruction." The process of fashioning such a political axiom is
strongly abetted that over time any caveats coming up from lower levels in the IC
get stripped away as information moves up the political hierarchy.

Mr. Chairman, I trust that Congress will remember Hippocrates' injunction:
"First, do no harm." In altering the structure of the IC, it is essential to deliberate
long and hard — and not to be stampeded into doing harm. On page 339 of the Re-
port of the 9/11 Commission, the commissioners wisely state:

"In composing this narrative, we have tried to remember that we write with
the benefit and the handicap of hindsight. Hindsight can sometimes see the
past clearly — with 20/20 vision. But the path of what happened is so bright-
ly lit that it places everything else more deeply into shadow."

Mr. Chairman, our understanding of past events becomes perfect only in hind-
sight — if then. There will never be any corresponding perfection in intelligence orga-
nization — which necessarily must operate with foresight. Reform may now be nec-
essary. Yet, in the vain pursuit of a perfect intelligence organization, do not shake
up intelligence in a way that does do harm — and in pursuit of this will of the wisp,
damage, in particular, those military capabilities that we alone possess.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be pleased to answer any questions that you
or members of the committee may have.

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger. That's a very
strong and clear message.

Secretary Carlucci, I'd Hke to also advise my colleagues, that
while you are best known, maybe, for serving as SECDEF, you also
served as the Deputy to the Director of CIA for some 4 years, am
I not correct?

Mr. Carlucci. Three years.

Chairman WARNER. So, much like Dr. Schlesinger, you've worked
at both of those agencies and the Department.

Mr. Carlucci. Yes, sir.

STATEMENT OF FRANK C. CARLUCCI, FORMER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, THE CARLYLE GROUP

Mr. Caelucci. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for in-
cluding me with this distinguished panel.

Senator Levin, members of the committee, I think this hearing
is very important because any organization, any reorganization —
and I've been through a number — is disruptive. You have to be cer-
tain that the long-term gain exceeds the short-term loss. You also
have to be certain that the solution fits the problem.

Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement. I'm going to sum-
marize it, with your permission.

Chairman Warner. Without objection, it will be admitted into
the record.

Mr. Carlucci. We need to be sure that the solution fits the prob-
lem. It's tempting, because we have 15 organizations with the label
"intelligence" on them, to say they ought to be under common man-
agement. But as Jim Schlesinger has just pointed out, some com-
petition, particularly among the analytical agencies, is, indeed,
healthy; I would argue, necessary.

As this committee is well aware, unity of command is necessary
for any military operation. So is intelligence, and Jim Schlesinger
has discussed that in some detail, and I agree with virtually every-
thing he has said.

The failings of September 11, as I read the report, were in the
areas of human resources intelligence (HUMINT) and analysis.
These can be improved without disrupting the DOD chain of com-
mand. The CSAs are already subject to the DCI's programming and
budgeting authority, as you, Mr. Chairman, pointed out in your
opening statement. The DCI has the concurring authority on peo-
ple. I question whether much more is needed. It is true that DIA,
on the analytical side, competes with CIA in some areas, but that
is, by and large, healthy.

I cannot find in the 9/11 Commission Report a convincing case
that September 11 stemmed from any Pentagon failure to coordi-
nate. The dots problems were mainly between domestic and foreign
intelligence — and intelligence, on the one hand, and law enforce-
ment, on the other — and the NCTC, as proposed by the 9/11 Com-
mission, should go a long way to solving these problems.

I would have the center report to the DCI. I do not favor the cre-
ation of an NID, certainly not in the White House, for reasons. Sen-
ator Levin, that you have already discussed. I lived through that,
as National Security Advisor, in the wake of Iran-Contra.

The dilemma is that if you give teeth to the NID, you risk dis-
rupting combat support, as Jim has described in some detail, you
disrupt the unity of command, and you have agency heads in one
department, DOD, reporting to somebody outside that depart-
ment — hardly a healthy relationship. If you don't give teeth to the
NID, then you've created a useless layer. In either case, you've
weakened the DCI, and you've created a competitor to the National
Security Advisor.

A better approach, in my judgment, at least one that's less dis-
ruptive, would be to set up the NCTC and strengthen the DCI's au-
thority in areas where analysis may show it's needed. I question
whether it's needed. I think, Senator Lieberman and Senator

Levin, you heard this morning from former Director Stansfield
Turner, that he had plenty of authority at the time he was director.
I can vouch for that, because I was his deputy, as I think you men-
tioned this morning. So I question how much more is needed. It
may be just a question of exercising existing authority.

There's been a lot of focus on the organizational issue. Let me
mention some other shortcomings which I think are at least as im-
portant. They are not mentioned — some of them are not mentioned
in the 9/11 Commission Report.

I see no mention of better trade-craft in the recruitment of hard
targets. I learned many years ago, as a Foreign Service Officer
(FSO) in the field working with case officers, that the best way to
recruit is to be able to protect sources and methods, or at least
have the perception that you can protect sources and methods.

Unfortunately, the perception out in the real world is that our
country can't protect sources and methods. I can remember, when
I was Deputy DCI, the head of a European Intelligence Service say-
ing to me, "Frank, we don't give you all our information, because
you can't keep a secret." Imagine, Senators, that you were an Iraqi
under Saddam Hussein, and a CIA case officer came to you, and
you took a look at the leaks coming out of the U.S. Government —
there are a couple of investigations underway already — the Free-
dom of Information Act being applied to the CIA, and the prolifera-
tion of oversight committees. Would you put your name on the
rolls? All the skilled in the world won't do us any good in that se-
cretive part of the world unless we do a better job of keeping our
own secrets.

The Commission did have some positive recommendations to
make on the classification of information and on congressional
oversight. But, in general, they were hostile to the need-to-know
principle. I can't imagine distributing information to people who
don't need to know. I think we need to retain the need-to-know
principle.

Good collection of intelligence entails risk-taking in the recruit-
ment process. Ever since the days of the Church Committee, we
have discouraged risk in our intelligence organizations. We've in-
dicted professionals for carrying out their responsibility. We've
made it more complicated, or put a chill on the recruitment of peo-
ple with human-rights violations on their record, when, indeed,
those are some of the very people we need to be going after.

Sure, there are failures, and we need to determine why those
failures came about; but there are also successes, largely
unheralded, and we should not risk the successes by excessive fin-
ger-pointing at the failures.

Final point is resources. I think we can all agree that, in the
1990s, we shortchanged DOD, State, and our intelligence agencies.
The rebuilding process is underway, thanks to members of this
committee, among others, but it will take longer to rebuild than it
takes to tear down. When I think of the length of time required to
recruit, train, organize hard-cover for intelligence case officers, I
agree with George Tenet when he says the rebuilding process will
take 5 years. Let's hope that we don't prolong this process by hasty
and ill-advised organizational moves.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carlucci follows:]

Prepared Statement by Frank C. Carlucci

Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee: It is a pleasure to ap-
pear before you today and I commend you for holding these hearings. Reorganiza-
tions are always disruptive and we must be certain the long-term gain outweighs
the inevitable short-term loss.

We must also be certain the solution fits the problem. Just because 15 agencies
carry an intelligence label doesn't mean they all should be integrated. Indeed man-
aged competition is a healthy component of good intelligence.

Unity of command is essential for military operations. So is good intelligence, as
the 9/11 report acknowledges. Leaving aside the reluctance of policy makers to act
on warning, the failings of September 11 appear to be principally in HUMINT and
analysis. Improving HUMINT can be done without disrupting the Pentagon chain
of command. Eighty percent of the Intelligence budget is frequently cited as dis-
proportional DOD control. These assets are mainly in the hardware area and hence
very costly. The NRO, NSA and NGA are already subject to the DCI's budgeting
and programming authority. I question whether further DCI control is needed or de-
sirable. The service HUMINT operations are largely tactical and nobody proposes
separating them. DIA's HUMINT largely comes through the Attache System and is
coordinated by Ambassadors at the local level. DIA's analytical effort can and should
compete with that of CIA.

I fail to find in the 9/11 report a convincing case that the September 11 problem
stemmed from the failure of the Pentagon agencies to coordinate. On the contrary,
the "dots" problem seems to be mainly between the CIA and the FBI on the one
hand, and law enforcement and intelligence on the other, not with DOD. TTIC and
the Patriot Act have gone a long way to solving some of these problems. The
Counterterrorism Center, which would build on TTIC, is a good idea despite the
dangers of putting intelligence and operational planning close to each other.

I beUeve the Counterterrorism Center should report to the DCI. I do not favor cre-
ating the post of NID, certainly not in the White House where it would be too close
to both the political and the policy process. Its main value would be to serve as a
coordinator of domestic and international intelligence. The dilemma is that if you
give the NID budget and personnel authority over DOD, even if he or she is not
in the White House, you jeopardize combat support and disrupt the military unity
of command. You also create a competitor to the National Security Advisor. On the
other hand, if you don't give the NID budget and personnel authority, you add a
useless layer and weaken the DCI in the process. A better approach would be to
set up the Counterterrorism Center and strengthen the DCI's concurring authority
over the CSA's where it may be inadequate. The main thing though is to make sure
the DCI has clout over both the CIA and the FBI.

If one goal is to improve HUMINT there are shortcomings more important than
organizational structure. They are not dealt with in the 9/11 report. I learned as
an FSO working with case officers in the field that the key to good HUMINT is the
ability to protect sources and methods, or better said the perception that we can
protect sources and methods. In the intelligence business perception is as important
as fact.

Unfortunately the widespread perception is that we can't protect our sources and
methods. I can recall the head of a major European Intelligence Service telling me
when I was DDCI that he withheld information from us because we "couldn't keep
a secret."

Imagine you were an Iraqi under Saddam Hussein and a CIA case officer ap-
proached you. Knowing about extensive leaks, the constant pressure on the Agency
(including by the 9/11 Commission) to reveal more information, the use of FOIA to
reveal CIA material and multiple congressional oversight committees, would you
want your name on the rolls? All the skilled Arabist's in the world won't be able
to recruit in the highly secretive Middle East unless we commit to better protection
of sources and methods.

The commission did make some positive recommendations for a tiered classifica-
tion system and streamlined congressional oversight but their overall thrust was to
abolish "need to know" and have a more open intelligence process — an oxymoron.
It is good to disseminate information, but the dissemination process is useless un-
less there is reliable information to disseminate. One source compromised means
many sources not recruited.

Grood collection also requires risk taking. Much of our approach to intelligence
since the Church Committee has been to discourage risk. Whether it is indicting
professionals for canying out policy or making it complicated to recruit human

rights violators we have put a chill on entrepreneurial activity. There will be fail-
ures and we should determine why, but there are successes, largely unheralded, and
we should not risk them by seizing on every failure to point fingers of blame.

A final word on resources. They are needed. It is clear we cut DOD, State, and
Intelligence too much in the 1990s — over 30 percent. The capability we lost can be
rebuilt but not as quickly as it was eliminated. Bearing in mind the time required
to recruit, train and organize effective cover in tightly closed societies or terrorist
groups I think George Tenet's estimate of 5 years is on the mark. I hope we don't
prolong that period by making the wrong organizational moves.

Chairman Wakner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Another strong
statement, very clear in your views.
Secretary Hamre?

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN J. HAMRE, FORMER DEPUTY SEC-
RETARY OF DEFENSE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES

Dr. Hamre. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, thank you for in-
viting me.

I acknowledge I come here with severe disadvantage, compared
to my colleagues at this table who have such deep richness of tal-
ent and experience compared to me, but I do have the indisputable
advantage in that I worked for all of you for 10 years. So I throw
myself on your mercy, and hope that you remember kindly your
children. [Laughter.]

Chairman WARNER. Before you further demean your creden-
tials [Laughter. ]

— let me point out that you perhaps have as much experience as
any of us with regard to the issue of budgeting. In the course of
the colloquy here between my colleagues and myself and the wit-
nesses, we will try and define your individual views on that.

Dr. Hamre. I'd be happy to respond to that, sir.

Chairman WARNER. You do have experience there.

Dr. Hamre. I do, sir. Thank you.

Let me say, I am grateful to the work of the 9/11 Commission
for having opened up, for all of us, a debate we really should have
as a country. How do we need to organize our intelligence services
that support us in this important endeavor to protect the country?
As I've written before, my concern about the recommendations that
flow from them is that they are organizing, or reorganizing, the IC
too narrowly around one set of problems.

Yes, the connect-the-dot problem is very real, and we do need to
anticipate, in our structure, how we try to solve that problem. Just
as important, in my view, is the collective narrowness of thinking
that's endemic in the intelligence process when it's supporting deci-
sionmaking. Those two, I think, are, frankly, in tension with each
other.

If you try to organize the entire IC around one dimension, con-
necting the dots, frankly, I feel that we're going to make it much
susceptible for a narrowness and a group-think to set in if we put
everj^hing under one person. If, by contrast, we try to keep broad
diversity in the IC, as we have now, we have a coordination prob-
lem. So it's these two, I think, that we have to try to solve simulta-
neously.

My concern about the 9/11 Commission is that it creates an NID
and tries to coordinate by bringing all of the budget and personnel
control under his authority. I must tell you, I would be very uneasy
with that, having been the Comptroller in the DOD, and having
been the Deputy Secretary. To have a major element of my depart-
ment really working for another cabinet individual is, I think, a
real mistake. You can't help but have that become a source of great
friction over time, and I think that would not be healthy.

I also think it is really not a good idea to strip away from the
Cabinet Secretaries their assessment capacity to evaluate intel-
ligence on their own. They need to come into a meeting with the
President — and, frankly, come before all of you in hearings on the
Hill — with their own independent capacity to reach a judgment, not
just simply receiving it from a central authority.

So I do not think it's a good idea to focus in such a narrow way
that we get one point of view coming out of an IC. I really think
a far greater risk lies in having that too narrowly constrained, and
for Cabinet Secretaries, like these two gentlemen, not to come be-
fore you in a hearing, or not to come before the President, to make
their case on their own assessment.

Now, I've seen what the Commission has recommended, what
Senator Kerry has recommended, and I've seen what the President
has recommended. I, probably much like my two colleagues here,
think that the current situation is preferable to the two that are
on the table before you. I, personally, think that the 9/11 Comniis-
sion's recommendation would create a very dysfunctional situation
in the executive branch. But I also think that the President's rec-
ommendation is going to create a very weak NID and, the way it
was announced, could weaken the CIA in the process. I think that's
a step back.

So I come to a conclusion. If the politics is going to drive us to
have an NID, then, I have to conclude, we have to find a way to
make that individual have some genuine heft in the process.
They're not going to be strong just simply running interagency co-
ordination structures. They're going to have to have institutional
depth.

So my recommendation, which I realize is controversial, would be
to move the intelligence factories — and that is the NRO, the NSA,
and the NGA — under the NID. Just the factories.

Now, some have asked me why do I not recommend that we
move HUMINT. Frankly, those aren't factories. Those are artisan
craft shops, and I don't think they're of the same scale. I think we
should keep them where they are. I think they ought to be with
the CIA and, to a lesser extent, the DOD or the Defense Human
Intelligence Service. I think you should leave them there. But the
factories that produce the raw material, I feel could be brought
under this and give genuine depth to the NID.

Now, Secretary Schlesinger rightly raised how crucial it is for us,
in the DOD, to have reliable intelligence for our warfighting. It
isn't a matter of just getting a finished intelligence product. We
need the electrons. We need the electrons on the battlefield, almost
in real time, to be able to do our job.

Now, I will say that a good number of those platforms that
produce tactical intelligence are under the management and control

of the DOD already, and that would not change by moving the par-
ent of the NSA to this new NID. But I do think that there would
be problems that would emerge if you were to move the factories
over under this individual. But I think they're manageable prob-
lems. At least I know how I would manage it if I were to do that.
We come to this — we, DOD — would come to this with considerable
clout, frankly. Each of those three agencies would collapse if we
pulled out our people and our resources.

Dr. Schlesinger said that there would be a tendency to reproduce
those capabilities. Frankly, we can't afford it. I mean, we are going
to rationalize our process. We've had to do that by the expense of
these platforms already.

So I think that there would be a — no question, there would be
some tensions, but I think it is something we could manage. I, per-
sonally, would recommend that the deputies — myself, if I had been
in the job, the deputy — or the Vice Chief of the Joint Chiefs, as well
as other deputies — serve as a board of directors to the NID on,
really, a daily basis, to ensure that we're getting the kind of sup-
port and product that we need.

As I said, I don't think this is — I propose this really because I'm
trying to find a path. If it is inevitable that we're going to have an
NID split away from the CIA, we have to have a strong position,
and I think this is a plausible way to do it, although I do acknowl-
edge that there are going to be some challenges. I look forward to
answering your questions or talking with you about them.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hamre follows:]

Prepared Statement by Dr. John J. Hamre

Chairman Warner, Ranking Member Levin, distinguished members of the com-
mittee, thank you for inviting me to participate in this critical hearing. I am grate-
ful that you are undertaking this review. How we organize our government to un-
dertake critical intelligence is one of the most fundamental problems we face. We
need your thoughtful review and considered judgment. This is not something to
rush. Please take your time to think through these issues carefully.

With your permission, I would ask that you accept as my statement a copy of the
article I wrote that appeared Monday in the Washington Post. It outlines everything
I would otherwise want to say this morning. I would like to amplify on that state-
ment, however, to discuss the implications this holds for the Defense Department.

Let me say at the outset that American warfighting is more dependent on intel-
ligence today than at any time in our history. The globe is not getting smaller; our
forces are, so we have to get maximum efficiency by being precise in our planning
and operation. We depend on superb tactical intelligence.

A good deal of those capabilities are organic to our operating forces. But we also
depend on the intelligence support we receive from the National Security Agency
(NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National RJeconnais-
sance Office. I honestly believe we can count on that support and have it tactically
relevant, even if those organizations are transferred to a new central intelligence
organization under a new DNL But there are some steps we should take.

First, I believe we should continue to send our military personnel to those institu-
tions, even after transfer. Frankly we need to do that because we don't have the
rotation base exclusively within the military services to support our force structure
and manage our personnel. We need the wider job rotation base that these agencies
provide. So it is in our interests for two reasons — to insure they continue to focus
on us and to insure that our best tactical intelligence operators have a rotation base.

Second, I would explicitly establish a very senior board of directors to oversee the
new department. These individuals would actually be representatives for the Cabi-
net Secretaries who have the constitutional missions assigned them by the Presi-
dent. The Intelligence Community (IC) should be accountable to them, and we need
a standing structure that insures that oversight and accountability.

Third, I believe that we are on the edge of a new set of military intelligence plat-
forms — long dwell unmanned vehicles is a good example — that provide needed tac-

tical intelligence, but which also feed the national system. I would make those DOD
investments and keep them in the Defense Department. We already know how to
jointly task them for tactical and national missions.

Fourth, I think the two Armed Services Committees need to strengthen their
oversight of intelligence. But the focus should be on outputs, not on inputs. Too
much of the oversight today is devoted to the review of the annual budget inputs
to the system, not an assessment of the capabilities we get from the systems. Your
oversight will help insure that the new intelligence system is responsive to our
warfighters.

Thank you for inviting me to participate today. I am pleased to answer any ques-
tions you have at the appropriate point.

Washington Post

A Better Way to Improve Intelligence:

The National Director Should Oversee Only the Agencies That Gather Data

By John Harare

Monday, August 9, 2004; Page A15

It's refreshing to have a big debate in Washington. Too often our debates are small and arcane.
The Sept. 1 1 commission has touched off a much- needed debate of constitutional proportions:
How do we best organize the intelligence functions of the government to protect the nation, yet
oversee those ftmctions to protect our citizens from the government?

The commission has rendered an enormous contribution to the nation. But its recommendations
need to be the starting point for a great debate, not the final word. Political passions are rising,
which portends danger. The American system of government is designed to move sbwly, for
good reason. Such a big and complex country needs to fully consider all the implications of
major changes. We make mistakes when we move quickly, and we can't afford to make a
mistake here.

Good as they are, the commission's recommendations are too narrowly centered on one problem.
This is understandable. The commission was established to examine the problems the
government had detecting and preventing the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 . By defmition,
that was a matter of coordination among elements of the government, both vertically widiin
organizations and horizontally across institutions. This is often referred to as the "cormect the
dots" problem.

But that isn't the only trouble with the intelligence community. Before the war m Iraq, the policy
and intelligence communities held the near-unanimous conviction that Iraq was chock fuU of
chemical and biological weapons, yet we found nothing. We collectively embraced a iiniform
mind-set, which is every bit as serious a problem as connecting the dots.

The field of view of our intelligence community is too narrow. The conununity is relatively
small and its component institutions isolated. It is understandably and necessarily preoccupied
with protecting sources and methods. And bureaucracies naturally fight for resources. In that
environment, intelligence bureaucrats, like bureaucrats in any organization, strive to please their
policy bosses. Taken together, these factors contribute to an endemic narrowness of perspective.
The shorthand label given to this problem is "groupthink."

We need to fight that narrowness by creating more competition for ideas in the intelligence
assessment world. The competition among ideas is improved when different organizations
reporting to different bosses compete for better insights and perspectives. Bringing together the

entire intelligence community under a single boss who exercises budget and personnel control
would further constrain the constructive competition we need within the inteUigence commimity.

The two great problems — connecting the dots and avoiding groupthink — are in tension with
each other. Implementing an organizational solution to just one of the problems will worsen the
other.

The great debate underway in Washington has two camps. The Sept 1 1 conunission. Sen. John
Kerry and many congressional leaders believe a new director of national intelligence (DNI) can
succeed only if the person in that job controls the budgets and personnel of the intelligence
agencies. People in this camp would leave the agencies with their host departments but give the
budgets and control of personnel to the new director.

President Bush chose a different path. His plan would create a relatively weak DNI, whose
power would come firom managing a set of interagency processes and supervising a set of ill-
defmed new centers. Unfortunately, if unintentionally, this approach also diminishes the
bureaucratic standing of the CIA.

In sum, both approaches are flawed. I know from personal e)q)erience in government that
ambiguous command authority is dangerous. Keeping intelligence agencies within a department
whose budgets and senior leadership depend on people outside the (tepartment won't work.
Similarly, we have a long history to demonstrate that the power and standing of central
coordinators of interagency processes -- Washington policy wonks now call them "czars" ~
deteriorate rapidly with time.

More fimdamentally, each of these two approaches solves one of the great problems but
exacerbates the other. The Sept. 1 1 conMnission's proposal would improve "dot- connecting" but
would threaten competition among ideas. The president's recommendation would better sustain
idea competition but do little to solve the problem of interagency coordination.

Frankly, I didn't favor the idea of creating a DNI, but I understand poUtics. Both political leaders
in a hotly contested campaign have endorsed it as a symbol. We will have a DNI. We now have
to ensure tiiat we get a good solution. There is a third patL

The new DNI should run the existing interagency intelligence centers or their successors and
coordinate the tasking process. But the DNI needs to be imdergirded with real institutional
power. The technical collection agencies -- notably the National Reconnaissance Office, the
National Securiy Agency and the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency — could be
transferred to the DNI. The new director would manage the factories that provide raw material
and support to the intelligence bureaus, which would remain within the Cabinet departments.

This approach would facilitate the integration of data collection while preserving diversity of
perspective across the community for purposes of strategic assessment. Cabinet secretaries could
devote their energies to demanding better analysis, rather than managing large bureaucracies that
run machines to collect raw material for the intelligence process. This approach also would
ensure that oversight of domestic surveillance on American citizens remained a responsibility of

the attorney general, who is charged with protecting our civil liberties. Even here, however, the
FBI could turn to the central collection agency, but under the attorney general's supervision.

My friends in the Defense Department are shocked that I have suggested this approach. Modem
American war- fighting is more dependent on high- technology intelligence than ever before, they
note. We carmot decouple the close working ties between our intelligence capabilities and our
war fighters.

But there are ways to ensure that we sustain those close working ties, We should continue to
send our best military personnel to work in these agencies and to support national collection
efforts with tactical military intelligence systems. The DNI shoiild have a board of directors
made up of senior operators fix)m die supported departments. And imderlying it all is what I
know to be true: that all civilian employees in diese agencies consider it their highest priority to
support the American warrior in combat. That will not change, even if these institutions report
directly to a DNI.

Yes, there will be challei^es and problems, but they are manageable. It is said that the
intelligence community needs a reform like that of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which
transformed the Defense Department In fact, Goldwater-Nichols changed the Defense
Department because it institutionalized demand for better capabilities fi-om the military services.
The Pentagon fiercely fought Goldwater-Nichols when it was proposed by Congress. Now it
swears by its results. We have proved in the Defense Department that we can bring competing
institutions together for a common purpose without forcing people to wear a conunon uniform.

TTie writer is president and chief executive of the Center for Strategic & International Studies
and a former deputy secretary of defense. The views expressed here are his own.

Chairman Warner. Thank you. The committee will now proceed
to its 6-minute round. I'll start off with Dr. Schlesinger.

On page 4 — I repeat your testimony — "To shift control over cru-
cial intelligence assets outside the DOD risks weakening the rel-
ative military advantage of the United States," and so on. The op-
erative word is "to shift control."

Then I look at the statement by the National Security Advisor
to the President, Ms. Rice, and she said the following, "We expect
that the NID would have significant input into the development of
a budget." Now, that's not shifting control in the President's posi-
tion. Now, I recognize September 11 is on a different

But let's go back and explore. Is there a bridge between these
two "poles," so to speak, of shifting absolute control and the ques-
tion of significant input? May I suggest the following, which I have
mentioned pubhcly, and that is, let the SECDEF retain the budget
structure, the actual people who work on all of these things and
put it together. It's very complicated. We're talking about tens of
thousands of people in these various agencies, am I not correct in
that?

Dr. Schlesinger. Yes.

Chairman Warner. Tens of thousands of people. Leave them
put. Let the SECDEF create the budget, but in coordination with
the NID, allowing the maximum of input. At the time, presumably
and optimally, when they would have a concurrence on the various

points — that they would then jointly submit that budget to the
President so that there would be accountability to both individuals.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I have little problem with that. I think that
Frank has already observed that we have moved a long way in that
direction. I think that both Don Rumsfeld and George Tenet would
say that they already have that degree of collaboration. This might
formalize it.

Chairman WARNER. I think that would be the objective of the
legislation, which I hope, by the way, would not be driven by poli-
tics. Dr. Hamre. I hope it would be driven by good sense.

So on that point, you feel that that is a bridge between some of
the poles here.

Mr. Carlucci. Yes.

Chairman WARNER. Would you like to speak to that, Secretary
Carlucci?

Mr. Carlucci. I think already, or at least when I was in the
CIA, the Director put together the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP), which was then worked out with the SECDEF. I
can remember when I was in the job John Hamre was in, as Dep-
uty Secretary of Defense, I persuaded the Office of Management
and Budget (0MB) to let me determine the intelligence budget, be-
cause it was a straight tradeoff with the DOD budget, because the
President had already determined the top line of the DOD budget.
I gave intelligence a higher growth rate than I gave DOD. So a col-
laborative relationship already exists, and I think your suggestion
is appropriate.

Chairman WARNER. In your study of the 9/11 report, and in my
study, I'm not sure that they recognize fully the extent to which
this is currently done. Am I correct in that observation?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that's correct, Mr. Chairman. If you re-
call, I think that what they're sa5ring is, we have failed to connect
the dots.

Chairman Warner. Right.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That does not mean that there's not coordina-
tion on the budget.

Chairman WARNER. No. I think we've reached consensus.

Dr. Hamre, how do you feel? You've had a lot of experience.

Dr. Hamre. I sure have, and I've put together eight budgets, four
of them as the comptroller, then four when I was in the deputy's
job. To be honest, there's not nearly the close review of the intel-
ligence budget that people think there is. When you look at what
we submit to all of you, it's really quite skimpy by comparison to
what it is that you ask that we submit for the DOD. There is co-
ordination, but it's really quite limited.

To be candid, I think the quality of oversight inside the executive
branch isn't as strong as it ought to be of the intelligence, so that
ought to be strengthened. But I think the reason it hasn't been,
frankly, so strong is that there has been a de facto tug-of-war be-
tween DOD and the IC over who has the lead. In that struggle,
frankly, that — just really has not dug into it as deeply as we prob-
ably should have.

Chairman WARNER. All right, then do you feel that the creation
of the post of NID, with what I outlined, is a joint responsibility?
While the people would be retained in the DOD, the actual work

product would be coordinated carefully with the NID, and then
they would both sign off on it, and both names would appear as it
goes to the President. Do you think that would help remove some
of the criticisms?

Dr. Hamre. I think that that is, as the secretaries have said,
quite similar to what's done now. It needs to be strengthened, no
matter what. Is it going to get better by creating the NID? Not nec-
essarily. It isn't necessarily going to be better if you create the
NID. The process is weak right now because there are two bosses
and there are two separate chains, and, frankly, there's a lot of am-
biguity between those two chains. That's, frankly, replicated up
here on the Hill. We've divided the oversight of the intelligence
budgets and the armed services budgets.

Chairman WARNER. But that's a separate problem, budgets.

Dr. Hamre. So we see this throughout the system.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman WARNER. Yes?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
Energy jointly sign off on the stockpile requirements for our nu-
clear weapons. There is also a Nuclear Weapons Council that is
made up of members of the DOD and Energy Department, and that
may be the model you're seeking.

Chairman WARNER. Right. Let me just take it to the next step,
and that is the hiring and firing. Here, I draw on some modest ex-
perience I had in 5 years working for you, Jim, and the two prede-
cessors. Laird, Elliott, Richardson — three of them. The heads of
DIA, traditionally — NSA — have been military officers. I can recall
that each of the military secretaries were asked to nominate — you
recognize that, too, in your experience — and maybe a dozen or more
individuals. The SECDEF, together with the secretaries of the mili-
tary departments, really had a lot of personal knowledge about
each of those individuals, and the selection process was driven al-
most entirely on credentials and experience, and those were the
factors that made the final decision.

Now, the NID simply doesn't have the benefit of having gotten
to know those individuals through the many trips that each
SECDEF and service secretaries make to the commands, visit with
them and families, and everything else. Therefore, I think, again,
I draw another parallel with the budget, and that is that there
would be a joint consideration and a joint submission of that name.
But given that the DOD would have more insight, certainly, into
the military nominees — now, I don't suggest that they always have
to be military.

So, again, I come down to a similar process on the hiring and fir-
ing, and that would be collaborative between the SECDEF and the
NID, and then a joint recommendation. Would I be correct in that
assumption?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. At the moment, there is collaboration on the
hiring side. I think that that collaboration would break down on
the firing side.

Chairman WARNER. Let's hope it wouldn't.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes.

Chairman WARNER. They both have to remain accountable, if
they have their two names on that nominee.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think when you were the Secretary of the
Navy, Mr. Chairman, you might have been hesitant to share cer-
tain information with somebody who was necessarily reporting to
somebody outside the building. I'd ask you to reflect on that possi-
bility.

Chairman Warner. I think that we've come to the point — there's
the old adage, "need to know," but we also now have the "need to
share," and there has to be a greater sharing of information.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. One very useful thing that an NID can do is
to break down the classification boundaries among these intel-
ligence agencies.

Chairman WARNER. You and I have discussed that.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes.

Chairman WARNER. Secretary Carlucci, to you for an answer on
the hiring and firing-sharing?

Mr. Carlucci. I think there would need to be a mechanism for
breaking down an impasse. That is to say, if they can't agree, even-
tually one of them sends a name forward to the President, with a
dissent by the other, so that the President can make a decision.

Chairman WARNER. If there were an impasse, I would presume
that the President would be involved

Mr. Carlucci. Yes.

Chairman Warner. — and perhaps reconcile it.

Mr. Carlucci. The other point I would make — ^your comment
that the DCI doesn't have the opportunity to know military peo-
ple — my recollection is that either the DCI or the DDCI has to be
a military officer, at least in

Chairman Warner. It has been that practice.

Mr. Carlucci. — by practice, so that one or the other of them
should have knowledge of the military people who are proposed.

Chairman WARNER. Some knowledge, but perhaps not to the de-
gree of the SECDEF.

Senator Levin?

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Under the current law, the DCI is responsible for developing and
presenting to the President the annual budget. That's the current
law. So, in terms of preparation of the budget, it's right where the
9/11 Commission is saying it should be prepared, it seems to me,
under law.

When it comes to execution of the budget — by executive order,
that is now basically in the DOD. But, Secretary Carlucci, when
you were deputy to Admiral Turner, as you just indicated and he
indicated this morning, in the Carter administration, that was
done differently, by executive order at that time. That execution of
the budget was in the hands of the intelligence people. Is that cor-
rect? That's what Admiral Turner, at least, told us this morning.
I thought you were indicating something like that earlier today.

Mr. Carlucci. I have trouble understanding what you mean by
"execution." Do you mean, has the money been spent or has the
program been carried out the way that Congress directed?

Senator LEVIN. Including reprogramming.

Mr. Carlucci. Including reprogramming?

Senator Levin. Right.

Mr. Carlucci. The answer to your question, then, is yes, that
was done by the DCI.

Senator Levin. That was done by the DCI, so that — by executive
order, I emphasize — this shift could be made back, if it were desir-
able

Mr. Carlucci. Sure.

Senator Levin. — to the intelligence

Mr. Carlucci. That's the

Senator Levin. — the head of intelligence.

Mr. Carlucci. — point I tried to make, that we don't necessarily
have to have statutes here.

Senator Levin. Right.

Mr. Carlucci. There is some flexibility.

Senator Levin. So that's, it seems to me, point one. To the extent
that it's desirable to shift back, reprogramming into the DCI or a
successor, that could be done by executive order without legislation.

Now, when we look at the September 11 failures, what I don't
see is any connection between the failures and where that re-
programming authority on the budget should lie. I don't see any
connection to the remedy which is proposed. Do any of you see the
relationship between the remedy proposed, which is, basically, put
reprogramming or execution of the budget back in intelligence, and
the failures which preceded September 11?

Mr. Carlucci. I think we're fixing a non-problem, to be honest
with you.

Senator LEVIN. Do either of the other witnesses see the relation-
ship between that remedy and the flaws before September 11?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. No. Here's the thing, Senator Levin. One of
the commissioners confirms that they spent 18 months studying
the problem of September 11, and 3 weeks to put together this re-
form of the IC. I think that that tells

Senator Levin. But specifically, though. That's a general com-
ment. But specifically then, at least — and I won't — Dr. Hamre, un-
less you have a difference on this, I'll say, so far we don't have any
connection between the flaws before September 11 and that par-
ticular remedy, relative to who has the reprogramming power.

Dr. Hamre. The reprogramming isn't really going to solve a prob-
lem like that. It's really your capacity to structure the IC prospec-
tively through your budget-

Senator Levin. Through the budget, which, by law, by title

Dr. Hamre. Right.

Senator Levin.— Section 403-3 of

Dr. Hamre. Right.

Senator LEVIN. — 50 USC, belongs, or is, right now, in the DCI.

Now, if this is right, what we've said so far, we have this situa-
tion, that the remedy, relative to the budget change, does not cor-
rect the flaws. To the extent it's desirable, an3rway, it can be done
by executive order. Now, that's my summary of what your testi-
mony is so far.

Now, on the personnel side of this issue, we have, under current
law, the requirement that the SECDEF obtain the concurrence of
the DCI before submitting to the President any nomination to head
the NSA or NGA or NRO. The only one left out of that would be
the DIA. So, right now, under law, with that one exception, which

I think would be continued, probably, by the 9/11 Commission, al-
though I may be wrong — right now, the concurrence of the DCI is
required before the appointment, at least, is made. So that if that
is robustly implemented, presumably we have a DCI who has a
veto over any intelligence head of those three agencies. Is that —
are you with me so far? Okay.

Is that not an adequate input into who the heads of that agency
is — those agencies are to meet the goals, it seems to me, which are
desirable goals, of the 9/11 Commission. Namely, which is that
there be a significant input into who is going to run the intelligence
for those three agencies? Does it meet the 9/11 Commission's very
legitimate point about having the person responsible for intel-
ligence also having hiring authority for the people who are going
to be collecting it?

Mr. Carlucci. I think it does.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It does.

Senator Levin. Do you agree with that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It does.

Mr. Carlucci. I agree with it.

Senator Levin. Okay.

Now, just on the accountability issue. Perhaps one of the two
most troubling things to me is that the Commission did not ad-
dress, in my book, the accountability failures prior to September
11. I disagree with you here, Dr. Schlesinger. When you have all
those dots up there, it's not just that the dots weren't connected;
it's that the information was not shared which would have allowed
for the dots to be connected. You put dots on a board, and obvi-
ously, there's no automatic logic to connecting them. But the infor-
mation which would have allowed the dots to be connected was not
shared, as required by job description. You had people in the CIA
who knew that al Qaeda operatives, who had attacked the U.S.S.
Cole and were members of al Qaeda, had entered the United
States, and never notified the FBI, as their responsibility was. You
had FBI people — in Minneapolis, in Phoenix — who did what they
were supposed to do, notified the national FBI office, the bin Laden
desk at the FBI office, and nothing was done with critically action-
able information about people in the United States who were clear-
ly connected to bin Laden. Those are failures to do one's job and
there's no one been held accountable for that.

How do we get greater accountability into this process to address
those kind of failures which were at the heart of the September 11
failure? They weren't who has budget responsibility; it was people
not doing their jobs. How do we get that into this process?

Mr. Carlucci. If this were today — if that were being — happening
today, we would look to TTIC. Presumably, after we set it up, we'd
look to the NCTC.

Senator Levin. My time is up but do either of you have anything
to add to that?

Dr. Schlesinger. My only observation is that, after the 1970s,
it was prohibited to share intelligence information with law en-
forcement, and that that was one of our problems. I agree fully,
Senator Levin, that we did not share as much as we could. But
there were restrictions.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the witnesses for being here. There aren't three
individuals for whom I have greater respect and appreciation for
your incredible contributions to our country, and I'm very grateful
they're here.

I must say, though, that I think I've had an out-of-body experi-
ence here, because when I summarize the testimony of the wit-
nesses, we really don't have to do anything substantive, as far as
reorganizing our ability and enhancing our ability to fight the war
on terrorism, which all of us agree is going to be with us for a long
time.

Secretary Carlucci mentioned we have to keep our own secrets.
I don't know anyone who would disagree with that. The need to
know — Senator Levin just pointed out that somebody felt it was
such a need to know that they didn't inform the proper agencies
that people were taking pilot training in Phoenix, Arizona. Risk-
taking is at a minimum now, according to everj^hing that I've
read, and that is that our now-intelligence services sit in the em-
bassy and wait for the somebody to walk in.

I don't know how long we're going to keep blaming the Church
Committee. It's been about 30 years now since the Church Commit-
tee had their hearings. Maybe the effect of the Church Committee
would have some kind of half-life after awhile.

Yes, we've had successes. But for us to rest on those successes,
given the ample evidence of massive failures that caused the worst
attack on the United States of America in our history, I think
would not be satisfactory to my constituents.

Secretary Carlucci, you mentioned that rebuilding is underway,
and that former DCI Tenet said it would take 5 years. What was
he doing the previous years when he was in charge? As a member
of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission, I have
been finding out more and more information, most of which is pub-
lic knowledge, that there were massive failures. A guy named
"Curveball" gives information which was accepted on its face and
somehow became a part of Secretary of State's testimony before the
United Nations Security Council — that, and other information he
now deeply regrets — that he presented as fact. According to Mr.
Woodward, the WMD information was a "slam dunk" to the Presi-
dent of the United States.

I guess my counter-argument to the testimony is, for us to main-
tain the status quo is simply not acceptable. I am not a Member
of the Intelligence Committee. But, reading this report, no matter
whether they spent 3 days or 3 weeks or 3 months, they did some
incredibly valuable work.

I'd be glad to hear your responses, but my question also is that,
in your testimony, none of you have addressed the recommenda-
tions for a fundamental reorganization of how Congress exercises
its oversight. They're very critical of Congress's oversight capabili-
ties and activities, responsibility and blame that I think is well de-
served, because — not because of the nature of the individuals, but
the nature of the system. I'd like to hear your comments to mine,
but also response to — if you have any ideas or thoughts — on reor-

ganizing how Congress could better exercise its oversight respon-
sibiUties.

Dr. Schlesinger?

Dr. Schlesinger. Fools rush in where angels fear to tread, and
recommendations as to how Congress should reorganize itself

Senator McCain. I could help you.

Dr. Schlesinger. — usually fall on deaf ears. I think that you
should carefully consider the joint-committee procedure that we
had for atomic energy as a better way of organizing activities on
both sides of the aisle. I'm not recommending it; I think you should
consider it.

As to what is wrong with intelligence, that is a matter of good
analysis, improved analysis, and hiring good people. The problem
was not the Church Committee, it was the reaction to the Church
Committee in law and executive orders that said, "Don't talk
amongst each other." There's some very silly examples that oc-
curred as a response to those injunctions.

Senator McCain. I'd be glad to hear from Secretary Carlucci, but,
in response, again, there was no law or any custom or anything
else that prevented the information about people taking pilot train-
ing in Phoenix from getting to the right

Dr. Schlesinger. Absolutely right.

Senator McCain. There are a lot of things that happened that
there's neither law nor action of the Church Committee that would
have prevented this incredible stovepiping which has been identi-
fied by a large number of experts as one of the serious problems
that we have.

Dr. Schlesinger. That's absolutely right, and we need to get rid
of the stovepiping, and that's one of the things that an NID can,
indeed, do. Because only the clout of somebody with authority from
the President can eliminate some of those classification barriers.

Senator McCain. Secretary Carlucci?

Mr. Carlucci. Senator McCain, I didn't mean to give the impres-
sion, and I hope I didn't, that I think everything is fine and we
shouldn't make any changes. Indeed, I think we ought to set up the
NCTC, and that's a major change. What I was saying is, be careful
about moving the organizational boxes around, because you may
make the problem worse.

So you can enhance the DCI's authority. Let's look at it — as Sen-
ator Warner is already doing, let's look at the DCI's authority and
see where the shortcomings are, set up the NCTC, and proceed
from there. There may be things that we could do afterwards that
would be important. But, to take what Jim Schlesinger said, "First
do no harm."

Senator McCain. Do you have any comment about reorganizing
Congress's oversight responsibilities?

Mr. Carlucci. It's not been my area of expertise. Clearly, there
are too many committees. To set up some kind of a joint committee
would be a highly desirable thing to do.

I mentioned trade-craft. There's been a lot of talk about connect-
ing the dots, and that was the failing of our intelligence system.
Okay, so be it. But had we had one asset inside of al Qaeda, we
might have had highly accurate information. So let's also look at

our trade-craft. Let's not just say it's a matter of organizational
structure or connecting the dots.

Dr. Hamre. Senator McCain, first I — our current system of budg-
eting, as we — when it comes to the IC — and it's because we have
two different chains — and, frankly, there's a lot of ambiguity over
who's in charge. People fight for the authority, not necessarily fol-
lowing through with the kind of details that we should have. I,
frankly, see the same extending up here on the Hill. The quality
of oversight is very uneven. The committees are too big, as Sec-
retary Carlucci said. Far too much time is being devoted to arguing
over budget inputs, not enough about what's coming out of the sys-
tem. The Intelligence Committees and the Armed Services Commit-
tees compete with the Appropriations Committees to try to do the
same job: control dollars. I think that's something that we really
should look at.

There is a range of things. I have some ideas. I think it would
be useful to have, as Secretary Schlesinger said, a joint oversight
committee that is comprised of the two Intelligence Committees to
really do oversight of the intelligence process. So there are a num-
ber of things that need to happen. It's a rather wide set of rec-
ommendations I think you'd want to consider if you were looking
at oversight for the community.

You don't have any jurisdiction, for example, over — or the Intel-
ligence Committee really doesn't have much — over the FBI, and yet
the connecting-the-dots problem was very much a domestic/foreign-
intelligence issue. Those all have to be put on the table. How you
structure it to deal up here is going to involve some fairly big
changes.

I'd be happy to come and talk later. I got myself in a lot of trou-
ble in the House for being too public, but I'll do it again, if you
want.

Senator McCain. You never get in trouble here. [Laughter.!

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Waener. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with all of
those in welcoming a very distinguished panel.

I had the chance over the last 10 days or so to go through pretty
much all of the 9/11 Commission Report, and it obviously has to
bring back to all the families those extraordinary moments and
times of deep loss, and you can't read through that extraordinary
report without recognizing it. It's also a tremendous challenge for
the country.

Now we are attempting to deal with these recommendations. It's
against a background where I think all of our panelists have ac-
knowledged the extraordinary progress that's been made, in terms
of communications, intelligence, and information. The Gulf War,
won 72 hours from the time of siting onto a target until the time
weapons could be delivered, to — now to 20 minutes — the progress
that's been made has been extraordinary. No one wants to upset
that. No one wants to disturb it.

But the fact is, we're facing a newer world, a newer world with
al Qaeda. A newer world with al Qaeda. This is not the issue of
changing, ensuring that government is going to do what it has to

do and should do, and has the most important responsibihty to do,
and that is to protect its people — to protect its people — and also to
secure, obviously, the best that we can, in terms of our national —
of our defense forces. That's obviously important.

We're mindful that this is an issue which — in asking the Con-
gressional Research Service, which I did in preparation for this
hearing — this issue about how we can make our intelligence sys-
tems more effective, they've given me 15 different reports, going
back to Herbert Hoover, about steps that could be taken, most of
them not enormously dissimilar from the 9/11 Commission. Not
enormously dissimilar. Not enormously dissimilar.

The one I want to speak to you about — I haven't got the time to
go on through them — is the Scowcroft Commission Report. This
isn't someone who is reckless in recommendations; this is a person
who has served under seven Presidents, been a distinguished mili-
tary leader, been a national security officer, heads the National Se-
curity Office for Bush 1, now the head of the Foreign Intelligence.
He had some enormously important recommendations that are not
greatly dissimilar from the recommendations of the 9/1 1 report.

Let me just summarize. This is a — just very quickly, from a New
York — or from a Time magazine story. "Scowcroft chaired a year-
long study on the subject and sent his report to the President in
March. There, it collects dust. At a black-tie dinner last week" —
this is in December 2002 — "when he presented an award to CIA
George Tenet, Scowcroft broke cover again. Tor years, we had a
poorly organized intelligence system,' he said, 'but it didn't matter,
because all the threats were overseas. So now we have a huge
problem. It is unfair,' he said, 'to ask Tenet to take responsibility
for intelligence matters when he has authority over only some of
them. I think it's time we give him all the tools he needs to do the
job.' The room, full of spooks, spy chiefs, exploded in applause.' "

Now, maybe the Scowcroft Commission recommendations aren't
the answer, maybe September 11 is not the answer, but the Amer-
ican people know we're dealing with al Qaeda that's out there in
towns and communities, trying to steal weapons of mass destruc-
tion, bioterrorism, working day and night, in terms of its kind of
a threat. I think we have to be able to evaluate — I don't know why
we can't look at the Scowcroft Commission and make the rec-
ommendations — but we have to have serious recommendations,
rather than, as Senator McCain has mentioned, just saying,
"Things are working okay."

Let me ask you, Mr. Hamre. How satisfied are you, today, given
what you know and given what you understand is the current situ-
ation, that we are doing everything that we can — should be doing,
in terms of dealing with the threat of al Qaeda?

Dr. Hamre. Senator, this is a — that's a much broader question
than just the issue before us. I think that — first of all, I would say,
I think there's a good deal more cooperation between the intel-
ligence and law enforcement communities than ever existed before.
Is it sufficient to divert the next attack? Maybe not, I don't know,
but it's certainly much, much better than it was. The focus — we
have many more people who are now worrying on this issue, com-
pared to what we had before.

Now, institutionally, you'll have to ask, is that — does that have
sta5ring power? I think the issue in front of you and the rest of Con-
gress is, do you need to put an institutional framework to this? I,
personally, think that the system that we have right now is, we
tend to have a weak coordination structure. It's not that the au-
thorities aren't strong for the DCI — he has very strong authori-
ties — but he's not chosen to use them all, and they've fallen into,
frankly, disrepair, because he's bucked up against very powerful
SECDEFs through the years.

So I think you — now you have to ask the question, do you change
that? Do you basically ask him to override the SECDEF, or do you
institutionally give him more standing, independence, and power,
as was recommended by the Commission? At some point, we're
going to have to restore, in a more institutional way, some of those
authorities to coordinate across the government. But I think that
there is a lot of risk of doing it the way the 9/11 Commission rec-
ommended.

Senator Kennedy. Are you familiar with the recommendations of
the Scowcroft Commission?

Dr. Hamre. Sir, I have never read it, because I don't think it's
been publicly released, but I am aware of the recommendations.

Senator Kennedy. Could you give us any reaction as to

Dr. Hamre. I think they were also trying — they recommended
creating an NID, separated from the CIA director. I worry that
there's not enough basis inside the Scowcroft recommendations for
a strong NID, because, under that formula, he's still largely going
to be managing a set of procedures, and I think that it needs to
be stronger than that, frankly.

Senator Kennedy. Could I ask the other — if my time permits —
Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary Carlucci, whether you're fa-
miliar with the Scowcroft Commission and what you could tell us
about it?

Dr. Schlesinger. Yes, I am familiar with it. I make the first ob-
servation, General Scowcroft's remarks at the black-tie dinner, he
said, "In the past, the threat has been overseas." The inference
from that is that we have to have better coordination between the
agency and the other intelligence agencies and the FBI, which has
been perhaps the weakest point of all. The reforms that he sug-
gested do nothing about that.

Senator Kennedy. My time's up. Do you think we ought to have
that before the committee, the Scowcroft Commission?

Dr. Schlesinger. I think that, whatever you do, you must have
a better coordination between CIA and FBI, for the very reasons
that you remind us

Senator Kennedy. I was thinking about the report.

Dr. Schlesinger. On the report. As my remarks indicated, I do
not think that it would be wise for the warfighter or for the DOD
to take coordination between C^ and intelligence out of the DOD.
I think that that would do damage to the warfighter, and I think
that the attempt of commanders in the field will be to substitute
other assets for the ones that they think have been lost to them.

Mr. Carlucci. Just one quick point. Nobody has said that, "The
intelligence system is working fine. Let's keep it the way it is."

We've all made recommendations for change. I agree with what
Jim has just said.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. For the record, the Scowcroft Commission
Report has not been released by the White House, so — there have
been some public discussion of its major points, and we're going to
look into seeing whether or not we can have greater access to it.

Senator Roberts.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just had a talk with Brent Scowcroft last Thursday. Even at my
age, I begged him, on hands and knees, to release the report to the
Intelligence Committee and to the Armed Services Committee. He
pointed out he is still the president of the President's Foreign Pol-
icy Advisory Board, and, as such, comes under the jurisdiction of
the National Security Council (NSC) and would have to receive
clearance from the White House to make that report public. I agree
with Senator Kennedy, and I agree with you.

Finally, after struggling from my hands and knees, I said that
Senator Rockefeller and I would make that request, and that we
would also make a personal call to the White House to see if we
couldn't get that done. With all of the horsepower that the chair-
man has, and the vice chairman has, I am very hopeful we can get
that done.

Let nobody state that we are abrogating our responsibilities and
challenge to try to implement the goals of the 9/11 Commission and
to meet our responsibilities with the families. Senators Collins and
Lieberman just concluded a hearing, as of this morning, where they
had the DCIs, Webster, Woolsey, and Turner. All three indicated
that they were for an NID, with some modification — I don't want
to say that carte blanche — and also the NCTC. There was no com-
ment on how we fix the oversight of Congress in which, by my
count, we have at least eight committees, plus 0MB, in charge of
these decisions.

Let me say that, with Senators Warner and Levin and myself,
I was also hopeful that Senator Rockefeller would be able to attend,
being the Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee — we share
their very strong feeling that we must preserve the tactical intel-
ligence to the warfighter. That's a given. That's the tactical intel-
ligence and related activities (TIARA) part of the program, in re-
gards to tactical intelligence.

Now, we have seven committees, I think, that have held hearings
during this break. It's not a break. We have about 13 to go, and
it'll probably be up to 20 by the time we come back into session.
So I think there is real work being done in September and I am
very thankful for that.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask unanimous consent that the speech
you made on the Senate floor, as of July 22, be inserted into the
record at this point.

You spoke before the Senate as the chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee. You talked about the 9/11 report being
a roadmap, but then you also pointed out, made the comment that
amounted to a sweeping indictment that we have been dysfunc-
tional in our oversight.

I've been a member of this committee for 8 years. Of course,
you've been the chairman, off and on, along with Senator Levin.
You pointed out that you structured the Goldwater-Nichols legisla-
tion and we created the Special Operations Command. Through the
efforts of Senator Lieberman and Senator Coats, you have also cre-
ated a Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. That
subcommittee, by the way, warned, in 1999, what could happen to
the World Trade Center. In that subcommittee, we have made a lot
of progress with regards to joint experimentation, homeland de-
fense, counterterrorism, and future technologies and concepts that
will be needed to confront all sorts of future threats.

Then you had a minority-view report. This report is 10 years old,
signed by Senators Warner, Danforth, Stevens, Lugar, and Wallop.
Bottom line, "Reductions in the U.S. intelligence capabilities in this
period of international stability are unwise and do not serve the
Nation's long-term security interests." There's more. Basically, this
is 1994, 10 years ago.

So I'd like the entire speech to be made part of the record. I
think it's pertinent. In setting the record straight, I congratulate
you, sir, and I think you made some fine comments.

Chairman Warner. Without objection. I think we should also
note that you've been the distinguished chairman of the Sub-
committee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities since the day it
was created.

[The information referred to follows :1

S8608

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SEN ATE

July 22, 2004

VU COMMI£aiON REPORT

Mr. NEILSON of Florida. Mr. Presi-
dBiit, I rise to conunent about the 9A1
Commloslon report. I think it is an ex-
cellent report. Its recommeudationfi
ought to be Implemented and they
oaght to be implemented soon by the
Congress. G-lven the fact that we are
near gridlock in an election season and
tt is very unlikely in September when
we come back from the August recess

we will get an.ythiQ^ done, I think we
oug-ht to consider coming back after
the election and Implementing the rec-
ommendatlooB of the report. Why? Be-
cause the only way we protect our-
selves from the enemies whom we call
terrorists Is to have accurate and time-
ly Inforraatilon.

The terrbiist uses surprise and
stealth, and the only way to defeat
that Is by having accurate and timely
intelligence

So whatever we need to do to avoid
the colossal intelligence failure we had
on September 11 and the colossal intel-
ligence failure we had again prior to
going Into Iraq, we best get about the
job of correcting that information
gathering, information flow, and Infor-
mation analysis so we can try to con-
tinue to thwsLrt the attempts at doing
oiimage to as.

Is it not interesting what the 9/11
Commission report said? It speoifJcally
defined the terrorist as someone who is
usually an Isiainist fundamentalist
who has warped the teachings of Islam
so that it becomes a passion of hatred,
and out of that wanting to do damage
to the free world. Of course, we being
the superpower are the target of that.

It was also noteworthy In the Com-
miSBlon's report, as they are sug-
gesting how to restructure the Intel-
ligence api>aratus. they have suggested
having a national intelligence director
and that the oounterterrortsm center
would be a compendium that would re-
port to him. It is also Interesting that
they stll] wanted to keep the adminis-
tration of intelligence gathering and
analysis from direct political involve-
ment. So the Comniission did not rec-
ommepd the new Intelligence chief be a
member of the President's Cabinet but
rather be what they have defined as the
National Intelligence Director. Then in
all of these aubdepartraents that have a
myriad of filling out a flow chart, an
organizational chart, it is interesting
how all of the different components of
InteUlgenoe, the CIA, the DIA, the FBI.
would then fit together into this new
apparatus.

We only have to remember that
about a month ago we had another
major information failure, and this was
at the time of President Reagan's fu-
neral. We had the Governor of Ken-
tucky on his State airplane, having
been given clearance by the FAA to
come In and land at Washington Na-
tional Airport, and his transponder was
not working. He had been given clear-
ance by the FAA, hut the FAA was not
communicating with the military. So
the miUtary. seeing a blip on the radar
moving to the center of Washington,
without a transponder, sent out the
alert and, of course, everybody In this
U.S. Capitol building and In all of those
office buildings off to the side of this
building got the emergency evacuate
order, so much so that the Capitol Po-
lice, bless their hearts, were shouting
at the top of their lungs, get out of the
building, run, there ia an inbound aii^
craft.

July 22, 2004

CONGRJESSIONAL RECORD— SENATE

S8609

So how many more of these do we Spe'ichar Mam has left and has given destruction. But he had a special team

need to have before we come to the up the search. I hope that is not true, that was led by Major Eamee. who has

commonaense reality that; we are not The tamUy who lives la my State. In now been promoted to lieutenant oolo-

collating and coordinating all of this Jacksonville. FL. deserves to have clo- neL That youny officer was as devoted

mlormation like we ought to? So. we sure. The family has been through a as any that I could ever Imagine In the

best get on the process of reforming trauma like hardly any of u£ could be- search., when I visited with him In his

the system. lleve. The WashingTion Times gives a headquarters in Baghdad. At the time

Now we have a good blueprint with great deal of detail. 1 don't tnow If It we had actually gone to one of the cells

13 true or not. but If it is. then what where we thought maybe it was Scott

this country owes to that family is to Speicher s initials on the wall, having

keep searching. If a team has been re- been scratched into the stucco: MS5.

That leads me to the next subject I turned, as the Washington Times has All those leads did not pan ont. But

want to talk about, our allies. The 9/11 stated, then it is important that what- there are other leads they need to fol-

Coramission report also says something ever the size of that team, that we low. It is my hope the U.S. military

that many of us in this Chamber have have a presence. As long as the U.S. will continae to do that, even though

been saying for some period of time: military is located there, a fallen filer General Dayton is not in Iraiq anymore.

which to do it. We have an opportrunlty
to make America safer — and. with
allies. QOlte

You can't go out and be succeeeful in in the future will -always have the con-
the war on terror until you can bring fldence to know we are not going to
. lot of colleagues, a lot of allies. In leave him or her there alone, and we

and he deserves to be home. Eh^en
though Colonel Eames is not in Iraq
If those leads would be continued.

a coordinated and planned effort so you are coming to get you. We didn't do Colonel Eames would, in fact, be back

i^q in a heartbeat, following up
the Senator that new information.

I want to take the occasion of re-
minding the Senate that this Senator
will continae to speak out on this

am de-

Internationalize the effort We did that that with Scott Speicher

brlUlantly 13 years ago in the gulf war. Mr. WARNER. WUl

We did that again bniUantly in Af- yield?

ghonlatan when we started going after Mr. NELSON of Florida

bin Laden. But we didn't do that In lighted to yield. _

Iraq. Especially, we didn't do it m Iraq Mr. WARNER. First and foremost, I iggue, to remind the U.S. military of its

after a brtlliant military victory. We can't comment on the Washington obligation to continue to search for

didn't do It in the occupation. Times article. But yesterday, in the evidence so the case of Scott Speicher

What the 9/11 Commission is pointing course of an Armed Services Com- ^^^^ \^ brought to closure,

out is that if you want to Improve the mlttee briefing by General Dayton, mj. president. I yield the floor.

InteUiKence-gathering mechanism and who at this point in time Is also brief- j^ WARNER. Mr. President. I com-

analyala, then you have to Intematlon- Ing the Senate Intelligence Com- tngn^ my colleague. He has worked

allze the effort. That stands to reason, mittee — and I Just left the InteUigence very hard on the Speicher case and un-

Fortunately, through Interpol and dl- Committee meeting to come to the (jonbtedly his commitment will c^rry

rect one-to-one relationships with floor — the matter was discuseed. That forward. I suggest, based on what waa

other countries' intelligence ^rvlces, much I will oonflrm. as appropriate. As ^^^ yesterday, that he will be in con-

we get a lot of that Information. But as a member of Che Committee of the sujtatlon with the Secretary of the

the 9A1 Commission said, we have to do Armed Services, my able friend knows (^^vy He has the authority to make

a lot more. that at every Juncture our committee, disclosores as he sees fit about this

The 9/U Comraisaicn also told us largely through yourself and Senator ^ja^e but I believe General Dayton, in a

something that we didn't know. It said Roberts most often, brings up a our- ^ proteseional and conscientious

the country of Iran may have taclll- rent report on that. way will discharge his duties.

tated al-Qalda. It did not suggest that I will not say. other than it was a «/ o nr

Iran's Government knew anything matter that was discussed, and General aT^tJe^^'^^^ ^ fl'^

about the planning for the September Dayton shared with us his views. But I ^^- WARNKR. Mr. President, I would

11 attack, but It suggested that some of wish to point out. in discussing it with "^^ ^° provide this Senator's observa-

those operatives passed through Iran. General Dayton, he finds that whatever "°°S' 'eT preUrainary though they

■There have been a number of us in was carried today, reflects It as his ™»y ^^- with regard to the report of

this body who have been talking about views, and he simply wants to say the "^^ *1' CoramlBslon which was made

Iran; that after September U. and the final decision rests with the Secretary PUbl'o today.

importance of going after al-Qaida, of the Navy, not General Daytott, as to Yesterday I joined about a dozen or

that the next imminent threat to the the course of this Investigation. So ^o Senators, the distinguished majority

Interest of the United States were the that rauch.I will say. Beyond that. I be- leader, and others to receive a brief

coontTles of Iran and North Korea, Ueve, regrettably. It was a top secret private briefing. That was our first of-

Why? Because they are trying to ac- briefing, but nevertheless Information Ocial glimpse of this rejiort. I have not

quire or alpaady are bnildlng nuclear might well have gotten out. That is re- l^^^ "J^s opportunity to, of course, go

oapablllty. Therefore. I tbiTiif it is very grettable. through this rather prodigious vol-

Important that we get our act together I thank the Senator for bringing it ume— each Member received a copy—

and implement this Commission report up. I. too. Join you in fervently wishing but I do Intend to do so because I think

for many reasons. That is jost one ad- and praying for Scott Speicher The " is ^ 'sry important contribution by

dltlonal reason. Senator has to be commended for the tWs Commission. I think many parts of

I see the esteemed chairman of the amount of time he has spent on this it can provide a roadmap for things

Senate Armed Services Committee has situation. tha-t most be done.

come mto the Chamber. I want to say Mr NELSON of Florida. I thank my It has been my privilege to serve in
in Ills presence, as he knows, as one of colleague, my esteemed chairman. I am the Senate-- this is my 26th year, ajid I
the members of his committee, on ti a devoted member of his committee, commit to work with other oolleagnes.
completely different subject. I have iinder his leadership. I thank the Sen- all colleagues, to see what we can do to
spoken out time and time again about ator from Virginia for all the personal strengthen our ability, not only In In-
the plight and the determination to encouragement he has given to me as telUgence, but across the board in a"J
find some evidence about CAPT Scott we have Telentlessly kept after this, areas of national security.
Speicher, the Navy pilot who was shot trying to find some evidence. As privileged as 1 am to be the chair-
down on the first night of the gulf war I do want to say. since my colleague man of the Senate Armed Services
In 1991 mentioned General Dayton. I think he Committee, I am prepared to listen to

There is a report, in the Washington performed magnlflcently. He, of coarse, hovr the responsibilities of that oom-

Tlmes — and I will make reference di- had many other responsibilities other mlttee should be changed for the bet-

rectly only to what is reported In to- than Just the search for CAPT ter. I will not participate in any ob-

day'a Washington Times— and what tie Speiciier. He had all ciie responsllDll- structloii slmcly beesuse of turf. I hftVS

Washington Times says is that a ities of the search for weapons of mass lieen here too long. Also, this changed

S8610

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

July 22, 2004

world In which we live l8 bo very dif-
ferent than when I came to thlB insti-
tution a cniarter of a century ago. and
most particularly in the aftermath of
the tragedy of 9/11.

So I think it iB Incumbent upon all of
us In the CongrresB and. indeed, the ex-
ecutive branch to have a strong self-ex-
amination of the areas covered by this
report; to use this report, along with
input from other commtBSions. groups,
and individuals, as a sort of roadn:iap to
guide iiB into those areas which need to
be carefully reviewed.

Out of that proceas. which I hope is a
carefully thought through, not rushed,
deliberative process. I hope will evolve
such changes as we. Congress, deem
necessary to strengthen our capability
to deter and. if necessary, engage fur-
ther in this war against terrorism. So.
therefore. I say with respect, 1 welcome
the recommendations of the Commis-
sion. I commit to study them and com-
mit to wort with my colleagues.

Yesterday a specific qaestiOD was put
to the two cochairmen of the 9/11 Cora-
mlBSlon: Is America safer today? And
their unhesitating acknowledgment
was It Is safer today, and I agree it is.
Is it as safe as we need? None of us be-
lieve that. But I think oonBcientious
efforts have been made all along the
way to make this a safer Nation, and
we have. In large measure, succeeded
with the goals within the timetable we
have had.

I am disappointed, however, that
there was not more thorough dialog be-
tween the 9/11 ComralsBlon and Mem-
bers of the Congress. I do not take that
personally. I did have an opportunity
to visit Id ray ofHce some 2 weeks
ago — a very pleasant viait — with one
member, at which time we exchanged
views. Somehow I do not feel that was
the type of consultation that enabled
us to get into the report and make con-
structive contribtitlons. I do not sug-
gest all 536 Members of Congress troop
up before the 9/11 Commission. We do
not have time to do that. Somehow it
seems to me a better balance could
have been struck between the knowl-
edge and the ideas we have in the Insti-
tution of the legislative branch of our
Government that could have been
shared with this Commission. After all,
the Commission was. In many respects,
created as a consequence of the actions
of Congress.

Havmg said that. I am going to take
some specific issue with this rather
sweeping indictment that we have been
dysfunctional In our oversight.

All throughout my public servloe, I
have been privileged to have a number
of jobs, and 1 am very humble about it.
but I am far from perfect, and I have
always welcomed constructive advice
and criticism. But this time this dys-
functional brush that was wiped across
struck me as not fair to certain things
I personally have a knowledge of that
were done by this body, the Senate.

I will start back some years a^o In
1987 when, as a member of the Armed
Services Committee, we structured the

Goldwater-Nichols legislation which
bad sweeping ramifications in our over-
all defense setup. It has been hailed
since that period of time as a landmark
achievement by the Congress to begin
to transform our military from the
cold war era to the era of the threats
today which are so diverse and so dif-
ferent as compared to those we con-
fronted during World War n and in the
immediate aftermath of the cold war.

That was quite an accomplishment
and. in large meastire. is owing to Sen-
ator Goldwater and Congressman Nich-
ols. Again. I had the privilege to serve
with those two men for many years,
long before we started the Goldwater-
Nichols Act.

As a member of the Armed Services
Committee— and I say with humility
and personal pride, I was a close per-
sonal friend of Senator Goldwater. I ad-
mired him so much and looked forward
to the times we worked together and
traveled together. I remember Con-
gressman Nichols bore the scars of
World War n. having been a very cou-
rageous serviceperson in that wax. He
was extremely conscientious about his
duties on the House Armed Services
Committee. These twc giants in the
way of thinking got together and re-
lentlessly drove this legislation
through both bodies of the Congress,
and it has withstood the test of tune.

Contemporaneous with this, I re-
member my dear friend with whom 1
came to the Senate, Senator Cohen,
who later became, after he resigned
from the Senate. Secretary of Defense.
We worked together as a team with
others to carve out of the Department
of Defense, taking from the Army, the
-Navy, the Air Force, and the Marines
some of the best and the brightest to
create the Special Operations Com-
mand.

While today most colleagues have
seen their magnificent performance
worldwide, particularly as a front line
against terrorism, I remmd them it
was a tough and long struggle, vigor-
ously resisted by the Department of
Defense, to create this new entity and
to give them their dedicated assets of
modest naval vessels, modest number
of airplanes, and other equipment
which was their own. But we suc-
ceeded. Today those forces have estab-
lished themselves in the contemporary
military history of this country as an
essential part of our military struc-
ture, much admired by all, much
envied by all, and their performance
record is second to none. I do not mean
to suggest by that they have outpaced
or outperformed the basic elements,
particularly combat-committed ele-
ments of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marines. No, it is that the whole
military looks with a sense of pride to-
ward tihelr accomplishments. I am
proud to have been a part of estab-
lishing this important part of our
armed forces.

Then tn 1999, when 1 was privileged
for the first time to become chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Com-

mittee, 1 went in there and 1 changed
basically a structure that had been In
place for decades, the subcommittee
structure- Again, I carved out a new
subcommittee called Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats and Capabilities.
This is 1999. This is not in the after-
math of 9/11. This is 1999.

I must say. I have had the construc-
tive support of the" members of the
committee, and by pure coincidence — I
am speaking of the Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats and Capabilities—
the first chairman of that sub-
committee, the distinguished Senator
from Kansas, Mr. ROBERTS, just walked
into the Chamber, and perhaps he will
have a word or two about the functions
of that subcommittee.

Mr. President, 1 say to my distin-
guished colleague, I was saying the 9/11
Commission has brushed the Congress
as being sort of dyafimctional. and I
was going back in history. The Senator
from Kansas was one of my prlncli>al
supporters on establishing the Sub-
committee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities. He has been ranking
member or chairman of that sub- ~
committee, and under his leadership
and that of the full committee, we have
achieved a great deal, and have helped
the Department of Defense move for-
ward in the areas of joint experimen-
tation, homeland defense,
counterterrorlsm, and future tech-
nologies and concepts that will be
needed to confront future threats.

That subcommittee was directed to
look forward a decade and determine
what are the threats that are going to
face the United States of Amerloa euid
how best our Department of Defense
needs to transform itself and allocate
assets and men and women to take up
the positions of responsibility to meet
those threats.

That subcommittee has done its
work and done it admirably and has
measurably enhanced the overall
strength of our military today.

My distinguished colleague. Senator
Roberts from Kansas, is chairman of
the Intelligence Committee. I am privl
leged to serve on that committee
today. In years past. I was privileged to
serve 8 years. We have this rotation In
the Senate, and this is my second tour
on that committee. When I was vice
chairman, together with other mem
bers of that committee, we fought hard
against the cuts in intelUgenoe.

I aak tmaoimous consent that por-
tions of the minority view report be
printed into the Record.

There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed In the
Record, as follows:

MiNORTTY Views of Senators Wabhir.

DANPXiRTH. Stevens. Luqar, and Waixop

The UQit«d Statee must maintain aad
atreji^tben U.S. Ini^alllgeDce capabilities to
provide for the future eeourtty of the Nation
and for the protection of Ite Intereste around
the globe. The U.S. ahould commit more re-
BoQTces to actUevement of that objective
than the flso&l year 1994 Intelligence author-
ization bill reported by the Select Com-
miti,ee on IntelllgeDoe would provide.

July 22, 2004

CONGRESSIpNAL RECORD — SENATE

SSftlL

Tne U.S. ticed graso secarltv riaks during
the Cold War. but It fAued them la an Inter-
national environment tli3rt was compara-
bly stable and predictable. Wit* tHe end of
■ the Cold War and the dissolution of the So-
rtet Union and Its Warsaw Pact military al
nance, the U S had hoped lor a 'New World
Order- wltb stable and steady proirreso 'to-
ward greater democracy, freedom and free
enterprise. WUat the U s. fares in the post
Cold War era. however. Is a more chaotic en-
vironment with maltlple chaUenges to US.
Interests that complicate the efforts of the
U S. and cooperaUne nanona to achlefe the
desired prosress. In an unstable wortd ol dl-
verec and mcreaalns challenges, the need for
robnat and reliable U 3 Intelligence capa-
bilities hae grown rather than diminished.
America faces a world In whicb-
Ethnlc. religious and social tenelona spawn
regional conflicts.

A camber of cations possess nuclear weap-
ons and the means to deliver thorn on a tal-

^ Other nations seek nuclear, chemical or bi-
ological weapons of rr.aeii destruction and the
means to deUver them;

Terrorist organlzatlona contmue :o oper-
ate and attack U.S. lateresto (Including here
at home, as the bombing of the World Trade
Center In New YoTt reflects);

International drug organizations oontUins
on a vast scale to produce Illegal drugs and
smuggle them into the US. „and

US. economic interests are under constant
challenge.

The United States continues to have a
vital interest In close monitoring of develop-
ments in the mdependent republics on the
territory of the former Soviet Uyjon. The

U S Government needs accurate and timely
IncelllgeDce on the nuclear arsenals. faclU-
tiea and mater.ala located In Rossia, Ukraine
andj^^har repnbllcs; the economic and mili-
tary reBtruotarln* m the republics; and the
ethnic, religloofl and other Booial turmoil
and seceaflionlst pressures In the repubUcs

To the extent that the end of the Cold War
aUows a reduction of U.3. resources devoted
to intelligence capabilities focused on mill
taiy capabilities of countries on the terri-
tory of the former Soviet Union, the US
should reallocate the gained rosooroes to
strengthen Intelligeooe capabilities to deal
with growing risks to America's Interests.
The U.S should make such resonices avail-
able for strengthened Intelligence capabili-
ties focnaed on the problems with which the
U.S. Oovemment moflt deal in the coming
decades, including proliferation of weapons
of maaa destruction, terrorism. International
narcotics trafMcklng. and the illegal transfer
of U.S high technology In many Intel-
ligence disciplines. Investment In research
and development is needed now to yield In-
telligence capabilities a decade from now.
Absent needed Investment, capabilities will
not be available when needed and existing
capabilities will erode.

At the same time as risks to U.S mcerent
grow. U.3 military power will decline as the
U 3 draws down substantially the size of ite
armed forces following victory In the Cold
War. With a diverse and growing array of
risks to U.S. Interesta and a reduced com-
mitment of resources to the Nation's de
fsuse. the US will grow Increasingly de-
pendent for its security and the protection of
its Interests abroad open its Intelligence ca
pabillties— the Nation's eyes and ears. In-
deed, the substantial cuts of recent years in
defense budgets have been premised directly
upon the strengthening of Intelligence sup-
port to the remaining, smaller aimed forces
Reducing the Nation's intelligence capablll

ties magnlllee slgnincantly the nsks attend-
anlj to reductions io rsaooicos devoted to the
Nation's defense. As thiw Comnalttee noted In

dlBCOSs-jig -.oglslation to asalst m managing
the personnel reduooons at the Central In-
telligence Agency, '. - maintaining a
strong intelligence capability la particularly
iraBortanl when mlltUry forces are being
substantially reduced . . ." <s. Kept. 103--13.

"" The U-3- will depend on efTecuve foreign
intelligence in allocating scarce U.S. na-
tional security resources effectively. To pro-
tect America's interests In Umes of peace
and of conniot. US. poUcymakers and mili-
tary commanders will depend heavily upon
sarly warning of trouble and- early and. ex-
tensive knowledge of the activities, capabili-
ties and intentions of foreign powers. Kflec-
trve intelligence will multiply eubetintiaUy
the etrectlvenees of the smaller u S. mlUtary

tOTOe, , . ^ *v n c

A sampling of the deployment of the u a.
armed forces abroad in the past foor years il-
luetrates nsks to Air.erioan Intercsto In the
poet-Cold War world, likely uses of U.S. mUl-
tary forces In the future, and the importance
of effective InteUlgenoe In supporting mili-
tary operauons In late 1969. American
troops in operation JUST CAUSE liberated
Panama from the Nortega dlctatorahlp that
suppressed Panamanian democracy and
threatened U S. personnel. In 1890 and 1991 In
Operations DBSERT SHIELD and DESEET
STORM American and coalition forces liber-
ated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, and
those forces remain on station in and around
the Fabian Peninsula to enforce United Na
tlons sancnons on Iraq. American forcss
have rescued American diplomats caught In
civil inaurrecttons abroad. U.S. forces have
ajKlsted In stemming the flow of lllsgal im-
migrants Into the United States U.S. forces
have undertaken humanitarian relief oper
atlons. to feed hungry people and provide
them medical care. The U.S. hae assigned Its
forces as part of or in support of United Na
tlonfl peacekeeping forces in many countrlea.
Including Bosnia. Macedonia. Somalia, and
Cambodia- In every one of these operatlon--
from massive operations on the scale of
DESERT STORM to the smallest humani-
tarian relief operations— the auccasaful ac
compllshment of missions by tie U.S armed
forces and the protection of American troops
have depended directly upon the high quality
and timeliness of the IntelUgence available
to American forces

Bed-actions In US intelligence capabilities
in this period of international inaUbl'Jty are
unwise and do not serve the Nation's long
term security Intereots. Defense of America
aod America's interesta abroad requires a
greater commitment of reaonrcea to U S. In
telligence capabilities than the fiscal year
1994 Intelligence authorization bill providee
John WAiUES
John C. Danforth.

TED aTEVBNS.

Richard Q luoar.

MALCOLM WaI-LOP

Mr. WARNER. I have the repoiT^ Chat
aocompanled the 1994 bUl This wfts
written in July of 1993. This report cov-
ered the ensuing QsoaJ year. I wrote
the minority views, which were joined
m by other colleagues an the com-
mittee at that time: Senator DanTorth.
who Is cow our Ambassador to the
United Nations; Senator STEt'ENS. who
is currentl.v chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee. Senator
Luoar. who is cjrrently chairman of
the Foreign Relations Oommittee: and
our former colleague. Senator Wallop.

Here is what we had to say. and 1 do
not think this Is dysfunctional partlcl-
paMon, but I will let my colleagues

judge for themselves after I have read
portions of Sills report.

The mlEonry views of the followinr
Senators:

The United States must mamtain and
strengthen US intelligence capabilities to
provide for Che future security of the Nation
and for the protection of Its Interesta around
the globe The U.S. should comirat more, re-
sources to achievement of that objective
than the Hscal year 19S4 intelligence anthor-
Izatlon bill Imported by the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence would provide.

We were, of course, members of that
select committee.

The n S faced grave security risks during
the Coid War. but it faced them m an inter-
national environment that was campara-
tiveU staljle and predictable With the end of
the Cold 'War and the dissolution of the So-
viet Union and its Warsaw Pact military al-
liance, the U S. had hoped for a "New World
Order " with stable and steady progress to-
ward greater democracy, freedom and Hve
enterprise. What the US faces in the post^
Cold War era. however, is a more chaotic en-
vironment with multatads challenges to U.S.
interests that complicate the efforts of Che
U.S. and cooperating nations to achieve the
desired progress. In an unstable world of di-
verse and increasing challenges, the need for
robust and reUable US. intelligence capa-
bUlties has grown rather than dlmmlflhed.
America faces a world m which; Ethnic, reli-
gious and social tensions spawn regional coc-
fUcts: a number of uaUons poseeas nuclear
weapons and the means to deliver them on a
target; other nations seek nuclear, chemical
or biological weapons of mass destruction
and the means to deliver them; terrortat or-
gaaizationa continue tc operate and attack
US interesta (including here at home, as
the bombing of the World Trade Centar in
New York rer.ec',«)—

This is 1993. It 13 interesting. It was
June 30. just about this time —
International drug organlzatione continue on
a vBAt scale to produce Illegal drugs and
smuggle them into the U s . and U.S eoo-
nonuc Interesta are under coiistanc ohal-

To the extent that the end of the Cold War
allows a reduction of U S resources devoted
to Intelligence capabilities focused on mill
tary capabilities oC countries on the terri-
tory of the former Soviet Umon. the U 3.
should reallocate the gained reeouioee to
strengthen Intolligenoe oapabiUtles to deal
with growing risks to America's lnt«reetB.
The U.S. ahould make such resources avail-
able for strengthened intelligence capablli-
tiee focused on the problems with which the
U 3. Crovomment must deal in the coming
decades. Including proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, terrorism, international
narcotics trafficking, and the illegal transfer
of US .high technology

I shall not read further because I WJl
put It in the REGoaD

ThlE is not dysfvmctional action by
leglslatore: this is legislators looking
Into the future and seeing much of
what is occurriEg today I only wish we
had the opportunity to advise the 9/U
Commission of this and other contrlbu-
Uons by many others In this Chamber
at that period of tune who were In the
service of Che Senate and their States.
This was not dysfunctional.

In the days ahead, we do need to look
at how best to organize the IntelllKonce
elements of our national security
structure, along with many other com-
ponents. We must not, however, do
anything precipitously.

In the flpeclfic &re& of iBtelligence,
our Lntelllg'ence services, even with tlie
flaws that have been recently pointed
out. are the beat in the world, by far.
They are not perfect, and their busi-
ness is, by definition, one of uncer-
tainty — beat Judgments made with the
information that Is currently in hand.
Any changes we make must be care-
fully constructed to preserve existing
excellence, while improving other func-
tions.

Afi we consider any changres, we must
remember that intelligence la an inte-
gral part of military operationfi, Re-
cent military operations by our forces
In Afghanistan and Iraq have been ex-
traordinarily succesaful. In large part
because of excellent intelligence, and
because of the close relationship be-
tween military operationfi and intel-
ligence that has been so carefully built
over the years. Intelligence is part of a
whole I>epgirtment of Defense, as well
as part of a larger Intelligence commu-
nity. Moving defense Intelligence func-
tions under the authority of another
cabineHevel official could have unin-
tended consequences— we must move
with careful deliberation.

I yield the floor, and I sugg-est the ab-
sence of a qaorum .

Senator Roberts. As always, your humble servant, sir.

Let me just say that if I can sum up the testimony — and I know
that I should not do this with Senator Collins being present, who's
doing an outstanding job, along with Senator Lieberman, on the
Governmental Affairs Committee — but the three of the witnesses
there pretty much got on the NID stage and the counterterrorism
stage and left town. Now, they didn't leave town, but at least that
was their recommendation. From what I hear of the witnesses, I'm
not sure if you're on the NID stage, or not.

Do you support really granting the NID direct supervision and
control over the DOD elements of the NFIP? Now, saying that,
there are 15 agencies; there are 4 of them under the DOD; then
you have the 4 Services, that's 8; and then the rest of them are
under the Intelligence Community, as all 3 of you well know. The
suggestion has been made by the distinguished chairman that
somehow we could work out some kind of an arrangement whereby
there is better coordination. But it was just like Senator McCain
said, I think, with the 9/11 Commission, with a lot of support in
this town, and with the administration moving toward that goal,
and it's not a set policy yet that they are for the NID, and they
are for this NCTC. Yes/no, are you for it or against it?

We'll start with you, Jim. Pardon me. Secretary Schlesinger? And
K State fan.

Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, sir.

Now, we used to have greater uniformity in that, prior to the
1970s, the CIA was under the control of the Armed Services Com-
mittee. So what we have been doing on the Hill has been to split
those authorities, reflecting the public reaction to the so-called
"scandals" of the 1970s.

No, I don't think that the authorities in the DOD should be
placed under the NID.

Senator ROBERTS. Secretary Carlucci?

Mr. Carlucci. I agree with the concept of an NCTC. I do not
favor an NID. If we're going to have an NID, I don't think he ought
to have line management over the CSAs.

Senator Roberts. Dr. Hamre.

Dr. Hamre. Sir, I do not favor the 9/11 Commission recommenda-
tion that gives the NID authority over DOD agencies. If you're
going to have an NID, you'll want a strong one. If you're going to
have a strong one, I think you're going to have to give him some
real things to manage, other than just interagency coordination
processes.

Senator Roberts. Let me give you the counter-argument. I have
noted what appears to be very redundant, often wasteful, procure-
ment of intelligence system, in my own view as chairman of the In-
telligence Committee, shared by many across the several intel-
ligence budgetary mechanisms down through the years, different
agencies and different congressional committees — obviously, that's
no surprise. You have the entrenched interest of several of these
bureaucracies. We may see that, when an intelligence requirement
is levied, the NRO always finds one of its satellites to be the best
solution, if not all of them. The NGA will feel its imagery is the
best. The NSA may offer signals intelligence. The Air Force may
prefer its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The CIA may obviously
feel an agent collecting information is the best, not to mention a
poor marine who would just want new tires on his high utility mo-
bile mechanized vehicle.

Sadly, all of these programs may be funded to meet similar, or
even redundant, needs. Yet the SECDEF cannot do all that. We
have an Under Secretary of Intelligence now who has his hands
full. The SECDEF certainly has his hands full. Would an NID,
with more powerful authorities, be able to make the tough and un-
popular decisions that fiscal responsibility requires? It doesn't have
to mean that you put the whole agency out of the DOD over to the
NID, but at least that person would have funding authority, hiring
and firing authority, shifting personnel authority, and also transfer
authority in regards to funds.

What I'm trying to say is the reprogramming — is your answer
still no?

Jim?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the NID can do much more in the
area of centralizing collection, which is the big money area, as your
question raises. The NID should not be engaged in suppressing
competition among the agencies. The SECDEF and the Joint Chiefs
should have their own DIA.

Mr. Carlucci. The way you've described it, I can see an NID
building a huge staff right now, and that would be just another
layer. So I think we have to be cautious about giving him all this
authority. Either he builds his staff or he yanks something out of
DOD. There's no in-between.

Senator Roberts. Dr. Hamre?

Dr. Hamre. I'd agree with what Dr. Schlesinger just said to you.

Senator Roberts. Okay. My time is expired, and I thank you,
Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Roberts.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to you
and Senator Levin for these hearings.

As has been indicated, Senator Collins and I have been involved
in holding some hearings and we welcome — there's a lot of overlap
between our two committees, Mr. Chairman. We look forward to
working with you as our committee produces the legislation that
Senator Frist and Senator Daschle have asked us to produce some-
time in September.

I want to pick up on the questioning of Senator Roberts and
some of the others, the line of questioning that they've been follow-
ing.

You can't read the 9/11 report without concluding that it's an in-
dictment of the status quo, in some measure. They don't quite say
this, but it certainly left me with the impression that if the kind
of reorganization they recommend was in place prior to September
11, maybe it wouldn't have happened. It goes to the connecting of
the dots, to the focusing of resources where they were necessary.
The bottom line seems to be, no one was in charge. The Commis-
sion says that. Mr. Zellico, the executive director, testified to the
Governmental Affairs Committee that that remains the case. No
one's in charge of the American IC. As a result, there is
stovepiping, there's not an overview by somebody at the top of
where priorities are and, therefore, where the money should go.

In that report, I believe it says that our IC is organized according
to the best management principles of the 1950s, which is not sur-
prising, because it came into being in the late 1940s, when the
world was very different and the enemy was very different — Soviet
Union, as opposed to all the diffusion of terrorism.

Incidentally, we know the toughest part of this is what to do
about the Defense intelligence budget. Questions have been raised.
It's true that a lot of the criticism in the 9/11 Commission Report
was focused on other agencies, particularly the failure of CIA, FBI,
et cetera, to cooperate. But there is some criticism of the NSA,
which is in the DOD, obviously.

I'll just read from the Commission report, page 80, "The NSA
began" — let me start with page 87 — "An almost obsessive protec-
tion of sources and methods by the NSA and its avoidance — its
focus on foreign intelligence and its avoidance on an3rthing domes-
tic would, as will be seen" — in the report — "be important elements
in the story of September 11." Basically, an accusation that the
considerable assets of the NSA were not being focused on the war
on terrorism.

They say, "The NSA began putting caveats on its bin Laden-re-
lated reports that required prior approval before they're sharing
their contents with criminal investigators and prosecutors. These
developments further blocked the arteries of information-sharing."

Finally, from page 417, "In the September 11 story, for example,
we see examples of information that could be accessed, like the un-
distributed NSA information that would have helped identify
Nawaf al Hazmi, in January 2000." It goes on.

So there is some direct connection in the report to failures of co-
operation by intelligence assets now under the control of the DOD.

Senator Roberts asked about whether you were for the NID, and
there was — as recommended, I think you generally said no. Bob
Gates, former DCI, said in testimony he submitted to our commit-
tee this morning — strong statement — "The new intelligence direc-

tor, as described" — he actually talks about the White House. He
says, "The President recently announced his initial decisions in re-
sponse to the Commission recommendation. I hope, as the White
House spokesman has suggested, that these decisions are only a
first step, because the new intelligence director, as described, will
impose a new layer of bureaucracy, but has no troops, no budget
authority, and no power. Therefore, the new position would be
worse than the current arrangement."

So what's my question? [Laughter.]

My question is this. You've answered, in part. Let me go at it
this way. You've had the extraordinary experience in administra-
tion, both in the public and the private sector. How can we, in
something so fundamental as this war on terrorism, go on without
having somebody in charge? If you put somebody in charge, doesn't
that mean they have to have budget authority over the DOD — or
at least significant non-TIARA, non-tactical parts of the DOD intel-
ligence budget?

Secretary Carlucci?

Mr. Carlucci. I think we can do that without creating another
layer. That's the point I tried to make, that we ought to look at the
DCI's authority, and where they are found wanting, let's change
that. But to create another layer with a whole staff, I agree with
Bob Gates, that either he's toothless, in which case it's a useless
layer, or he's a nuisance because he's intervening in the
warfighting process of DOD.

Senator LlEBERMAN. Okay, so that's helpful for me to under-
stand. In some ways, you're saying if there's need for coordination
and more strength, including some budget authority, give it to the
DCI

Mr. Carlucci. Absolutely.

Senator LlEBERMAN. — instead of creating an NID.

Mr. Carlucci. Absolutely.

Senator LlEBERMAN. Secretary Schlesinger?

Dr. Schlesinger. The first point that I make is that the
stovepiping that has so badly damaged our ability to deal with Sep-
tember 11, evidenced beforehand, was basically between the FBI
and the CIA, and that if that is the area that you must bring great-
er integration, how far the TTIC does in bringing FBI information
to the benefit of the counterterrorism area, I don't know. The FBI
has historically been outside, really, of the IC.

Second point, you mentioned that the NSA was obsessive about
protecting its sources and methods and information, and the reason
that it was obsessive was that during the 1970s and 1980s, we told
the NSA, "Never eavesdrop on an American citizen." If you tell peo-
ple not to hear things, and then, certainly, if they've heard things
inadvertently, not to pass them on, they will be obsessive.

Senator LlEBERMAN. As you know better than anybody.

Dr. Schlesinger. Yes.

Senator LlEBERMAN. You'd say it yourself, we're not in the 1970s
and 1980s anymore; we're in a new century with a new enemy,
about whom we

Dr. Schlesinger. Absolutely.

Senator LlEBERMAN. — need to know ever5^hing there is to know.

Dr. Schlesinger. Absolutely.

Those restrictions should be dropped, and they have been
dropped.

Senator Lieberman. Dr. Hamre?

Dr. Hamre. Senator Lieberman, you really don't need to add
more authority to the DCI on budget. He already has very strong
authority, but he doesn't really use it. The reason is, he's up
against very strong Cabinet Secretaries.

Senator Lieberman. So how do we deal with that? Because we
know the SECDEF has a lot of authority and power. How are we
going to equalize that competition, that tension, in a way that gives
more resources to the war on terror?

Here we have, "George Tenet declares war on terrorism as DCI
in" — as the Commission report said, "in 1998." Nobody responds to
him. Maybe it's because they didn't think it mattered, because he
didn't have any budget authority over them.

Dr. Hamre. But, Senator, it's not the only war we're fighting. We
have a lot of things we're having to do besides war on terrorism.
It is not the only focus. I think that's the primary worry I have:
we're going to organize around just that one concept. I think that's
where I have to ask you to be careful.

Senator Lieberman. My time's up. But, obviously, we're not
going to organize just around that one concept. The problem — my
fear is — and this report documents it — this is the great threat to
the security and lives of the American people, and we're not devot-
ing enough of our intelligence resources, in a coordinated way with
somebody in charge, to it.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. May I, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Warner. Yes.

Dr. Schlesinger. There are bureaucratic problems within the
CIA, and when George Tenet, quite rightly, said, "We are at war,"
even within the CIA, there was not the resource shifts that should
have come, given the fact that we were at war.

Senator Lieberman. It's a point well made.

Chairman Warner. Thank you.

Senator Sessions.

Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We're talking about the problems, and I think the panel has
dealt with the problems, the deficiencies we had at the time of Sep-
tember 11. But a lot has happened since September 11, for heaven
sakes. The NCTC that's been established, with CIA as the head of-
ficer — I think it's in the FBI building, supported fully by FBI — and
every bit of intelligence involving terrorism is filtered through
there so it can be properly analyzed. I guess, first of all, that's a
big step forward, I think, and it's the kind of thing that was not
happening before September 11. Also, I notice in the Commission's
report that our expenditures for intelligence fell every year from
1990 to 1996. From 1996 to 2000, it was flat, except for a Gingrich
supplemental, they note.

But since then, we've been spending a lot more money on intel-
ligence, particularly HUMINT and other things that we know we
were, in the aftermath of the disaster of September 11, to do better
about.

Do any of you doubt that there is a great deal more cooperation
within the agencies now, a great deal of effort to knock down the
stovepiping, that obviously existed before September 11, in the
months since September 11? Secretary Hamre, I guess you're the
most recent

Dr. Hamre. Sir, just by way of disclosure, I serve on an advisory
board to both the FBI and the NSA, and there is more cooperation
than I have ever recalled between these agencies and with the NSA
and with the CIA. There is dramatically more cooperation. There
still are organizational impediments. The law enforcement perspec-
tive is constraining, from an intelligence standpoint, to be candid.
So there are issues like that.

But, as you pointed out, lots has happened. Lots of good things
have happened.

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Hamre, I know you served as Dep-
uty Secretary and also as the Comptroller to the DOD under Presi-
dent Clinton's administration, but let me ask you about this. It's
the "Central" Intelligence Agency. I presume that means it's sup-
posed to be the central source of intelligence for the country. Was
that the purpose of the founding of this agency, or one of the pur-
poses of it?

Dr. Hamre. Sir, it's supposed to be the one and only all-source
intelligence center that's supposed to provide.

Senator Sessions. So if we create another one now, we're putting
layer on layer. Is that what you're concerned about?

Dr. Hamre. Sir, I think the proposal that the Commission is rec-
ommending is not to duplicate the CIA, but, indeed, to split off the
central coordination role of the DCI from the CIA. That's where my
concern lies, is that I think that recommendation, if left at that,
will actually weaken both, and that's not a good idea.

Senator Sessions. I had an opportunity to have dinner with
some CIA agents and station chiefs and it was 8 o'clock. They said
that was the earliest they had been at home. They're working 7
days a week to serve this country. I don't think they think that this
Congress or the American people have any idea of what they do.
My impression was, they simply felt that what they were doing was
critical to this country, and they were doing it because they love
this country.

Mr. Carlucci, you mentioned "disruption" and Secretary Schles-
inger, "do no harm." Isn't it important that we not do anything that
damages the morale and the motivation of those agents in CIA and
DIA around the world who are at risk for us this very moment?

Mr. Carlucci. I'm glad you raised that, Senator Sessions, be-
cause I don't think enough focus has been given to the recruitment
of human assets around the world. I have worked with these people
throughout a 26-year Foreign Service career. I have seen them do
their day job during the day, do their CIA work all night. I've seen
the strain on families. I've seen the dedication. There's no recogni-
tion. They can't become ambassadors. They just do it out of pure
dedication. We need to support them. The name Dewey Claridge
probably doesn't mean much these days, but there is a man who
was indicted for carrying out his professional responsibilities. We
don't treat them well. We need — one of the things — people say,
"Well, we're not recommending change." I'm recommending a very

serious change, that we make sure we support our intelUgence offi-
cers in the field. Recognize, sure, there are mistakes, there are in-
telHgence faiUngs, but there are a helluva lot of dedicated people
out there doing a fine job.

Senator SESSIONS. Perhaps what Mr. Tenet meant when he said
it would take 5 years to get this thing back on a level we'd like
to see it move to, he was talking about the delays that occur when
you establish HUMINT. You just can't do that overnight, isn't that
correct, Mr. Carlucci?

Mr. Carlucci. You have to organize some cover. You have to
train, you have to organize cover. You don't just go out and hire
an Arab-speaking officer and send him into Iraq or Afghanistan
and say, "Recruit." It takes years to get good cover, non-official
cover. You can do embassy cover very quickly. But non-official
cover, which is what you have to do against the terrorist target, or
against hard targets, like North Korea or Iraq, takes years to de-
velop.

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Schlesinger, you've headed two cabi-
net agencies. I happened to be a prosecutor when we did the drug
czar. That was supposed to coordinate all the Federal agencies on
the drug front. I'm not saying it did not have some positive bene-
fits, but it's pretty hard, is it not, to have some non-cabinet-level
official order cabinet-level officials around?

Dr. Schlesinger. My observation is that, unless a czar is given
an agency, that, sooner or later, like Nicholas II, he winds up at
Ekaterinburg with a bullet in his head. [Laughter. 1

Two quick points, Senator. First, the disruption that Frank re-
ferred to does not just affect our ability to recruit agents; it affects
the morale of the people in the Department. When you shuffle
around agencies, you're going to pay at least a short-term price, be-
cause individuals in the system will be concerned about where they
fit into the new system.

Second point, we are now dealing with a different kind of con-
flict, and the CIA was established to bring together all of the infor-
mation that came from the then-Army and Navy that was lost dur-
ing the runup to Pearl Harbor. It was not designed to bring in the
FBI.

When I joined the government in 1969, the Director of the FBI
was Herbert Hoover, who had given orders to all FBI personnel
never to speak to anybody in the CIA. Now, that is real
stovepiping. Of course, there were all these clandestine, if I may
use — these exchanges of information, because the people in both
the FBI and the CIA recognized that, to some extent, they had to
work together.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Reed.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, not only for your testimony, but for your
service to the Nation over many years.

It seems to me we've had two extraordinary failures in intel-
ligence, both September 11 and Iraq. There were failures in collec-
tion, analysis, distribution of information, and, ultimately, decision-
making. They represent — if not two sides of a coin, slightly dif-
ferent phenomenon. I would suspect that if we focus only on Sep-

tember 11, we might not fully realize all the changes that we have
to make.

The September 11 problem has a domestic component, which is
not the case if we look at North Korea, we hope, or Iran. Those are
strategic problems we have to deal with. In September 11, it was
more of a failure of warning. In Iraq, it certainly wasn't a failure
of warning.

Consistent, though, were belief structures. We believed, before
September 11, they could never do an3d;hing like this. With respect
to Iraq, we believed they were going to do something the next day.

So, again, a very general question, but in terms of collection,
analysis, distribution, decisionmaking, what specific advice would
you have for us? Also, what about this notion of belief structure,
about — we fool ourselves sometimes — not the bad guys, but we fool
ourselves.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Let me comment on WMD, if I may.

Senator Reed. Yes, sir.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Given the information that the analysts had,
theirs was not an unreasonable conclusion, that Saddam Hussein
had WMD, given his history. The problem with the intelligence
that went public was that it did not include the caveats that should
have been included, all of the doubts, all of the holes.

The real problem with intelligence on WMD was not the ana-
lysts; it was the failure to have effective HUMINT from inside Iraq,
which is, unlike the Soviet Union or China, more readily penetra-
ble. That we had no solid information. The analysts were working
on the basis of inferences, and that's all they had, and the infer-
ences are not unreasonable.

Senator Reed. Mr. Hamre?

Dr. Hamre. Sir, I think you've identified a very central problem,
which is this — as you've talked about, belief structure, or some peo-
ple call it "group think," which sets in. I can only think of one real-
ly structural solution to that, and that's to make sure that the var-
ious elements of the government that have to come together to
make a decision in the executive branch have to report to different
oversight committees up here on the Hill and explain it to people
with different perspectives. That's the only way I can think you can
do that. Therefore, they need to keep — retain intelligence capabili-
ties for assessment purposes and for their own department.

Senator Reed. That presupposes that our oversight will be vigor-
ous and consistent.

Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir, and I hope it will.

Senator Reed. Thank you.

This issue of stovepipes is interesting. We all understand about
stovepipes, but eventually they end, and that's in the National
Command Authority, where the President — not just this President,
but any President — has to challenge these agencies.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Usually stripped of their caveats.

Senator Reed. Caveats, yes. But that's where the President will
ask about the caveats, one would hope, because to assume that this
is all simple stuff, I think misses point from the beginning, which
raises a question. Maybe it's a mundane question, but with all this
anticipated moving around of institutions and organizations and
analysis, how will that help the President and the White House

make better decisions? I think it is really one of the fundamental
questions, and I'd appreciate your comments.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Look at the issue of the WMD once again. My
problem with that is that the agency that had the best technical
knowledge was disregarded. The Department of Energy said, "All
of our people who have looked at it said that these particular tubes
are not intended for centrifuges," and that, in the overall, was
pushed aside. You have to have a system that has respect for those
who have the closest technical knowledge.

Senator Reed. Again, I think that kind of nuance and detail is
not being captured in the discussion of creating an NID and

Dr. SCHLESINGER. No.

Senator Reed. — the TTIC. But that's really where it — eventually,
you make the judgment, which is, basically, giving the experts
their play, letting them give you the analysis. In that case, they did
connect the dots.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes.

Senator Reed. But they were ignored. So it's not all the time
about just connecting the dots; it's having decisionmakers who are
willing to listen and to probe the analysis.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We not only want to connect the dots, we want
to connect them correctly.

Senator Reed. It looks as if we will do something. I would ask
you, what do you think is the minimum we should do, Mr. Carlucci
and Dr. Schlesinger and Dr. Hamre? Then what things, specifically,
we might defer because they're hard and they require more cogent
thought and they require, perhaps, just more time?

Did you have any thoughts in that regard?

Mr. Carlucci. Let me start. I think we ought to go ahead and
create the NCTC with the operational planning component in it.
I'm a little nervous about putting operational planning too close to
intelligence, but I think, given the changed circumstances — Senator
Lieberman, you said, "It's not the 1970s" — we ought to do that. We
ought to find ways to tighten up cooperation between domestic and
foreign intelligence. I would do that by looking at the DCI's author-
ity, seeing if that could be enhanced, seeing what kind of participa-
tion the FBI's going to have in the NCTC.

I would defer the question of an NID until we've had opportunity
to give it more study.

Senator Reed. Dr. Hamre? Dr. Schlesinger?

Dr. Hamre. Jim?

Dr. Schlesinger. Go ahead.

Dr. Hamre. As I said, I think that the 9/11 Commission rec-
ommendation would give us too strong an NID for what we want,
and I think the President's recommendation is too weak an NID.
So if we're going to have an NID, I think you have to ground him
with enough institutional heft so he can carry out the duties that
I think Secretary Carlucci just outlined. He's not going to become
a strong coordinator if he has no underlying institutional base for
it.

Senator Reed. Dr. Schlesinger?

Dr. Schlesinger. I agree with what Frank said, and partially
agree with what John said.

The point to keep in mind is that one can estabUsh a czar who
has a sunset provision, not at any fixed date. But the power of a
czar tends to fade over time. So when it's first estabUshed, there's
great fanfare, and so on.

Two things that the NID could do. One is to break down the im-
pediments to the flow of information that are represented by each
agency having its own special classification system. There is no
way that much of the agency material cannot pass from one to an-
other, and somebody with the authority of the President, whether
in the White House or out of the White House, can break down
those classification barriers.

The second point that I would make is, going back at least to the
time of Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor has done a
lot of coordinating for the President. We can have that coordination
formally established through an NID. But if the NID does not have
large number of troops under his control, sooner or later his power
will fade.

Senator Reed. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator.

Dr. Schlesinger, for the record, you replied to an earlier question
by Senator Reed comparing the former Soviet Union, China, and
Iraq with regard to the ability to get HUMINT in. Would you, once
again, repeat that? Because I understood you to say it would be
easier to get into Iraq than China or Russia.

Dr. Schlesinger. That would be correct.

Chairman Warner. All right. Then the record is correct.

Senator Collins.

Senator Collins. Thank you.

I want to return to the issue that was raised by Senator
Lieberman and Senator Levin, albeit from different perspectives,
about whether there is a link between the failures prior to Septem-
ber 11 and the issue of budget authority for the NID. I want to re-
turn to this, because I think there is a link, and that there is an
important link, which the 9/11 Commission revealed.

The Commission talks about DCI Tenet issuing a directive in De-
cember 1998 in which he says the following, "We are at war. I want
no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside the CIA
or in the community." But the Commission goes on to note that
nothing really happened after that directive was issued.

To me, that is directly attributable to the fact that the DCI does
not have the authority to mobilize resources across the govern-
ment, and that's why I do think the idea of an NID with significant
authority is part of the answer.

Secretary Carlucci, you mentioned this morning Stansfield Turn-
er testifying before the Governmental Affairs Committee. He en-
dorsed the creation of an NID. He tells a story about how, shortly
after he took over as DCI, you came into his office, as deputy, and
said something to the effect of, "We have a lot of levers in this of-
fice, but I've come to the conclusion that the wires have been cut
and that they aren't actually connected." I love that quote, because
I think it sums up what's wrong, that we have, on paper, a position
that looks like he would have considerable authority, but that

when it comes to mobilizing the entire IC, the powers that are
needed, the authority's simply not there.

Secretary Carlucci, I'll start with, could you respond to that,
since I'm quoting, or trying to quote you?

Mr. Carlucci. I've not had the opportunity recently to do an
analysis. Certainly, I felt that Stan had ample authority, and exer-
cised that authority.

My point is that if you don't have the requisite authority with
the DCI, don't create another layer. Give the requisite authority to
the DCI. Let's analyze that, see what he needs — he or she — and
make sure that that person has the tools to do the job. I'm very
much afraid of the disruption that goes with creating another
layer, and the impact that might have on our warfighting capabil-
ity, as well.

Senator Collins. Dr. Schlesinger?

Dr. Schlesinger. When DCI Tenet made that observation in
1998, that we are at war, he certainly had authority within the
CIA, which has large numbers of people. Every element of the CIA
said, "That's right. Just don't take any resources away from me,"
so that you wound up with 6 or 8 or 10 people being assigned to
Osama bin Laden. It wasn't that he did not recognize the problem.
It was that there was bureaucratic resistance, or lethargy, what-
ever you want to call it.

I am sure that if the DCI talks to the Director of NSA and says,
"This is our problem. Listen carefully," that the Director of NSA
will respond to that. If he doesn't, a conversation with the SECDEF
would have been, should have been, sufficient.

The problem was that DOD was not responsive in that period.
There was reluctance to get involved. Secretary Cohen, as John
Hamre will remember, talked about the threat of WMD on U.S.
soil, but DOD did not devote the resources, and was certainly op-
posed to any military action to go after al Qaeda.

Senator Collins. Dr. Hamre?

Dr. Hamre. Senator Collins, I think if you were to look at the
statute that currently gives authority to the DCI, you'd find it real-
ly gives the authority that you're seeking in the NID. So, to Sec-
retary Carlucci's point, you could — you really could — it's already
there. The authority is there. I think you have to ask, why hasn't
it worked? Why hasn't it happened? I think the candid reaction is
that the DCI bucks up against big, powerful Cabinet Secretaries,
and there's always compromise in all that. I don't want to quarrel
about the priorities of the 1990s, but we were fighting other wars
at the same time, and so you're using — you're always apportioning
your scarce resources — your intelligence resources, your military
resources — for a range of things, and you're making a judgment as
to where you have to put them at the time. I don't think anybody
consciously said, "Well, we know there's a big terrorist threat out
there. We're just going to ignore it." Nobody ever said that. I think
there was a consciousness change on September 11 that made all
of our decisions on September 10 irrelevant. I think that's now
what we're looking at. We're looking back at that period with the
consciousness we now have, on September 11, that we didn't have
before. Now, you have to ask yourself, "What do I do about that,"
in terms of changing the government.

Senator COLLINS. That's true. But it seems to me that when you
have a call to action that is as stark as George Tenet's was in 1998,
when he says, "We are at war. I want no resources or people
spared in this effort throughout the entire IC," and yet little hap-
pens, that suggests to me a flaw in our structure, and that's why
we're striving so hard to fix that.

I see my time has expired. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Collins, your question, to me, it goes
to the heart of a point that I raised in my opening statement. Dr.
Hamre said that the DCI has all the authority he feels he needs
now; it's a question of whether to exercise it. I wondered, did the
other two witnesses concur that the DCI, under current law, has
sufficient authority to do those things that we envision an NID will
do?

Mr. Carluccl I haven't made a study of it, but I think he does.
Certainly he did when I was in the CIA.

Chairman WARNER. I don't think the law has been changed that
way.

Dr. Schlesinger?

Dr. Schlesinger. I think that — I don't know whether he has all
the authority. He certainly has a great deal more authority than
was exercised.

I might observe, Mr. Chairman, that we had national compla-
cency in that period. It is important not to blame national compla-
cency on the failure of the IC. It was a general national failure.

Mr. Carluccl Moreover, we don't know what actions George
Tenet tried to take where he was blocked. I've not heard any evi-
dence to that effect. He issued the warning. Did he do anything to
follow up on the warning? I don't know.

Chairman Warner. Thank you.

Senator Ben Nelson?

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm intrigued by the discussion about solving the right problem,
because I think that the tendency in Washington, or in other areas
of government and in the States is, typically if there's a problem,
we need more money, a reorganization, some other layer of bu-
reaucracy to solve it, and that's what we typically do. So I'm hope-
ful that we will avoid doing that here.

In that regard, I also hope that we will solve the current prob-
lem, rather than the problem on September 11. Let me be clear on
that. I get the impression that maybe some of the circumstances
that existed on September 11 have either been self-correcting or
have had some correction along the way with subsequent knowl-
edge and experience. If that's the case, isn't it important that we
make sure that the recommendations that the 9/11 report have are
for the current situation, versus the prior situation? I'd like to get
your thoughts about that.

Dr. Schlesinger. I think that the first act of this committee
might well be to make an inventory of the changes that have actu-
ally occurred in the IC and beyond the IC since September 11.
Then you will be able to deal with the situation as you see it today
rather than the defects of the period before September 11.

Mr. Carluccl I think your point is right on, and endorse what
Jim said.

Dr. Hamre. I agree.

Senator Ben Nelson. Now, in that regard, holding back, per-
haps, on the NID might make a lot of sense, because if you're going
to put somebody in a position to be part of the solution, you're
going to have to deal with the authority issue. That'll relate to
budgeting, hiring and firing, policy relating to implementation.
Would that also require an inventory of what really needs to be
within the power of that NID if we choose to make that part of the
solution?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that you might well indicate to that
NID the priority tasks, because, otherwise, you have an endless list
of things that might be done, and there are certain things that are
high priority that should be done.

Mr. Carlucci. I now have visions of an enormous bureaucracy
turning itself inside out to reorganizing, everybody writing a job
description, trying to figure out where they're going to be the next
day, figuring out what pieces of the CIA should go to the new NID,
how we ought to intervene, what kind of command-and-control ar-
rangements he ought to have over the CSAs. I think we may be
creating a real confusing mess.

Senator Ben Nelson. I was about to say that that's what we had
with the Department of Homeland Security, but I would suggest
that we're still having it.

Dr. Hamre?

Dr. Hamre. I'd agree with what you just said, and I would agree
with what my colleagues said.

Senator Ben Nelson. Well, what an agreeable group. [Laughter.]

I really appreciate that.

As we relate to the executive branch, with the oversight from the
legislative branch, can you give us some enlightenment, your
thoughts, about how we exercise oversight in this particular area,
with a number of committees having some degree of oversight,
some of it overlapping? Is there a way to help straighten out the
relationship between the executive and legislative branches? Hav-
ing served in both, myself, at the State level, and then here now,
in the legislative branch — is that a bigger question than we have
time for?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, if you can persuade your colleagues
to put protection of turf further down their priority list, you will
have accomplished a great deal.

Senator Ben Nelson. Are you going to touch that one, Mr. Car-
lucci?

Mr. Carluccl I've never been on the Hill, so I'll bow out of that
one.

Dr. Hamre. Sir, I worked up here for 10 years, and, frankly, con-
gressional oversight amplifies the stovepipes in the executive
branch.

Senator Ben Nelson. Do you think it also can — when you say
"amplifies," it just creates

Dr. Hamre. It reinforces

Senator Ben Nelson. Reinforces them?

Dr. Hamre. — reinforces the parochialism inside the executive
branch. The hearings, Congress tends to hear from its favorite de-
partments and agencies, and that gets reinforced in the bureau-

cratic fights that we take into the executive branch. So it's — there
does — it really does, in many ways, start here. I would think that
spending some time figuring out some reform, bringing yourselves
together in a cleaner oversight, would help a great deal.

Senator Ben Nelson. Probably we'd have to have some outside
suggestions brought to us, because it's probably not easy to reform
ourselves, when we have our own interests. But I do think that
that will have to be part of the solution when we put together
whatever the recommendations and/or legislation that might be
forthcoming.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.

I believe, under the leadership of Chairman Roberts and Vice
Chairman Rockefeller, that that is the subject of review of the In-
telligence Committee on which I serve.

Senator Ben Nelson. I don't believe the process will work with-
out reform on the inside here, as well.

Chairman Warner. Thank you.

Senator Talent.

Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really want to
thank you for holding this hearing. It's been one of the best I've
attended. I came in here really leaning towards this whole idea of
an NID, and, I have to say, you've made a very powerful case
against it, which, in all candor, I don't think has been shaken very
much by those who have questioned you and who support it.

It seems to me — and tell me if I'm wrong — that what you're basi-
cally saying is, if we create this NID and he's too weak, it's just
another layer of bureaucracy, which nobody wants; and if he's too
strong, there is a considerable risk that he will disrupt the actions
of his new directorate, will disrupt the considerable amount of good
work that is going on within the agencies, certainly within the De-
partment, without fixing what, in your judgment, really went
wrong. Because, I take it from your testimony, that you just think
there is no substitute for getting good people on the ground who
are exercising good analytical judgment on the basis of both good
technical and human intelligence. Is that a pretty fair summary of
what you're saying?

Mr. Carluccl Perfect.

Senator Talent. Perfect. Mr. Carlucci, I was going to raise a lot
of issues and try and think of some hypothetical about why an
agency, let's say, station head or an agency official might not al-
ways share, in order to protect his sources. But I think the one you
came up with in your testimony about the hypothetical Iraqi offi-
cial who you're trying to recruit, and if he knows the watchword
of the day throughout the Government of United States is "share
everything," he might be a little bit disinclined to put his neck on
the line, wouldn't want that floating up in every discussion that
goes on in Washington.

Mr. Carluccl Back in the days. Senator Talent, when we could
protect sources and methods, I can remember as an FSO having a
particularly important, but highly sensitive contact. I deliberately
turned him over to the agency because they could run him in a cov-
ert way, and that would better benefit the U.S. Government, even
though it would not help my career.

Senator Talent. So you turned him over to the agency because
you knew they could stovepipe it.

Mr. Carlucci. Yes, I knew

Senator Talent. Put it that way.

Mr. Carluccl Exactly.

Senator Talent. They could protect that source.

Mr. Carluccl They could protect that source, and he went on
being protected for years.

Senator Talent. All right. So it seems to me — and tell me if I'm
wrong — that you're recommending several things. One of them —
and I think I heard you all very strongly on this, and I'm really
inclined to agree with this — that there has been no effective case
made, either by the 9/11 Commission or otherwise — and certainly
sitting on this committee, both here in the Senate, and in the
House, I agree with this — there's been no case made that the collec-
tion and dissemination of intelligence within the Department, for
the purpose of supporting tactical military operations in theater, is
broken. That is working, and working because of efforts made
throughout the Department ever since — well, for the last 20 years,
and certainly since Operation Desert Storm. So we must, at all ac-
counts, not break that. In other words, it took a lot of effort to get
that to where it is, and we have to be careful we don't break it.
Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Carluccl Jim made the case very well, I thought.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. May I

Senator Talent. Yes, go ahead. Please.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. — go back to your first statement? It was per-
fect, except in one respect

Senator Talent. Yes.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. — that NID can be too strong and too weak at
the same time. [Laughter.]

Senator Talent. Having only 5 minutes, I don't know that I'll go
into it; besides which, I understand in the less nuanced way that
you've presented it to this point, and I don't know that I want to
mess up my understanding.

I feel strongly about that, also. I have seen this work — I think
we all have — in classified settings, and I know that commanders in
theater now have confidence in this. I think if we turn this over
to a directorate, I think you're absolutely right. Dr. Schlesinger,
there's a tremendous danger that either it won't work, or they'll be-
lieve it won't work in theater, and that could cost us lives. The
funny thing is, if it does cost us lives, and there's some huge fail-
ures, we'll probably appoint some commission and then have a
bunch of hearings after that, and go back and ask ourselves why
that happened, and it will have been the result of not being careful
not to fix what isn't broken.

The second point I hear you saying is, look, if there are further
obstacles to prevent sharing between FBI and CIA, we ought to get
rid of them. Now, to utter a little dissenting point of view. I re-
member some of the abuses in the 1970s that were the reason why
those Chinese walls were set up. Can we do the sharing without
the abuses? I guess this isn't any of your field of expertise, but do
you want to comment on it?

Mr. Carlucci. One thing that that ignores is the degree of over-
sight that you currently have.

Senator Talent. Yes.

Mr. Carlucci. Jim Angleton couldn't perform today the way he
had performed — the way he performed back in the 1970s. Congress
would have full knowledge of the activities. So I think oversight
takes care of that problem.

Senator TALENT. Okay. So, again, yes, allow the sharing, encour-
age the sharing, but have effective and honest people in charge to
do the oversight.

Mr. Chairman, that's all I have to say. I had more coming in. I
think they've made a pretty strong case. I appreciate your holding
the hearing.

Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. I appreciate. Senator, your arranging your
schedule to be back here for today and tomorrow, and your partici-
pation. Thank you.

Senator Dayton.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with the oth-
ers in thanking you for convening this and tomorrow's hearings.
Gentlemen, thank you for your appearance and your service.

I want to focus on a different set of failures that were disclosed
in the 9/11 Commission Report, which were the failures to, as I
read it, follow some of the existing protocols and procedures, and,
thereby, a failure to the respond to the actual attack, on September
11. Given especially your experience at the very top of the civilian
chain of command, I'd just like to see whether what strikes me as
some egregious disconnects were, in fact, what I perceive them to
be.

Because we talk about this need for fundamental reorganization
or reform and these different words at these levels of sophisticated
intelligence gathering, coordination, et cetera, which I don't dis-
pute. We've spent now this morning in another committee hearing
and this afternoon. It's about 6 hours well spent on these various
aspects.

But according to the Commission report, at least two, and prob-
ably three, orders from the Vice President of the United States,
through a military aide, to North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) to communicate to the fighter planes that
were in the air at that time, the authority to shoot down an incom-
ing enemy plane, a hijacked plane, were not passed on to the fight-
er pilots by the mission commander. On page 83, both the NORAD
mission commander and the senior weapons director indicated they
did not pass the order to the fighters circling Washington and New
York because they were unsure how the pilots would or should pro-
ceed with this guidance. Leaving aside that this authorization from
the Vice President, based on, as he's communicated, his conversa-
tion with the President occurred 2 hours after the first hijacking
began, and 10 minutes after the last plane actually had crashed in
the fields of Pennsylvania, the fact that it was not passed on by
NORAD to the pilots, to me, just is astonishing.

The Commission goes on in the next paragraph to say, "In most
cases, the chain of command authorizing the use of force runs from
the President to the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary

of Defense to the combatant commander." The President appar-
ently spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld the first time that morning
shortly after 10:00. No one can recall the content of this conversa-
tion, but it was a brief call in which the subject of shoot-down au-
thority was not discussed.

Then the SECDEF, who I give full credit for going courageously
to the site of the Pentagon explosion, returned at 10:39 — this is 2V2
hours now after — almost 2 hours and 25 minutes after the first hi-
jacking commenced — and the Vice President is understandably of
the belief that he's passed on these orders and that they're being
carried out, and the SECDEF seems to be — very appropriately is
saying, "Who did you give the direction to?"

The SECDEF, "Let me"— you know, "Has that directive been
transmitted to the aircraft?"

The Vice President, 'Tes, it has."

Secretary of Defense, "Just to be clear, so you have a couple of
aircraft up there that have those instructions at the present time."

Vice President, "That is correct. It's my understanding they've al-
ready taken a couple of aircraft out."

Now, if you were the SECDEF in this situation, and that order
from the Vice President of the United States, transmitted that way
to the defense of this country has not been communicated to the
pilots up there? I mean, is that an acceptable procedure, or is that
as egregious a failure to defend this country as it appears to me?

Mr. Carlucci. It's certainly not acceptable. Defense never
trained for this kind of circumstance.

Senator Dayton. Well, but

Mr. Carlucci. But that's no excuse. But that's a fact.

Senator Dayton. They trained to follow out the command — I
mean, that's what I'm trying to understand. Is it a failure to estab-
lish the proper chain of command? If the SECDEF had given a
command from the President of the United States, would that have
been carried out without question? Or, in this case, given that it
came from the Vice President, based on a verbal conversation with
the President, who's up on Air Force One, understandably — is up
there and, by his own testimony, is having difficulty with the com-
munications system there, which is another concern, to commu-
nicate in an ongoing line of communication with the Vice President.
The Vice President transmits an order from — or an instruction
from the President to NORAD, and it's not passed on. Where is the
breakdown here? Just because it hasn't been rehearsed?

Mr. Carlucci. I can't answer that.

Senator DAYTON. No, I mean, I — is it — I mean, I'm aston-
ished

Dr. Hamre. Sir, I'm not going to try to answer it. But for some-
thing of this nature, there are procedures that an action officer in
a command center will check that he's received a valid order. Very
few action officers actually are talking to the Vice President on the
other end. So there is a procedure and a set of very specified direc-
tions so that you get a validated order, so you know you are under
the authority of the Commander in Chief of the United States to
taken an action.

I surmise that those — that that wasn't in place. It was happening
so — in such a chaotic way, and it just wasn't there. People said.

"Well, wait a minute, we don't — we didn't get X, Y, Z kind of a mes-
sage from such and such," and they probably said, "Well, how do
you know this is real?"

I'm speculating here, sir, but I — we need to be — we know now
that we have to be ready for this. We didn't have that conscious-
ness on September 11, and my guess is, is that they didn't have
the — they didn't follow a predesignated format for authenticating a
communication from the President of the United States. We know
how to do that for nuclear war. We've never had that for an episode
like this. So before we just say that there was an egregious failure
of duty, my guess is there are some operational details I need to
understand better before I could jump to the conclusion that said
that it was a dereliction of duty.

Senator DAYTON. I'm not suggesting that at all. I think people
were individually responding according to their own judgment. Cer-
tainly, the Vice President was running the command post there.

Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir.

Senator DAYTON. The fact that we didn't receive — weren't receiv-
ing the kind of incoming enemy attack that we thought we would
be receiving

Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir.

Senator Dayton. — in some other circumstance

Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir.

Senator Dayton. — obviously, is

Dr. Hamre. I certainly understand your question. Yes, sir.

Senator Dayton. The other point I would just make, because it
leads to — and I know I'm out of time here — but due to the — I think,
the good graces of the chairman of the committee and his — the lo-
cation of the National Airport at — in the State of Virginia, we're
operating that with some risk to the Capitol, to the White House,
and the like. We had a situation with the Governor of Kentucky
which has been largely overlooked by Congress and by, I think, the
powers that be in the last — about 2 months ago that says to me,
if you look at the failure, again, of communications — we evacuated
this entire complex. A couple of thousand people were literally run-
ning for their lives out of the buildings because of a failure again —
and I can't get into this all — of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to communicate with NORAD, to communicate, in this, with
the Capitol Police. So, the axiom, what is condoned continues — yes,
we were caught very much by surprise on September 11, but I see
continuing evidence of a failure of the established procedures to be
followed in a situation 2 months ago. Fortunately, it was the Gov-
ernor of Kentucky in a propellor plane rather than some other kind
of attack. But it really alarms me.

Mr. Chairman, I just would submit that I hope we can pursue
this, because we can do all the intelligence reorganization, and we
can spend billions more, or billions differently, but if we don't have
basic lines of authority that we're going to follow in those situa-
tions of a national emergency, it doesn't matter, frankly, how much
we spend, it's going to fail again.

Thank you.

Chairman Warner. Senator, your point is well taken. The Sen-
ator's point is well-taken.

Dr. Schlesinger?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I can well understand why you are per-
turbed

Senator Dayton. Stunned.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. — but not astonished. The order to shoot down
a passenger airliner is met with a certain incredulity, and we were
not prepared for this occasion. A fundamental point to bear in mind
is, we had a clear chain of command, and yet there was a failure.
Reorganization is not going to solve that problem.

Senator Dayton. Right. Thank you.

Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, you bring a wealth of experience and knowledge to
this particular issue. By being here today, you're again performing
a great public service to your country, so we thank you for your
service here today.

I'm one of the folks who started out not being supportive of an
NID, and for a lot of the same reasons that you have enunciated
here today; particularly, Secretary Carlucci, your statement regard-
ing another level of bureaucracy continues to bother me today, even
though I've come around to thinking we need this position. But if
we create simply another level of bureaucracy, we're going to do a
lot more harm than we're going to do good, and the next 9/11 re-
port's going to be twice as thick, say the same thing, and yet we're
going to have another incident that has occurred.

But the fact of the matter is that there are a number of agencies
involved. We've talked about a lot of them here today. We've been
primarily concentrating on DOD, but there are a number of depart-
ment heads that we've not even alluded to today, some of which are
scratched, from a surface standpoint, in the 9/11 report. For exam-
ple, the Department of Transportation. We were just talking about
the FAA here. You have Amtrak involved. You have all of our
major transportation systems in every major city in the country
that would have to be involved.

The one major issue that, again, is touched on by the 9/11 Com-
mission Report that complicates this issue even further is the im-
migration issue. We're in the process right now, Senator Kennedy
and I, of trying to make some major changes relative to how we
deal with visas and who comes into this country. You have to have
some mechanism for tying all of these issues — whether it's defense,
immigration, transportation, or whatever — together and make sure
that all of that information is getting into one funnel, and that that
funnel is where it ought to be, and it can get there in real time —
and not just get in the funnel in real time, but get out to the other
people that need that information in real time.

Because of that, I have come to the conclusion that an NID can
act in the same manner as a chief executive officer of a major cor-
poration if he has the right tools with which to do it. If you don't
give them to him, then he's not going to be able to do it.

But there's nobody out there right now — even with the powers
that the DCI has, he has no control over the FBI. Director Mueller
is responsible to Attorney General Ashcroft, he should be, and we
can't change that structure. DIA is responsible to the SECDEF. We

can't change that structure. You are absolutely right that the
warfighter who is on the ground in Iraq has to have the confidence
that his military superiors are the ones who are going to give that
answer to him.

So there has to be somebody out there to get all of this informa-
tion together, and get their arms around it, and make sure that
these folks are talking to each other, the stovepipes are broken
down. The Chinese walls. Dr. Schlesinger, that you referred to, be-
tween law enforcement and intelligence, are — they're down as a re-
sult of the Patriot Act. They have to stay down. It's absolutely im-
perative that they do. Somebody has to coordinate all of that.

I guess it's our job to try to figure out, taking the information
that you and other folks are giving us as to how we do that — there
is a statement that you made. Dr. Hamre, which I appreciate, and
I wrote it down, where you said that an NID really has to have an
institutional base if he's going to be successful. I know your com-
ments relative to moving NRO and our other two agencies out of
DIA — or DOD — under an NID would go towards doing that. But I'd
like you to expand a little bit on that.

What else does this individual need to have? We can say he
ought to be able to hire and fire, he ought to have budget author-
ity, but, as you and I were talking earlier, from a practical stand-
point that is going to be extremely difficult, and we're not going to
be able to do this by the October 1 deadline that's been imposed
on us.

But would you expand on what you mean by that institutional
base and where we need to go?

Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir. Senator Chambliss. The reason I don't want
to take away DIA from the SECDEF is the same as why I don't
want to take the Bureau of Intelligence and Research away from
the Secretary of State. They need those things. But there are a set
of — the large collection agencies, the factories — they run the sat-
ellites, they run the listening stations. They're in the business of
just collecting wholesale, large amounts of information and then
distributing it to the analysts. My view is that that could be
brought under this NID. This would be a very significant institu-
tion. These would — this would be tens of millions — or tens of thou-
sands of people, tens of billions of dollars annual budget. It would
be a very substantial base, and he would be — or he or she would
be the supplier, then, of intelligence to the analytic agencies, which
would remain with the secretaries. That would be considerable in-
stitutional clout.

Now, it also means that everybody else in the government is
going to be in the position of demanding better quality from him
and those factories. Those factories need now to support all those
people. Right, now, in DOD, frankly, we tend to spend more time
defending them because they're in our budget, rather than demand-
ing they give us good quality. We tend to do that through different
channels.

So I don't personally believe that you need to have budget control
in order to get good quality out of those agencies. Frankly, it hasn't
been budget tools that we've largely used to get the coordination
at the tactical level, it's been direct. It's making it a CSA. I, person-
ally, would be — would want to make sure that the head of those

agencies is a military officer, and remains under military command
and control. I think there are ways you can handle that. But that
way, you'll put genuine heft underneath that NID. If you don't
have that, then he really — I think, a little like Secretary Schles-
inger said, he's a czar, with power for the first half a year, and
then it starts to atrophy quite quickly.

Senator Chambliss. Anybody else have a comment on that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The first comment is that any reorganization
is going to have advantages and it's going to have disadvantages,
and you want to be sure that the advantages outweigh the dis-
advantages.

The second point is this. There are a variety of ways to handle
this. You could raise the DCI from executive-level two to executive-
level one. You could double-hat him as not only the head of the CIA
and DCI, but he could be the — designated as part of the executive
office as advisor to the President without splitting the analytic ac-
tivities in a way that simply adds another layer to the system. You
can create, by legislation, that the clandestine services, the Direc-
torate of Operations is handed off to a deputy. You could do what
has happened in the Department of Energy, which is to strip out
the national security functions and put it under a quasi-independ-
ent agency known as the National Nuclear Security Administra-
tion, in which the clandestine services would be responsive to an
administrator of clandestine services, whatever you call it.

So there are a whole variety of things that can be done, but hav-
ing a DCI and an NID at the same time, it seems to me, is going
to be counterproductive.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. Senator.

Senator Clinton.

Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our
witnesses for being here today.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that we're struggling with two
very significant questions that are difficult to answer. One is, in a
system with different and sometimes competing intelligence agen-
cies, both for collection and analysis, how do we ensure accountabil-
ity? The second is, how do we ensure that executive branch officials
do not cherry-pick the intelligence that most conforms to their
views, or, I think, in the words of Secretary Schlesinger, the con-
cept of reality that they hold?

We're dealing with human beings, we're dealing with politics,
we're dealing with, unfortunately, partisan politics. You had a
DOD that already controlled 80 to 85 percent of the intelligence
budget, and yet the current SECDEF thought it necessary to create
an Office of Special Plans, and go and find even more intelligence
to be used for whatever concept of reality existed. You had a Vice
President who went over to the CIA — not once, but enumerable
times — to find out what he could find out that would fit his concept
of reality.

So we need a system that can ensure accountability, but also put
some checks and balances back into this system. It is certainly
clear that many signals were missed. There's no doubt about that.
But I think it would be a shame and a tragic indictment of all of
us if we are not more straightforward and honest about the prob-
lems we face.

I listened with great interest to my friend Senator Sessions go
on and on about the questions concerning trade-craft and the expo-
sure of people, yet I have not heard one call from anyone on the
other side of the aisle to conduct a congressional investigation into
the outing of Valerie Plame. Talk about an example that's going to
send Shockwaves through the existing CIA and any of our friends
and allies around the world. There's no drumbeat for any congres-
sional investigation. Why? Because it's in partisan politics.

So I think we can rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic from
now until doomsday, but we need to reassert a sense of ethics and
responsibility that go beyond partisan politics again to get back to
an old-fashioned American patriotism where our highest obligation
is to whatever the facts lead us to. I don't know how we get that
by changing statutes, laws, and rearranging government positions.

I also think it would be irresponsible of our committee not to
take a hard look at Defense intelligence. It may very well be — and
I think the arguments are quite compelling — that you don't want
to interfere with the chain of command or in any way upset the
tactical intelligence that's needed in combat. But there have been
mistakes, and there have been missed opportunities, both oper-
ational and tactical.

I still don't understand what happened at Tora Bora. I don't un-
derstand what happened when the Predator allegedly had bin
Laden in their sights and didn't fire. I don't know what happened.
I think we need to know what happened.

So even if we conclude that it is not prudent to put any over-
arching authority over Defense intelligence, we'd better make sure
we're doing whatever is needed to improve Defense intelligence,
both collection and analysis, and not act as though, "Oh, well, we're
not going to mess with Defense intelligence, because that might
possibly interrupt the chain of command and tactical." We need to
make sure we're doing the best job we can with Defense intel-
ligence.

There was an example, and the 9/11 Commission talks about it.
They call it "the millennium exception." At a certain point in time,
all the forces of our government were called into a room, day after
day after day, run by the National Security Advisor, because, after
all, all of these decisions ultimately are going to be decided in the
White House. I don't care who you put in charge anywhere else.
What we need to do is to figure out how to have a system that rep-
licates what worked the one time in our recent history where we
think it worked, and that required literally having people in the
same room, being held accountable, having their information vet-
ted, asking for further information from the collection, as well as
the analyst, side.

So I think that it's important that we take seriously the need to
reorganize if it is necessary, but there's a much more important,
deeper issue at stake here. That is to try to de-politicize the collec-
tion, analysis, cherry-picking utilization of intelligence, no matter
where it comes from. I hope that that won't even be an issue post-
September 11. But, as I say, the outing of Valerie Plame does not
give me a lot of confidence that we would use a CIA operative for
partisan political advantage.

So I guess, from my perspective — and I take very seriously what
each of you have said; I have high regard for your opinions, based
on many years of service — but let's focus for just a minute in the
area of each of your expertise. Are there types of changes that you
think our Defense and military intelligence need to make to im-
prove on its performance, going forward, in both battlefield situa-
tions like Afghanistan and Iraq and with respect to the point that
my colleague Senator Dayton made? He's been beating this horse
quite vigorously in every hearing, because he is — as, I think, right-
ly so — quite appalled by what the ticktock is that broke down the
chain of command under unusual, but, nevertheless, pressing cir-
cumstances. So could each of you just address the Defense and
military intelligence issue for a moment?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Several comments. The first, Senator Clinton,
is, there may be cherry-picking, but it does not affect, in my judg-
ment, collection, which you mentioned. I think that the collection
activities go on. I think that the attempt — we have had failures in
collection — most obviously, HUMINT, in Iraq — but I don't think
that the problem of collection is either partisan politics or cherry-
picking. Now, the interpretation is a problem.

The second point that I would make is, in the past, we have, as
you indicated, had less partisan politics, and I join with you in
wishing that we could return to those days. But one must distin-
guish between partisan — problems of partisan politics and the
problems of real policy differences. Real policy differences are ap-
propriate, and people will disagree with regard to what should be
done, given certain circumstances. They may do that for partisan
reasons, but there are irreducible level of policy differences.

The third point I would make is, while you're here on Armed
Services, strengthen the DIA. You ask, what do you do about De-
fense intelligence? It is not a real competitor, in my judgment, for
the CIA, and we would be better off, analytically, if we had a
stronger DIA.

Mr. Carlucci. I'd just make — certainly, I think we can all agree,
those who have served professionally, that partisan politics is very
damaging to our intelligence capability and to our military efforts.

I think the one area that requires some attention is, the distinc-
tion between national intelligence and tactical intelligence becomes
increasingly blurred. You mentioned Tora Bora. That fighter in the
field actually has to know everything there is to know about
Osama bin Laden, his whereabouts. Things that used to be consid-
ered national intelligence now have to get into the tactical area. So
that argues, once again, for some kind of closer relationship be-
tween the DCI and the DOD intelligence agencies.

Dr. Hamre. Senator, I would — lots of areas that we need to work.
Specifically, I think the need in DOD is for what we call "long
dwell" in collection capabilities. We have two types right now. We
have collection that comes from airplanes that fly around. That's
a little like looking over an area with a spotlight. So it doesn't —
you can only look at a little spot for a period of time. Then, of
course, we have satellites, and they have huge coverage, big flood-
light-type thing. But they last for 10 minutes and then they won't
be back for another hour and a half.

What we're really needing in the Defense world is what we call
"long dwell," the capacity to get broad-area surveillance that can
linger. So it has the best attributes of both. It has the capacity to
see wide areas, but stay over the target area for a long time.

Now, that's going to be done with a new generation of — remotely
piloted vehicles, largely, is going to be the way we'll do this. It's
a ways away, and there are some very serious technical challenges
associated with it. They should be military assets, in my view.
They should be funded under the TIARA and Joint Military Intel-
ligence Program, because you want them integrated into
warfighting. But they'll have tremendous capacity in the national
world, as well. That's a very good example of where the tactical
systems will feed the national environment. We do that a lot.
That's a good case-in-point, where you would not want to break
that relationship, and you probably would want to put the lead on
developing that inside the DOD. But that's a case-in-point, and we
could come up with other examples like that for you.

Senator Clinton. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thanks, Senator. Senator, I'm sure you're
fully aware, because of your interest in the situation. Ambassador
Wilson's wife — that the FBI is now conducting an ongoing criminal
investigation. It's been my experience that, when that is taking
place, should a parallel investigation begin in Congress, it could
impede or imperil the work of the FBI.

Senator CLINTON. Mr. Chairman, I remember very well Federal
grand-jury investigations that had congressional investigations
going on simultaneously.

Chairman Warner. I defer to your recollection.

Senator Clinton. I have personal experience with that.

Chairman Warner. Senator Dole.

Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say to each of you, it's a privilege to have you testifying
here today. I certainly appreciate your outstanding service to this
country. I've had the privilege of working with two of you in past
lives, so I particularly want to welcome you here today.

I'd like to follow up on what Senator McCain and Senator Nelson
said earlier. Since the 9/11 Commission has made its recommenda-
tions, we, as lawmakers, have been told to look at ourselves in the
mirror. Congressional oversight has been called "Ieix," "uneven,"
and "dysfunctional." Critics have attested that overlapping jurisdic-
tion and turf battles are promoted, rather than the desired result,
which is accountability.

I think we can point to the recently created Department of
Homeland Security as an example of where lessons may be learned
in incorporating a government overhaul of this magnitude. While
we've been at war. Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge and
his top deputies have testified at 290 hearings in the past year and
a half. They've received more than 4,000 letters from Congress re-
questing information. Furthermore, 88 committees and subcommit-
tees assert jurisdictional interest over the Department of Homeland
Security.

Is it not instructive to look at this most recent example of a
major government overhaul as a reality check for a realistic time-
table for Congress to work under, and perhaps a reason to exercise

prudence and discipline, rather than rushing to judgment in con-
sidering the proposed recommendations?

Secretary Hamre?

Dr. Hamre. Yes, absolutely.

Mr. Carlucci. I agree.

Senator Dole. Anything else you'd like to add, utilizing this ex-
ample?

Mr. Carlucci. I think the disruption that goes with a large-scale
reorganization can't be overestimated.

Senator DOLE. Right.

Mr. Carluccl It's very harmful to performance. So I think your
point is right on.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Senator Dole, I'd be happy to submit my testi-
mony to the House Select Committee on those 88 committees of
oversight and how they have stretched out the senior officers of the
Department of Homeland Security. I fully agree with your observa-
tions.

[The information referred to follows:]

STATEMENT OF JAMES SCHLESINGER

PREPARED FOR AN OVERSIGHT HEARING OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RULES

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 10, 2003

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I thank the Committee for this opportunity to discuss the challenges of creating a new
department, relevant to the Department of Homeland Security — as the House of
Representatives considers possible adjustments in the jurisdictions of its standing committees.

Let me start with this observation. In the 35 years since I first became a government
official, relations between the Congress and executive agencies have changed markedly,
indeed, one might say radically. In the earlier era, a senior official was called on far less
frequently to testify. There would be a number of budget hearings — and from time to time
testimony on some prominent issues. To an extent that may seem surprising today, agencies
were left to manage themselves. Inquiries about specific issues tended to be on an informal
basis — rather than testimony in public session. When I was Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission, all issues were handled by the Joint Committee. When I became the Director of
Central Intelligence, the director was rarely called upon to testify — at least up until the time of
Watergate — and that was primarily in closed session. In the intervening years, that has
changed significantly, as congressional committees have become more deeply involved in the
management of executive agencies.

When we created the Department of Energy, in contrast to those older conditions, I
found that half my time or more was spent on Capitol Hill testifying before various
committees. Of course, the creation of the Department had involved the jurisdictions of
several standing committees. In the circumstances of the day, with repeated energy events or

"crises" like the shutdown of oil production in Iran, rising gasoline prices, the nuclear trauma
at Three Mile Island, these committees legitimately wanted a piece of the action — and
testimony . Moreover, in these last twenty-odd years, the continued proliferation of
subcommittees has only made the problem worse.

Subsequent to the dramatic terrorist attack on the United States in September of 2001,
the decision has been taken to consolidate a whole range of security-related activities into the
new Department of Homeland Security. The longer-term benefits should be substantial. In
particular, it should gradually reorient the cultures of the agencies coming together in the new
department towards the post-91 1 mission of homeland security. But there are always costs of
such consolidation, primarily short-term costs. There will be bureaucratic resistance. There
are inevitable frictions associated with the movement of agencies. There is a clash of cultures
that have to be adjudicated and, of course, the reconciliation of contrasting personnel and
acquisition systems. It is not a certainty that the benefits of consolidation will outweigh the
costs. \

For the Department of Homeland Security, however, that decision is behind us. It is
now the duty of all of us to do our best to make this crucial consolidation work effectively. It
is a monumental challenge successfully to bring together these rather disparate elements — and
efficiently combine them in pursuit of the conmion mission.

Here is the crucial point to bear in mind. A new government department does not
spring, like Athena from the brow of Zeus, full blown and ready for action. Organizing the
department is not instantaneous; it takes time. There are many organizational challenges and
organizational gaps, especially in the early days of a new department. The Department of
Homeland Security is, in a sense, a start-up organization. Contrary to the expectations of too

many, there will be unavoidable growing pains — as the overall organization gradually comes
together. No such thing as immediate and complete success should be expected. Inevitably,
in so complicated an operation, there will be unresolved problems and some setbacks.
Consequently, for those inclined to be critical, there will be all too many targets to shoot at.
The critics can have a field day.

In the case of the Department of Homeland Security, there are all too many platforms
for such criticism. At last count, there were 26 full committees with jurisdiction — and a total
of 88 committees including subcommittees. As problems are uncovered or lake time to be
resolved, the opportimities for criticism will mount. Nonetheless, since the stake is the
security of our homeland, the new department deserves support — and not unnecessary
carping. To whatever extent the Congress can help by simphfying the overlapping committee
structure that oversees the department, that would be a significant contribution.

By comparison, the creation of the Department of Energy was relatively child's play.
The Department was far smaller. Most of the budget came fi"om what had been the Atomic
Energy Commission. The incorporated entities, by and large, had a common mission either
producing energy or weapons. Additionally, there was the oversight function inherited from
the Federal Energy Administration. Yet, all in all, it was a simpler task. To be sure, the
department later ran into difficulties. Several secretaries, by direction or personal inclination,
wanted to disestablish the department. One department head was dismissive of the national
security fiinctions of the department. All that contributed to later and unnecessary disorder.

Yet, at the time of the Department's creation, there had been well-nigh universal
support, hi the House, the Speaker, to facilitate the formation of a national energy policy,
established a Select Committee, which brought together on strict time lines the actions of the

standing committees with jurisdiction. That resulted in quick passage by the House of the
several components of the National Energy Act. But the Senate, which had no similar
mechanism, took a long time to decide on the components. Nonetheless, when the Senate
finally acted, and the bills went to conference, the standing committees in the House once
again were empowered to assert their jurisdictions.

Some of those jurisdictional problems will likely afflict the new Department of
Homeland Security, though others will not. I underscore, however, that we all have an
immense stake in the mission and the success of this new department. Any weaknesses in the
Department likely will prolong the activities of potential terrorists. Rather than preserve all
the perches from which the department can be disparaged, whatever the House can do to help
the new department would serve the national interest.

Mr. Chairman, we must continue to keep the national security foremost. It is a
moniunental challenge to overcome cultural differences and bureaucratic resistance — and to
unite in a single department the many agencies that are being brought together for a common
mission. But it will also be a continuing challenge for the Congress to continue to foster that
integration. Unlike energy policy, which tends to divide the society, homeland security
should unite us.

Thank you for your attention. I shall be happy, Mr. Chairman, to answer any
questions that you and members of the Committee may have.

Senator Dole. Secretary Schlesinger, you've stressed the neces-
sity of cautious interaction between intelligence and policymaking.
Secretary Kissinger has said recently— this was a Washington Post
piece, just in the last couple of days— "Intelligence should supply
the facts relevant to decision. The direction of poHcy and the ulti-

mate choices depend on many additional factors, and must be made
by political leaders."

How effectively would the administration's proposal allow our na-
tional policymakers to direct the intelligence efforts without com-
promising the independence and quality of analj^tical products? Are
there better alternatives in this regard?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that this adds that other layer, and
that it compromises what Secretary Kissinger was calling for,
which is that the facts should come up to the political leaders. The
political leaders must decide on a policy. Their task is different
from that of intelligence; and the division of authority that is being
proposed, I think, compromises what he outlined.

Senator Dole. Secretary Hamre, since September 11, intelligence
sharing and analysis have been significantly improved, with assist-
ance from both the legislative and executive branches. How many
of the Commission's recommendations would you estimate have al-
ready been addressed? Could you highlight the major ones? Would
implementing any of the Commission's recommendations require
the intelligence agencies to fix what is essentially not broken?

Dr. Hamre. Senator Dole, forgive me for not having that at the
top of my head. Can I respond to you for the record on that?

Senator Dole. Surely.

Dr. Hamre. I don't have the 42 recommendations under my belt,
and what's been done. I've heard it said that a large number have
been implemented, but I just don't know that personally, and I'd
be glad to get back to you on that.

Senator Dole. Fine. Just submit it for the record.

[The information referred to follows:!

I have reviewed the 39 recommendations contained in the Commission report.
Some of them are rather general and some are specific. Some are easy to categorize
and some are not. After considerable study, I would assess them in the following
categories:

Completed

Not a recommendation but an observation 3

To be decided (e.g. congressional action needed) 8

Tried and (largely) failed 2

Nothing or very little has happened 4

Lots of rhetoric, very little substance 11

Significant progress, work ongoing 11

Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.

Senator Bill Nelson.

Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks you made reference that
the committee's purpose in this examination is, in many ways, to
look at the structure, the resources, and the leadership in trying
to arrive at a decision. I've heard from the witnesses — and thank
you, again, as to what has been said over and over, for your public
service over the years to your country; thank you for that — I've
heard them testify to basically that the structure they think that
is there now is sound; it may need some tweaking. I've heard them
say that the resources — there seems to be the resources that are
committed to it, but I haven't heard the examination of the third
issue that you raised, Mr. Chairman, which is the leadership.

So what I would like to ask is the question that is begged. Do
we have a system that is set up that is too sensitive to the person-
alities of the people — the personalities of the President, the
SECDEF, the Secretary of State, the DCI, the Attorney General?
If so, how do we fix it?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The second question is a lot harder than the
first. Sure, we have a system that is sensitive to the personalities.
That is, I think, unavoidable. Some of those are elected officials,
some of them are appointed officials. The appointment of officials
comes for a variety of reasons, including campaign contributions, in
some cases. Obviously, you're going to have different levels of abil-
ity, as well as backgrounds, that may or may not be appropriate
for the jobs to which these individuals are appointed.

I can't answer the second question. That's the nature of our sys-
tem. We have to — the system, in part, adjusts to weak personalities
in different executive-branch positions, and they lose influence, and
others take over, to a greater extent.

Mr. Carlucci. I would agree that the system is very sensitive to
personalities, but I would argue that that may not be totally unde-
sirable. That's why we have elections. If we're not satisfied with
the personalities, we throw them out.

It is true, as Senator Clinton pointed out, that we need to try
and insulate intelligence from political vagaries. Some thought
could be given to a fixed term, but I don't know that that totally
insulates the DCI from politics.

I think you asked a very fundamental question, but I don't have
a ready answer, unlike Jim.

Senator Bill Nelson. You must have the answer, then.

Dr. Hamre. No, sir, I certainly don't have the answer. But I
think — first of all, I think the collection environment, the collection
process is less, I think, susceptible to personalities. I think it tends
to be in the assessment, how do you — what do you make of what
it is that's in front of you? Here, my only recommendation is, I
think that you want lots of diversity in that, and you want those
people to have to come up to different committees in Congress and
explain why they think that. We need to force our system — as
much diversity and perspective in our system as possible, and I
think that's — use more open-source material, make sure that the
oversight system up here is quite rigorous, that there is — I have a
"long dwell" fly here, excuse me — that collection is available to ev-
eryone, that you are putting us through a process of explaining our
thinking, both in classified and unclassified hearings. I think much
more rigorous oversight and insistence that we come forward and
explain what we're doing would be good. I think that would be the
most helpful thing you could do, sir.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Can I add something to that. Senator? We
have something called "noise," and each of these agencies takes the
signals — or we hope it takes the signals — and forgets about what
it regards as noise. But some other agency may not regard that as
a noise. If that "noise" were disseminated — what is regarded by one
agency as noise selectively, were disseminated more generally, we
might be able to get something that is closer to the truth.

Senator Bill Nelson. In summary, I sense that there are two
things, two ideas, around which you all would clearly congregate.

that came out of the 9/11 Commission Report recommendations. A
number of them that you disagreed with, which we appreciate very
much your input. But these two, I think you would. Obviously, con-
gressional oversight and direction ought to be much more robust.
Then the other one is, I've heard all of you speak favorably — and
correct me if I'm wrong — about an NCTC, that being the place that
you could bring together all the collected information so that you're
getting analysis of it, and that all the various agencies dealing with
intelligence would be knowledgeable of that, and participate in,
that analysis, and then determine how to use it.

Mr. Carlucci. Agreed.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Those in the community who keep their nug-
gets to themselves and refuse to share them should be removed
from the community.

Senator BiLL NELSON. I would suggest that the most recent ex-
ample of that — and it wasn't specifically defined as intelligence, but
it was certainly critical information — was when the Governor of
Kentucky's inbound plane — the transponder wasn't working, and
the FAA was all happy with it, and they knew about it, but they
forgot to tell the military. Then they send the alert to the Capitol
Police. Of course, we get this emergency announcement, "You get
out of the building immediately. There's an inbound aircraft." So
there, sadly, is another example of where one hand is not knowing
what the other hand is doing.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There's a distinction between a failure of com-
munication and a deliberate failure of communication; and the lat-
ter, I think that we should be able to cope with.

Senator Sessions [presiding]. The Senator from Texas?

Senator CORNYN. Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and for hanging in there.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, Senator Cornyn has been very pa-
tient.

Senator CORNYN. You were patient, too, to wait until we get all
the way down at this end of the table for questions. I appreciate
that very much.

I especially appreciate all three of you talking, at the outset,
about the fact that solutions must logically flow from problems
identified. In other words, I trust that we will be on guard about
a solution looking for a problem.

Indeed, I was also interested to hear a number of references to
the fact that the specific causes of September 11, as identified by
the 9/11 Commission, had very little to do with the issues that we
are talking about when we talk about budget authority, and par-
ticularly the role of the DOD in supporting the warfighter. But I
think this is a very constructive and important exercise, and I com-
mend the members of the 9/11 Commission for doing an outstand-
ing job. But I think it's a difficult and complex subject.

The one thing that I think cannot be overlooked is the fact that
this administration and this Congress have not waited for 3 years
for the 9/11 Commission to issue its report to act in many ways
that I think have been very constructive, and designed to solve the
problems that we all know have existed. For example, we've talked
some about the creation of the TTIC. The NCTC, which is one of
the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, would indeed build on

that to enhance the information-sharing between the CIA and the
FBI, as appropriate under the law.

We also need to identify the fact — as Attorney General Janet
Reno and Attorney General John Ashcroft, and others testified to
at the hearing — about the fact that it was the Patriot Act — some-
times maligned, but frequently misunderstood — that was respon-
sible for tearing down the wall between law enforcement and intel-
ligence agencies, and allowing the kind of sharing of information
that has, indeed, I believe, made America safer. Indeed, of course,
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, billions of
dollars being appropriated to first-responders — variety of potential
targets for terrorists.

But I believe, of the recommendations that have been made by
the 9/11 Commission — the NCTC and certainly the legislative over-
sight reform, which we have not talked about much here today,
other than to avoid the subject because it is not necessarily the role
of this committee, but certainly a matter of interest — but to me it
seems less important when we look at reform to try to see how we
can reorganize the wire diagram or the organizational chart. In-
deed, as I think has been alluded to several times, the kind of au-
thority that some have proposed giving to the NID already exists
since 1997, when Congress passed legislation which created a Dep-
uty DCI for Community Management, and gave that person re-
sponsibility for coordination of all intelligence agencies. I hope we
wouldn't give too much — we wouldn't elevate the anecdote about
DCI Tenet declaring war in 1998 — we wouldn't elevate that too
much, because, indeed, we all know it takes more than a declara-
tion of war by the DCI to make things actually happen. That is
really where the rubber meets the road.

But let me ask a question that, I think. Dr. Hamre, you alluded
to, but we haven't seemed to talk about very much. I don't think
the 9/11 Commission Report really addresses this. In addition to
the failure of HUMINT, which has literally made us blind, what
happened in Iraq since 1998 — and I fear we won't talk about it
here — but I fear that is not an isolated event — open-source intel-
ligence collection. We spent a lot of money on satellites and all
sorts of interesting gizmos that, indeed, I think are very useful, in
terms of intelligence collection. But are you familiar with any effort
in our IC anywhere to have a systematic and comprehensive open-
source intelligence collection?

Dr. Hamre. Sir, there are procedures that the IC uses to survey
the thinking in the private sector on issues as they're trying to de-
rive an assessment. For example, the National Intelligence Council
will routinely go out and pull in the thinking of outsiders. It tends
to be in the assessment phase. That's a little different from open-
source, which is seen as a collection, as well as an assessment, ac-
tivity.

I think you will find that there's also a strategic study group that
works for the Agency which routinely goes out to outside of govern-
ment to try to augment its classified activities, but they tend to be
bringing perspective more toward to the tail-end of an assessment,
as opposed to being seen as a routine source of information-collec-
tion. I think the advocates — and I certainly do advocate wider

use — of open source is to use it as a collection modality, as well,
not just simply a second guess on the assessment phase.

Senator CORNYN. Secretary Schlesinger?

Dr. Schlesinger. I think, Senator, if you look at the fusion
methods of the Special Operations Command down in Tampa, that
they have brought together, or have attempted to bring together,
open-source information, in part because the part of the world that
they deal with, you have basically more open-source information
than you have secret information. A problem. It is a long, historic
problem of the CIA, or has been, that if something's good, it has
to be secret. Sometimes we just get the gems out of open-source.

Senator CORNYN. I've sometimes joked among my colleagues that
I have learned in classified briefing sessions since I've been in the
Senate as much by reading the New York Times and Washington
Post, and watching cable news. I wonder whether we are missing
opportunities as hundreds of new newspapers and news sources
arise in places like Iraq and all around the world, gleaning, sys-
tematically, information we could obtain from non-classified public
sources of information, and do that on a more systematic and rigor-
ous basis.

Dr. Schlesinger. We should.

Mr. Carlucci. May I comment. Senator?

Senator CORNYN. Secretary Carlucci?

Mr. Carlucci. We, of course, have FBIS, where we monitor all
the radio broadcasts around the world, and CIA has had a Domes-
tic Collection Division for some time. But, more fundamentally,
what you describe is a basic responsibility of embassy reporting. It
is up to the embassies around the world to deal with open-source
information, to tell the Department of State what the press is doing
in Country X or Country Y, what the politicians are saying. That's
why we have political sections in our embassies.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. My time is expired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner [presiding]. Did you wish to follow up on Sec-
retary Carlucci's response to you?

Senator CORNYN. Are we going to have another round, Mr.
Chairman?

Chairman Warner. Yes.

Senator CORNYN. I'll reserve any other questions.

Thank you very much.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Levin and I feel that we'll just take a brief round of
questions apiece here. Let me see if I can bring some conclusion to
this very important contribution that each of you has made.

It seems that you would want Congress to very carefully explore
what we could do, by way of law, to give to the DCI all those pow-
ers needed, such that he or she, as the case may be, would then
be on a coequal basis with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of
Homeland Security, Secretary of State, and that that would, in my
judgment, require less disruption. If you start pulling DIA and
NSA out of DOD, and all of the things accompanying that, at a
critical time in our history of this country, when we are on the
verge of a presidential election, a congressional election, with the
understanding that we'd take a look at how that works for a period

of time, and then perhaps come back and reexamine the need to
have some other individual, or converting the DCI to the NID and
then bring in subordinates under him to do the work of the agency,
is that a possible thing that we should consider, Secretary Schles-
inger?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think so, and I think you were out of the
room, Mr. Chairman, but we were elevating the DCI to executive-
level one, which makes them coequal.

Chairman Warner. Yes, I heard that testimony.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes. There are a number of things that can be
done.

Chairman Warner. Putting him on a total par

Mr. Carlucci. You may not need legislation. It's good to look at
the possibility of legislation.

Chairman WARNER. We'll figure that out

Mr. Carlucci. But, as Senator Levin pointed out, you may not
need it.

Chairman WARNER. My point is, use that as an interim step.

Mr. Carlucci. Oh, yes.

Chairman Warner. With the extraordinary confluence of events
taking place in the United States now, two very significant elec-
tions of both the President and Congress

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Some DCIs have been very timid about exer-
cising the community power.

Chairman Warner. Yes.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that a strong statement from Congress,
that we expect the DCI to be seriously in charge of the community,
would be helpful.

Mr. Carlucci. With oversight followup on that.

Chairman Warner. I understand that.

Dr. Hamre, we were exploring, as you stepped out momentar-
ily

Dr. Hamre. I sure did, sir.

Chairman Warner. — whether or not an interim step, given the
confluence of the events facing us — a presidential election and a
congressional election — but if Congress desired to act in this cur-
rent Congress, which is due to expire here in October, unless we
have a lame duck — of addressing whether it needs to be in law, or
otherwise, elevating the DCI to equate, in every respect, by way of
authority, emoluments, and ever5d;hing else, with the Secretaries of
Defense, State, and Homeland Security as an interim step, and see
how that system might work, and that would be less disruption, as
envisioned by other proposals on the table.

Dr. Hamre. I think I agree with my colleagues, I think it cer-
tainly would be less disruption. I think it's very hard to keep en-
ergy behind an initiative like that for every long. Things will fall
back into their old patterns very, very quickly.

Chairman Warner. So then your conclusion, we have to go to the
NID.

Dr. Hamre. No, sir. I think you need to take time to make sure
we get this right and I know you're going to do that.

Chairman Warner. I'm sure the leadership of Congress will
make certain we do take the time.

Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir.

It isn't the sort of thing, just by putting emphasis behind it — will
fade quite quickly, so you'll need to decide whether or not you want
to make this decision or take other structural changes to increase
the standing and stature of the DCI if you want to stay with the
current structure.

Chairman WARNER. I'm not suggesting that the current struc-
ture — I think we could enhance the DCI considerably so that he's
on a total par. Very often, in your testimony

Dr. Hamre. Sure.

Chairman WARNER. — today, you feel that the SECDEF — and I'm
not suggesting the personality of the current

Dr. Hamre. No, no

Chairman WARNER. — but the office itself is overwhelming of the
DCI, and that, therefore, he's not been able to exercise maybe some
of the current authority he now has in law.

Dr. Hamre. The DCI actually has more expansive authorities
than the SECDEF does in oversight and use of funds and that sort
of thing, than — he has enormous authorities, authorities that the
SECDEF had 50 years ago.

Chairman Warner. All right.

Secretary Schlesinger said, often some of the personalities did
not fully exercise that, for whatever reason.

Dr. Hamre. Right. They've been neutralized through the process,
the interagency process, through time.

Chairman Warner. Do you all think that's a proposal that we
should at least consider?

Dr. Schlesinger. Yes.

Mr. Carlucci. Yes.

Dr. Hamre. Yes.

Chairman Warner. It's worthy of consideration.

I thank you.

Senator Levin.

Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I think what the witnesses are
sajdng is that, interestingly enough, that if you put the SECDEF
on a par with the DCI, or whatever the successor to the DCI is,
you will demote the DCI, legally, from where the DCI now is, le-
gally, in terms, at least, of developing and presenting the budget.
Because under Title 50, it is the DCI who is responsible to develop
and present that budget. It's not par. It's the DCI who has respon-
sibility. Now, for various reasons, which our witnesses have out-
lined, that has been watered down over the years, for interagency
conflicts and whatever the reasons are. But, by law, to the extent
we worry about such things, under Title 50 — I'm reading it — I
think I'm reading — and this is an exact quote, I hope — "The devel-
opment and presentation to the President of the annual budget for
the NFIP is the responsibility of the DCI." I'm not sure I would
want to change that. That would be a reduction in the authority
of the

Chairman Warner. I've not suggested that be changed.

Senator Levin. You said "par," though. That would put him on
a par, in terms of that. But I think what you're suggesting, Mr.
Chairman, if I can be a little technical here and legalistic — which
I know is not my wont, but let me try it anyway — not too much
laughter here. [Laughter.]

My wife may be watching this. When it comes to reprogramming
and the execution of the budget, I think, what the chairman — and
I don't want to put words in his mouth — would Hke to see is a
greater equahty. Because, right now, that really belongs to the
SECDEF, rather than to the DCI, when we'd come to the re-
programming.

Now, the SECDEF has a serious responsibility in that, because
I believe that there must be concurrence under current law when
it comes to reprogramming. Does the SECDEF have to

Dr. Hamre. That depends entirely on where the dollars are ap-
propriated and what part of fiscal law is governing. There's enor-
mous flexibility in the intelligence budget.

Senator Levin. No, but in the law itself

Dr. Hamre. There's very little flexibility

Senator Levin. — in Title 50, when it comes to the reprogram-
ming power

Dr. Hamre. But, sir, it all depends on where it's appropriated up
here.

Senator Levin. All right. Okay.

Dr. Hamre. That's what is governing.

Senator Levin. But, in any event, I think that's an area where
we ought to be looking, because that's a very critical area.

Then when it comes to the hiring and firing point there, we have
in the DCI in effect, the power now to veto in law, except for the
DIA. But for these other three agencies, a concurrence of the DCI
is required under 10 USC. So that's a pretty powerful position that
the DCI is now in. He doesn't exercise it, apparently. But that's not
the lack of authority; that's the lack of a will to exercise it. I don't
know if we can legislate willpower, but, nonetheless, that's where
the current law is.

So I think that the one area where we really have to focus, in
terms of where the chairman is discussing this — at least from my
understanding of what he's saying, or perhaps his intent — is that
area of budget execution, or the reprogramming area. That's where
it seems to me there's real need to consider this power question.

Chairman Warner. Let me just comment on that, because I was
addressing this question of how the Secretaries of the many De-
partments — Defense, Homeland Security, and so forth — which con-
tain the affected element or elements of the IC, does not object to
such reprogramming transfer. Now, it seems to me if we took the —
they have veto power now, and what I was trying to do is to make
certain that the DCI — I didn't mean to demote him; I don't know
how I'd be demoting him if we passed laws to further strengthen
him

Senator Levin. Developing and presenting the budget?

Chairman Warner. That's right, and also to eliminate these
vetos over his reprogramming.

Senator Levin. Now, reprogramming, I misspoke. Let me just go
back to the reprogramming issue.

Chairman WARNER. At some point we'd want to hear from the
witnesses.

Senator Levin. Yes, but I misspoke, and I'd like to get their reac-
tion to see if I want to correct myself.

By executive order, the reprogramming power is now in the
DOD. But, as Secretary Carlucci has said, when he was the deputy
to the DCI, and as Admiral Turner said today, when he was the
DCI, President Carter put that power in the DCI so that by execu-
tive order, with the stroke of a pen, Hterally, that power on re-
programming could go back to the DCI if that's what President
Bush or the next President wants to do. So we don't even need a
legal change for that one, because that's an executive order alloca-
tion. That's my question. Am I correct on that, Mr. Carlucci? Then
I'd ask the others.

Mr. Carlucci. That's my understanding.

Senator Levin. Now, do our other witnesses want to come in on
that? Then I'll be done on that.

Chairman Warner. That's all right. Take your time.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I'm not sure I'm answering your question or
the Chairman's observation, but it would really help if the senior
leadership got together every once in awhile and just talked — the
head of NSA, the DCI, the head of DIA. Right now you have people
coming to what used to be — is now the foreign intelligence some-
thing-or-other board and their representatives of their agencies. It
would help enormously if we had the principals meeting.

Senator Levin. That's true. But I'm being very precise. There's
an executive order, number 12333, which now designates the
SECDEF the power to provide fiscal management for the NSA, for
defense and military intelligence, and national reconnaissance enti-
ties. That means that by executive order, the SECDEF is given the
power to supervise execution, including reprogramming, of that
NFIP budget. That's an executive order. That can be changed back
to what it was in the President Carter years, when it was the —
if we want to, or if the President wants to — not me, or us — if the
President wants to, he can give that power right back to the DCI
or the successor.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Right.

Senator LEVIN. So I just want

Dr. Hamre. That's true, sir, but I'll tell you, there's remarkably
thin budget-justification material that comes with the intelligence
budget. It's nothing compared to what you insist coming from us
in DOD. I remember when the NRO piled up $3 billion worth of
cash and nobody knew about it. I didn't know about it. I was the
Comptroller, I didn't know about it. Okay? I mean, this happened.
They do not get much oversight. They have tremendous flexibility
right now.

So I'm not sure that this is really the panacea that you think it
is.

Senator Levin. What?

Dr. Hamre. Moving the authorities around a little bit for more
flexibility, for money. They have so much flexibility, they don't even
know where the money all is.

Chairman Warner. My simple question was, if we did, by a com-
bination of execution order and, if necessary, statutory change, ele-
vate the DCI to level one, put him on a par — and hopefully, they
would meet, Mr. Secretary — would that be an interim step, avoid-
ing a lot of dislocation at this critical point in our

Mr. Carlucci. I see no objection to that.

Chairman WARNER. Do you have any support for it?

Mr. Carlucci. I think it helps.

Chairman Warner. All right.

Mr. Carlucci. Gives him a little more clout.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that it might be desirable to establish
a committee of principals

Chairman Warner. All right.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. — and force the heads of these agencies to talk
about their common interests.

Chairman Warner. That's certainly in the realm of the Presi-
dent. All right, thank you very much.

Senator Sessions.

Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, this has been just a marvelous
hearing and a marvelous discussion about government and respon-
sibility and how to improve it. We have some of the finest people
that I know of that work in our government agencies, spent 15
years at Department of Justice, and I know how fine the FBI
agents are, and I've worked with them. But bureaucracies inter-
cede, and we have real, real problems.

The best example that I've seen in my experience of change in
government was early in the Reagan administration, when he put
a young leader in charge of coordinating law enforcement around
America. It was Rudi Giuliani. He was third in command in the
Department of Justice, but everybody knew he was setting the pol-
icy on law enforcement, and he made things happen.

The drug czar, a non-cabinet agency, which we're talking about
here, under Bill Bennett's leadership for several years, was a pret-
ty significant force in establishing drug policy and coordinating
drug efforts for a number of years. But I'm willing to bet that our
drug czar today, his name is not known by the majority of the Drug
Enforcement Agency agents. They probably don't even know his
name, although John Walters is a fine person, doing a good job.
But as Secretary Hamre said, it tends to fade. They have 150 peo-
ple, and they're going to tell the Department of Justice how to run
their business? Somebody with 200-300 people is going to order the
DOD around? It just — over time, it doesn't seem to work.

So I guess I am intrigued and more inclined to be supportive of
your views that, let's take the system we have, see if it is broken
so badly we need major reform, or maybe the better approach is to
see if we can't deal with the problem itself.

Now, we talk about these agencies, and they deal with one an-
other as if they're foreign nations. They enter memorandums of un-
derstanding which are the equivalent of treaties. They — and it
takes years of negotiating these things. It's worse than dealing
with the Russians to get an agreement. Sometimes they never
agree on issues.

It seems to me that, really, the President can set this tone. If the
President says, "The CIA is going to coordinate my intelligence.
Every agency is going to back — and if they don't, I want him to
come tell me, and then I'm going to call in the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretary of State, and we're going to have a prayer meet-
ing over why he isn't working with the CIA Director." Am I off base
on that?

Mr. Carlucci. Sir, you're absolutely right. The one thing we
haven't really talked much about is the NSC and the role of the
NSC in implementing that kind of presidential directive.

Senator SESSIONS. I know the President has really stepped up
his commitment to this. The whole Nation, bipartisan. Republicans
and Democrats — since September 11, we have dealt with many of
the problems we've talked about today already, and made a lot of
progress. Together we've done that. But I do think, ultimately, that
if the President does not assert himself effectively, we won't see the
progress there, because these agencies will retreat to their turf.

One thing that still I believe is not completely fixed with the Pa-
triot Act — Senator Cornyn, you might correct me — but it seems to
me we still have some fear on the part of the foreign intelligence
agencies, the CIA, that if they are involved with somebody who
may be a citizen, even though they're connected to a foreign power,
that they feel somewhat intimidated and reluctant to pursue that.
Shouldn't we make sure that it's crystal clear that if an individ-
ual — there's probable cause to believe an American individual citi-
zen is connected to a terrorist organization or a foreign power hos-
tile to the United States, that they ought to be covered under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)?

Secretary Schlesinger?

Dr. Schlesinger. Yes.

Mr. Carlucci. I would agree, but I'm not a lawyer, and I think
you'd have to — well, you are — but what the legal constraints on the
CIA are on that score, I don't know.

Dr. Hamre. Sir, I think the key is what you said, probable cause.
That's where the complication comes in, is what does it take to es-
tablish probable cause for purposes of the surveillance? That's
where it has been problematic in the past. It's not difficult, once
you have probable cause, to get a FISA court order.

Senator Sessions. No, you're correct.

Dr. Hamre. It's that standard of probable cause that has been
very high.

Senator Sessions. Dr. Hamre, you're correct. I think — and on a
normal surveillance of a foreign operative, you don't have to have,
to reach the level of probable cause

Dr. Hamre. Right.

Senator SESSIONS. — which is a very high burden

Dr. Hamre. High burden.

Senator Sessions. — as a prosecutor, I know

Dr. Hamre. Yes.

Senator SESSIONS. But maybe we ought to relax that when there
is a connection to terrorism and foreign intelligence.

Dr. Hamre. I actually think there have — there actually have
been some changes in that regard. I'm not a lawyer, myself. I'd
want to defer to general counsel out at NSA. I think they're actu-
ally, the minimization rules are still in place, but I think that there
are some greater flexibilities. We use them. But I'd defer to them
to answer that for you, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. It's referred to some in the Commission re-
port, but I should study it more carefully.

Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Senator.

Senator Sessions. Thank you.

Chairman Warner. Senator Dayton.

Senator Dayton. I don't really have any more questions, Mr.
Chairman. When I was in Iraq last year with the Chairman, I re-
solved never to leave a room before he did, so [Laughter.]

It's held me in good stead.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.

Senator Dayton. Although I could say, if you're aware of any
other $3 billion just lying around any of these entities, if you could
let us know, that would be great. [Laughter.]

Thank you.

Dr. Hamre. Yes, I was pretty surprised to find it.

Senator DAYTON. All right.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.

The distinguished Senator from Texas can wrap it up.

Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just have one final area of questioning, and that has to do with
the dangers of consolidation in the IC. The best analogy I can think
of is how much different your world view would be each day if you
only read one newspaper and it was the Washington Post, and how
much different it would be if, every day when you got up, instead
of the Washington Post, you read the Washington Times. I worry
that if we are consolidating all of our intelligence collection and
analysis, and routing it up without the caveats, perhaps, as it goes
through each layer, we present a nice, pretty package. We claim we
have now consolidated the authority in one person, the NID, but,
in effect, we are limiting the range of information that the policy-
makers really need in order to make the best possible decisions. Is
that a poor analogy?

Mr. Carlucci. It's a good analogy. Too much uniformity in the
intelligence business is bad.

Senator CORNYN. It strikes me that there's some benefit to hav-
ing the competition or the diversity of voices. I know sometimes
people wonder how in the world can you find out what's happening
in Washington or anywhere else? I always say you need to read a
lot of different newspapers. You need to read several different news
magazines. You need to look at several different Internet news en-
gines, like Google or Yahoo or whatever. Maybe then you will have
some concept of what in the world is going on. But if you limit
yourself to one source, that seems like that is fraught with danger.

So I just hope that during the debate and discussion, as you have
counseled us already, that we look for those things that are going
to provide us better intelligence and not just claim that, yes, we've
redrawn the organizational chart, we've created somebody with a
new title, and we pat ourselves on the back under the mis-
impression that we've actually made America safer. Thank you
very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator. But if I might, just to
take an observation from your very important observations you
made, the one thing that goes through this report that has struck
me is the word "imagination." Is not imagination the direct product
of competition of differing intelligence views?

Dr. Schlesinger?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes. It's unquestionably a — look, there were
balls that were dropped here, and with — given the episode in Ma-
nila, given the seizure of the French aircraft that was supposed to
fly into the Eiffel Tower, our problem was a failure of imagination,
not to be cured — not to be cured — by restructuring. In Manila, it
was said — whoever the name, I've forgotten — he said that, "We
were going to take an aircraft and drive it into Langley head-
quarters of the CIA." I would think that that would really get the
attention of the CIA.

Chairman WARNER. I expect it would, too. But it is the product
of competitive intelligence analysis. Again, going back, as I did
with my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee, and looking at
the problems, the DIA was very skeptical, as was the Energy De-
partment, about certain aspects of the findings in the CIA.

Again, is not imagination a product, Mr. Carlucci?

Mr. Carlucci. It's a problem — I think that the report performs
a useful service in pointing that out, but the report also points out
that the policymakers do not act on warning, which is another
issue that we haven't discussed today. That's beyond the realm of
just pure intelligence. But the interaction between the IC and the
policymaker is very important.

Chairman Warner. Dr. Hamre?

Dr. Hamre. Sir, I strongly believe that you want competitive
analysis-

Chairman Warner. To give you the imagination

Dr. Hamre. Absolutely.
Chairman WARNER. — as a product.
Dr. Hamre. Absolutely.

Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, thank you. You win an endur-
ance contest. We're almost at 4 hours. Thank you very much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.!

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
PROPOSALS TO REORGANIZE THE UNITED
STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 2004

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:21 a.m. in room
SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Roberts,
Sessions, Talent, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Ken-
nedy, Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton,
Bayh, and Clinton.

Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff direc-
tor; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional
staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Thomas
L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; and Paula J. Philbin,
professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic
staff director; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; and Maren R. Leed,
professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Nicholas W. West,
and Pendred K. Wilson.

Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul, as-
sistant to Senator McCain; Darren M. Dick, assistant to Senator
Roberts; Lance Landry, assistant to Senator Allard; Lindsey R.
Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Steven R. Norton, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis, assistant to Senator Graham;
Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Mieke Y.
Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, as-
sistant to Senator Lieberman; Neil D. Campbell, assistant to Sen-
ator Reed; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric
Pierce, assistant to Senator E. Benjamin Nelson; and Todd
Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER,
CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to receive testi-
mony from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; Acting Director

(85)

of Central Intelligence, John E. McLaughlin; and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, on the implications
for the Department of Defense (DOD) and current and future mili-
tary operations of proposals to reorganize the U.S. Intelligence
Community.

We welcome our witnesses. I see that you're joined by Dr.
Cambone. We welcome you.

First, an administrative announcement to members of the com-
mittee. In consultation with Senator Levin, we have scheduled a
hearing of this committee for immediately following our return on
September 9. The question at that time will be the oversight review
of our committee of the remaining reports, as we understand it,
concerning the prisoner abuse situation in Iraq. Those remaining
investigations, particularly the Fay-Jones investigation into the
role of the military intelligence, and the Schlesinger-Brown panel's
overall view, should be completed in that period of time — would
that be correct, Mr. Secretary? — and available for review. Your De-
partment has so advised me of that.

Secretary Rumsfeld. That is the current schedule. Whether
something would come up that would cause one of them to delay
for some reason or another, I can't know. But, at the moment —
what is the date you're planning to be back?

Chairman Warner. September 9.

Secretary Rumsfeld. As far as I know, those two that you men-
tioned would be completed.

Chairman Warner. We've received excellent cooperation from
your staff on this in the scheduling, and I've had an opportunity
to work along with Dr. Schlesinger on these issues

Secretary Rumsfeld. Good.

Chairman Warner. — so I thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Now, the views of our witnesses today on the various rec-
ommendations for reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community, par-
ticularly the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the pro-
posals of President Bush, are critical to this committee's under-
standing of how those recommended changes would impact the
DOD in future military operations.

The impressive work of the 9/11 Commission has given America
a roadmap, a series of recommendations on how to move forward.
I might add that the Governmental Affairs Committee this morn-
ing is hearing from the families and some survivors of the trage-
dies of September 11, and I think I join with all my colleagues,
we're very impressed with their contributions into this national de-
bate.

So now it's time for Congress to thoroughly examine and evalu-
ate all of these recommendations, and to enact such changes as we
deem will strengthen our Intelligence Community.

President Bush has taken swift action to embrace certain ele-
ments of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations prior to the 9/11
report. We must be mindful of that, because this is a continuum
of steps that have been taken, all the way from the Patriot Act to
the establishment of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, those
steps to make our Nation safer each day that we go forward.

Of the 41 recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission, some
have already been enacted over the past 3 years. More will be done

through executive order, and, quite possibly, Congress will provide
legislation in the very near future.

But as the 9/11 Commission noted, in nearly 3 years since Sep-
tember 11, Americans have become better protected against terror-
ist attack. But none of us can rest. We must constantly work — each
day, each week, each month — to make America safer.

As our witnesses are well aware, the DOD is home to the largest
dollar — that is, budget allocation — within the Intelligence Commu-
nity. DOD is the largest consumer of the intelligence produced by
the Intelligence Community. We must not lose sight of these facts
as we consider the way ahead.

My overriding concern, speaking for myself as I examine changes
and proposals and recommendations to the Intelligence Commu-
nity, is, what changes will best help provide the strategic warning
we need to protect the Nation, to keep our President and his subor-
dinates fully informed while at the same time supporting the
warfighter — the man, the woman, the sailor, the soldier, the air-
man, the marine — who, at this very moment, is taking risks
throughout the world and fighting to keep the terrorist threat from
our shores? How can we better provide the necessary intelligence
to all of these consumers?

It was not long ago when the national-level intelligence support
to the warfighter was inadequate. All of us on this committee re-
member very well. The military's experience during Operation
Desert Storm was a watershed event. From the time General Nor-
man Schwarzkopf came before this committee in June 1991 and ad-
vised us that responsive national-level intelligence support for his
mission in the first Persian Gulf War was unsatisfactory.

The Defense Department, together with other elements in the In-
telligence Community, has painstakingly, since that time, built the
intelligence and operational capabilities that we saw so convinc-
ingly demonstrated on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq in
the recent past. As we examine ways to reform our Intelligence
Community, we must ensure that we do nothing to undermine the
confidence that the battlefield commanders have in the intelligence
support on which they must depend.

The 9/11 commissioners correctly pointed out that our overall in-
telligence structure failed to connect the dots, in terms of observing
and then fusing together the indicators of a significant threat from
al Qaeda in the years and months leading up to the actual attack
on our country on September 11, 2001. The recommended solution,
however, is to reorganize the entire community, not just focus on
the parts that were unsatisfactory; therefore, we must examine the
reasons for these dramatic proposals and understand how the rec-
ommended solutions address, or do not address, the problems iden-
tified in the 9/11 Commission's report.

Clearly, we must seize the opportunity to act — and I, personally,
am confident that Congress can and will do something in the bal-
ance of this session — but we should do it with great care. I'm ever
mindful of the legislation to our national security structure, the
National Security Act of 1947, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of
1986, which many of us on this committee were full participants.
These were not considered in haste, and we must not be rushed to
judgment in this case.

I, personally, as I've studied all the recommendations, feel, first
and foremost, that we must be mindful that this Nation is at war
at this very moment, with tremendous risks being undertaken by
many people. We're at war, Mr. Secretary. Were we to try and do
massive dismemberment of the DOD at this point in time, I
think — and I listen to the Secretary and our witnesses — it could re-
sult in turbulence that might degrade this level of intelligence so
essential as we continue to fight this war, as we continue to hear,
almost every week or month, of the threat levels against this Na-
tion, quite apart from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

So, with that in mind, I, personally, want to proceed, but with
great caution, and do what we can to strengthen this system; at
the same time, cause hopefully no turbulence or disruption in the
intelligence system that now, I think, serves this Nation reasonably
well — can be better.

I look at the proposal by which we could take the current posi-
tion of the Director of Central Intelligence, elevate it to — in every
possible way, to that of a full cabinet status. As I look at the cur-
rent body of law, you have extraordinary powers already on the
statute. Perhaps some correction could be made, or addition, by
Congress, to the existing powers so that there is no limitation to
your ability to work as a coequal with your peer group, be it the
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of
State, or whatever the case may be.

Perhaps we could change the name, call it the National Intel-
ligence Director (NID). But if it's desired of Congress to move for-
ward and create the entire new entity and a new layer, then I
think we ought to do it in such a way that it's a partnership rela-
tionship between the Secretary of Defense working in consultation
with the NID and his structure. At such time as the budgets are
brought forward, they work on them together and present those
budgets jointly, as they would present jointly to the President any
recommendations for key personnel to serve in the various intel-
ligence agencies.

So those are two approaches that this Senator is considering,
such that we minimize any disruption to the essential collection of
intelligence today.

Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses today. This is our
committee's second hearing on the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission to reorganize the Intelligence Community and the im-
plications of such reorganization for the DOD and military oper-
ations.

We have suffered from two different types of intelligence failures
in recent years. The first was the failure of agencies to share infor-
mation necessary to connect the dots before the September 11 at-
tacks. That failure is attributed, by the 9/11 Commission, mainly
to problems in the organization and management of the Intel-
ligence Community.

The second failure, the massively erroneous intelligence assess-
ments relied on before the war in Iraq, appears, in significant part.

to have been the result of the shaping of intelHgence by the Intel-
hgence Community to support the poHcies of the administration.

As we consider legislation for the reorganization of the Intel-
ligence Community, we should recognize the significance of both
types of failures: those resulting from poor organization and man-
agement, and those resulting from politicizing intelligence. Chang-
ing the organization of the Intelligence Community, as proposed by
the 9/11 Commission, may help address intelligence-sharing prob-
lems, but does not address politicizing intelligence, and could even
make that problem worse.

Relative to the failure number one, the 9/11 Commission made
major recommendations to reorganize the Intelligence Community
that could have significant implications for our military which we
want to explore today.

One recommendation is to create the new position of a National
Intelligence Director who would have greater authority over the na-
tional intelligence budget and programs and over hiring and firing
people to head the national intelligence agencies, including agen-
cies that are currently located within the Defense Department,
such as the National Security Agency (NSA), which is responsible
for collecting signals and breaking codes, and the National Recon-
naissance Office (NRO), which is responsible for building satellites.

Another recommendation is to create a new National Counter-
terrorism Center (NCTC) which would combine all-source fusion
and analysis of terrorist intelligence, similar to what the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center (TTIC) now does, but with the additional
function of planning and tasking counterterrorist operations, in-
cluding those conducted by military forces under the DOD.

Another recommendation is to transfer the lead responsibility for
all paramilitary operations, both overt and covert, to the DOD.
Currently, the CIA is responsible for covert operations, which re-
quire a presidential finding and a prior notification to Congress.

These recommendations raise a host of questions that need to be
considered as we reform our Intelligence Community. The relation-
ship between intelligence and defense entities and their specific re-
sponsibilities and authorities are not questions of turf. They are vi-
tally important to both the security and well-being of our Nation
and the safety of our troops.

I would hope that our witnesses will address, in their opening
statements, whether they agree with the following five rec-
ommendations of the 9/11 Commission. I'm quoting these rec-
ommendations.

Recommendation number 1: The National Counterterrorism Cen-
ter should perform joint planning. The plans would assign oper-
ational responsibilities to lead agencies, including Defense and its
combatant commands.

Recommendation number 2: The National Intelligence Director
should have, "the authority to reprogram funds among the national
intelligence agencies to meet any new priority."

Recommendation number 3: The National Intelligence Director
should approve and submit nominations to the President of the in-
dividuals who would lead the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), NSA, National Geospatial-Intel-
ligence Agency (NGA), NRO, and other intelligence capabilities.

Recommendation number 4: Again, I'm quoting, "Lead respon-
sibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, wheth-
er clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department."

Recommendation number 5: The National Intelligence Director
would manage this national effort, managing the national intel-
ligence program, and overseeing the component agencies of the In-
telligence Community with the help of three deputies, each of
which would also hold a key position in one of the component agen-
cies.

Now, if we fail to make needed reforms, we may be leaving our-
selves vulnerable to future intelligence failures. But if we unwit-
tingly create a system that results in confused, unclear, or duplica-
tive lines of command or responsibility, our security would be di-
minished. So we need to proceed urgently, but carefully, as we con-
sider reforming our intelligence system.

Regardless of the responsibilities that we might choose to give to
the proposed National Intelligence Director and National Counter-
terrorism Center, and wherever we decide to place these offices on
an organization chart, we must take steps to avoid the second
major intelligence failure, the shaping of intelligence assessments
to support administration policies — any administration's policies.
Independent and objective intelligence is a matter of vital national
importance. Objective, unvarnished intelligence should inform pol-
icy choices. Policy should not drive intelligence assessments.

The Intelligence Committee's report of July 9, 2004, on the Intel-
ligence Communitys prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq is a
multi-count indictment of faulty intelligence assessments.

For example, when the CIA's unclassified white paper said that,
"Most intelligence specialists assess that Iraq was trying to obtain
aluminum tubes for a centrifuge program for nuclear weapons," it
did not explain that the Department of Energy, the Intelligence
Community's nuclear experts, specifically disagreed with the as-
sessment that the aluminum tubes were intended for Iraq's nuclear
program.

Similarly, when the CIA's unclassified National Intelligence Esti-
mate stated that, "Iraq maintains several development programs,
including for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) that most ana-
lysts believe is intended to deliver biological warfare agents," the
CIA eliminated a footnote to the effect that U.S. Air Force intel-
ligence, the Intelligence Community agency with primary respon-
sibility for technical analysis on UAV programs, did not agree with
that assessment. When the CIA's unclassified white paper included
the statement, "potentially against the U.S. homeland," with re-
spect to the use by Iraq of biological weapons, it did not acknowl-
edge that its own classified National Intelligence Estimate on the
same subject did not include that frightening assessment.

When the Director of Central Intelligence's testimony before the
Intelligence Committee addressed, "training in poisons and gases,"
of al Qaeda by Iraq, which, "comes from credible and reliable
sources," the Director did not mention that the underlying intel-
ligence in his own classified statement called into question the reli-
ability of the sources of this information.

Now, these are but a few examples from the highly critical intel-
ligence report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on

the intelligence failures before the war with Iraq. It is unacceptable
for the senior U.S. intelligence official, whether that be a Director
of Central Intelligence or a National Intelligence Director, to exag-
gerate the certainty of intelligence assessments and tell the Presi-
dent, Congress, the American people, and the world that something
is an open and shut case, "a slam dunk," when it isn't, when the
underlying intelligence, in fact, has uncertainties and qualifica-
tions. Whatever changes we make to the organization of the Intel-
ligence Community, we must do all that we can to ensure that the
intelligence upon which our Nation relies, often for life-and-death
decisions, is independently and objectively analyzed and presented.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.

Mr. Secretary, we welcome, again, your appearance here. I would
recognize you just got back from an important trip to our forces
abroad, and I recognize that you've been in consultation this morn-
ing — at the White House, I presume — perhaps on this subject and
others, and we're anxious to hear your views.

May I courteously ask that you bring the microphone up as close
as possible, because we have a very full room, and the acoustics
somewhat diminished.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY DR. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE,
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee.

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the subject of strengthen-
ing the Intelligence Community in the United States, as well as
some of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

Needless to say, some of what I will be saying will be my per-
sonal views, because, while the President has made a number of
decisions — and announced them — that he believes will improve the
Intelligence Community, some aspects of his proposals are still
under discussion, and, in that case, I may very well be back some-
day to discuss those decisions as they arrive.

He's proposed the establishment of a National Intelligence Direc-
tor, as the 9/11 Commission recommended, the creation of an
NCTC, and the issuance of a number of executive orders to imple-
ment other recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, such as re-
form of the community's information-sharing.

I think what I'd like to do is to ask my complete statement be
put in the record, and I will abbreviate it substantially.

Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, a very wise course. All state-
ments by the three witnesses will be admitted into the record.

Secretary Rumsfeld. The President will continue to listen to the
debate on the subject of intelligence reform, as will others in the
executive branch. I think the hearings are a good thing. The ex-
perts that have been testifying have a lot of background and expe-
rience and knowledge, and certainly add dimension to the discus-
sion.

The objective of Intelligence Community reform is to provide the
community with a renewal, to refashion it to better succeed in this
still new and different 21st century. Those objectives include im-

proved indications and warning of impending events in enough
time to anticipate them and to permit effective action.

This requires, in my view, aggressively breaking down the stove-
pipes within and between domestic, foreign, and mihtary intel-
ligence; integrating domestic intelligence into the Intelligence Com-
munity while providing for the appropriate protections for civil lib-
erties — and that's not an easy task; it's a big issue for this commit-
tee and for the country — authorizing and enabling intelligence
users to access required intelligence data wherever it may reside;
improved analysis of the environment to reduce the likelihood of
surprise, especially by terrorists, and this requires conducting, in
my view, competitive analysis within the offices of the NID and
within and among departments and agencies based on all-source
intelligence; seeking to avoid "group think," as recommended by the
9/11 Commission; balancing the need for intelligence and warning
against the current threats in light of the need for longer-term
strategic analysis; improved ability to use intelligence to effectively
deter and disrupt, defeat, and defend against attacks on the United
States' interests, especially by terrorists — it requires ensuring that
departments and agencies charged with deterring and defending
U.S. interests possess highly capable all-source intelligence capa-
bilities, commensurate with their missions; developing and execut-
ing integrated joint responses by executive departments to effec-
tively employ the instruments of national power appropriate to the
task or mission; maintaining clear lines of authority and respon-
sibility between the President and the heads of the executive de-
partments and those operating agencies.

Mr. Chairman, I come to this subject with a background of inter-
est in intelligence capabilities. As I recall, I appeared before this
committee in January 2001, more than 3V2 years ago, for a con-
firmation hearing, and I was asked by one of the members of the
committee what subject kept me up at night. I answered, simply,
with one word: intelligence. The answer remains the same.

Adversaries have many advantages in den5dng information too,
and deceiving intelligence analysts and policymakers, alike, about
their capabilities and their intentions. As a result, they're capable
of surprising us, as well as surprising friendly foreign countries.
This is the reality our country faces as we consider various propos-
als for improving capabilities to the U.S. Intelligence Community
to meet the 21st century problems.

A variety of proposals for achieving these objectives have been
advanced. I'm persuaded that the attributes we seek in the Intel-
ligence Community — imagination, intuition, and initiative — may
best be encouraged and developed by organizations where planning
is centralized but the execution of the plans is decentralized. An In-
telligence Community organized around areas of substantive exper-
tise — for example, foreign, domestic, and military intelligence —
would possibly be more likely to generate, in a timely fashion, the
indications and warning of crisis and provide intelligence support
needed by the executive departments of government in the per-
formance of their respective missions than is one organized around
a single or preeminent national intelligence organization.

As some have suggested, organizing the U.S. Intelligence Com-
munity around national collections agencies, like NSA, NGA, and

NRO, and aligning them under direct NID leadership, could con-
ceivably lead to some efficiencies in some aspects of intelligence col-
lection, and some modest but indefiinable improvement in support
of those agencies provide to other elements of the government. At
the same, however, it's possible that, by their sheer size and the
broad extent of their activity, those collection agencies could come
to form the center of gravity of the NID's organization. If a consoli-
dation of those agencies outside DOD were to be considered, we
should be certain that it would actually help resolve the intel-
ligence-related problems and difficulties that have been described
by the 9/11 Commission and that we face, and that they would not
create additional problems.

As an example of the latter, we would not want to place new bar-
riers or filters between military combatant commanders and those
agencies when they perform as combat support agencies. It would
be a major step to separate these key agencies from the military
combatant commanders, which are the major users of such capa-
bilities.

With respect to solving problems that have been identified, my
impression is that the technical collection agencies collect more
than we can analyze today. This suggests that we need more ana-
lysts and capacity to process data.

It's also my conviction that we must repair our human intel-
ligence capabilities. They were especially hit in the budget cuts
during the 1990s. It's my belief that any changes that are made to
meet the objectives identified earlier need to focus on building a
community for the 21st century along 21st century lines,
networked and distributed centers of analysis within executive de-
partments and agencies, with access to all available data, focused
on employing instruments of collection, wherever they reside, as
tools for exploring hypothesis and conducting alternative analysis —
this implies a National Intelligence Director with authority for
tasking collection assets across the government — setting analytic
priorities; and ensuring all-source competitive analysis throughout
the Intelligence Community. Importantly, the personnel manage-
ment and training to alter the culture in the community — it's not
something that's been discussed extensively, but real change — most
people are discussing organizational changes, and, in my view, we
need to think also about the culture. If you think of the DOD and
the number of — almost decades it's taken to instill the culture of
jointness in that institution, it ought to remind us of the impor-
tance of culture with respect to the Intelligence Community's
issues. Information, security, and access policies, information tech-
nology standards and architectures across the community are also
enormously important. Reallocating resources in a year of budget
execution. As I said, the precise extent of such authorities and
other issues are still under consideration, but an NID likely will
need some authorities of these types.

The Department, through the Services and the combatant com-
mands, has worked to break down stovepipes between foreign and
military intelligence that support DOD activities. The impetus for
this effort was, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the lessons
learned from Operation Desert Storm, some 12 years ago. You re-

called the disappointment that existed with the timeliness, speed,
and scope of intelligence support for those operations.

The result of a decade's effort to establish a timely and seamless
interaction between DOD and CIA activities has become apparent
in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the ongoing war on terror. I sup-
pose anyone can have their own opinion, but, in my view, we are
about as well-connected as we ever have been, although we're prob-
ably not as well-stitched together as we conceivably could or should
be. But any change to the Intelligence Community, it seems to me,
should be designed to help us close, further, those gaps and seams,
not to reopen them.

The 9/11 Commission has focused the Nation's attention — and
very usefully — on questions related to strengthening the commu-
nity. I think it would be unfortunate if we were to lose sight of the
9/11 Commission's reflections on the nature of the world in which
we live and the recommendations for the national security policies
needed to protect and defend the country and the American people.

In addition to the recommendations offered by the 9/11 Commis-
sion, we could usefully consider the following:

Further improving U.S. domestic intelligence capabilities while
preserving U.S. civil liberties. I think that is one of their most im-
portant recommendations, and it's receiving relatively little atten-
tion and discussion. As part of that initiative, I would just mention
that the DOD appointed a panel, headed by Newt Minow, to look
at ways and means of achieving our domestic intelligence capabili-
ties — the defense intelligence capabilities — consistent with our laws
and values, to help counter 21st century threats. It's conceivable
that such an outside panel could be useful in this instance.

The President's been actively engaged in developing initiatives
that engage people at risk to subversion by extremist ideologies. In
no case is this more evident than his broader Middle East initia-
tive. These initiatives could be embraced by Congress so that edu-
cational institutions abroad that emphasize religious toleration are
supported, including provision for information technologies for
schools.

Foreign scholarships and fellowships for exchanging American
and foreign students and scholars are established to improve cul-
tural understanding.

Helping to mobilize private philanthropy and non-governmental
groups to promote ideas and amplify those local voices that oppose
transnational terrorism and extremist ideologies and provide coun-
terweights to terrorist-related organizations.

Providing the executive branch with the necessary flexibility to
manage the 21st century war of terror.

Congressional approval of the administration's request for funds
for combatant commanders' use in the field to aid in humanitarian
relief and reconstruction. Those of you who've visited Iraq and Af-
ghanistan know that our combatant commanders believe that those
dollars are as powerful as bullets in the work they're doing.

I think, a reexamination of the train-and-equip authorities and
missions to explore opportunities for improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of such assistance programs.

Consider conducting an interagency roles-and-missions study to
rationalize responsibilities and authorities across the government
to meet the 21st century threats.

In pursuit of strengthening our Nation's intelligence capabilities,
I would offer one cautionary note. It's important that we move with
all deliberate speed. We need to remember that we are considering
these important matters, however, while we are waging a war. If
we move unwisely, and get it wrong, the penalty would be great.

If you think back, the National Security Act of 1947 established
the DOD. By 1958, it had undergone no fewer than four major stat-
utory or organizational changes. Another round of major change
was inaugurated with the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. I doubt
that we should think of intelligence reform being completed at a
single stroke.

Intelligence is expensive. The community suffered substantial re-
ductions in the budget in the last decade and in people. Those re-
ductions were made on the theory that, the end of the Cold War,
U.S. reliance on intelligence for security would not be as substan-
tial as it had been. Events have proven otherwise, and we need to
recognize that.

To conclude, let me return to where I began. I'm still concerned
about our country's intelligence capabilities, but that concern stems
not from a lack of confidence in the men and women in the Intel-
ligence Community. They have fashioned important achievements
over recent years, and I believe our country owes them a debt of
gratitude. It will be a long time, if ever, that many of their achieve-
ments are fully and broadly known and appreciated.

The DOD and its counterparts in the Intelligence Community are
forging, during a war, a strong interlocking relationship between
intelligence and operations, between national and tactical intel-
ligence, and between foreign and military intelligence. We've
worked hard to close the gaps and seams that these terms imply.

Now, my concerns are rooted in the new realities of this 21st cen-
tury, and certainly the Department is ready to work with you to
further strengthen our ability to live in this new and dangerous
world.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald Rumsfeld
introduction

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss
the broader subject of enhancing the InteUigence Community, as well as some of the
9/11 Commission recommendations.

I want to point out that what I will be saying represents my personal views, in
that I am appearing before the President has made his final decisions on many of
the important issues.

As members know, the President has reached a number of decisions that should
improve the capabilities of the Intelligence Community:

• Establishment of a National Intelligence Director.

• Creation of a National Counterterrorism Center.

• Issuance of a number of executive orders that will implement other rec-
ommendations of the commission, such as reform of the Intelligence Com-
munity's information sharing.

In addition, the President has called for substantial reform of congressional over-
sight.

The way Congress decides to conduct its oversight certainly impacts the way the
executive branch does its business. If we are to become more agile and flexible in
fighting the war on terrorism and rapidly adjusting to meet new circumstances,
Congress will likely need to adjust its practices.

The President will continue to listen to the debate on the subject of intelligence
reform. He will continue to take the counsel of a broad range of experts, including
those who have written and/or testified before you and other committees, on this
important subject as he considers additional details relative to his proposals and
frames new initiatives.

OBJECTIVES

The objective of Intelligence Community reform is to provide the community with
a renewal, to refashion it to succeed in this still new and different 21st century.
Those objectives include:

• Improved indications and warning of impending events in enough time to an-
ticipate them and permit effective action. This requires:

• Aggressively breaking down the stovepipes within and between domestic,
foreign, and military intelligence.

• Integrating domestic intelligence into the Intelligence Community while
providing for appropriate protection for civil liberties.

• Authorizing and enabling appropriate intelligence users to access re-
quired intelligence data wherever it may reside.

• Improved analysis of the environment to reduce the likelihood of surprise, es-
pecially by terrorists. This requires:

• Developing an integrated and authoritative understanding of trends and
events, at home and abroad, and whether and how they might evolve into
threats to U.S. interests.

• Conducting "competitive analysis" within the offices of the NID and with-
in and among departments and agencies, based on all source intelligence,
seeking to avoid "group think" as recommended by the 9/11 Commission.

• Balancing the need for intelligence and warning against current threats
in light of the need for longer-term strategic analysis.

• Improved ability to use intelligence to effectively deter, disrupt, defeat, and
defend against attacks on U.S. interests, especially by terrorists. This requires:

• Ensuring that departments and agencies charged with deterring and de-
fending U.S. interests possess highly capable, all source intelligence capa-
bilities commensurate with their mission.

• Developing and executing integrated, joint responses by executive depart-
ments to effectively employ the instruments of national power appropriate
to a task or mission.

• Maintaining clear lines of authority and responsibility between the Presi-
dent and the heads of the executive departments and those operational
agencies.

• Improved process for setting national goals, priorities, missions, and require-
ments for the collection and analysis of intelligence. This requires:

• A more integrated approach to setting these goals, priorities, missions,
and requirements.

• Enhancing the role of policy makers and intelligence analysts in this
process; and

• Ensuring that the process produces intelligence and capabilities to deter,
defeat, and defend against adversaries, especially terrorists that are agile,
flexible, and responsive.

THE NEED FOR A RENAISSANCE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I come to this subject with a record
of interest in the Nation's intelligence capabilities.

When I appeared before your committee in January 2001, more than 3V2 years
ago, as the nominee to be Secretary of Defense, I was asked what subject kept me
up at night.

I replied, without hesitation, "intelligence."

My prior experience as chairman of two congressionally-mandated commissions —
one on the ballistic missile threat to the U.S. and the other on the organization and
management of national security space — had impressed on me how difficult it is to
acquire intelligence, convert it into useful information and then use it in support
of operations.

In our global environment, adversaries can exploit international trade, finance,
and communications to acquire expertise, technology and systems — often on the
open market — with which they can do great harm to the American people and the
Nation's interests.

My concern back in 2001 was, and remains today, that a combination of terrorists
and states that wish us harm, will exploit that global environment, and gain access
to or develop weapons of mass destruction.

The efforts of the Intelligence Community to identify such threats in a timely and
precise way that permit us to act decisively are frustrated by the reality that:

• Our adversaries are keenly aware of our vulnerabilities;

• They need to succeed only occasionally whereas we are obliged to defend
against them everywhere and at all times;

• Through a combination of espionage against the U.S., irresponsible leaks,
demarches, official disclosures and the general advance of scientific and
technical knowledge, adversaries have learned far too much about how we
collect, analyze, and use intelligence;

• Adversaries have many advantages in denying information to and deceiv-
ing intelligence analysts and policymakers alike about their capabilities and
intentions; and

• As a result, they are capable of surprising us as well as friendly foreign
countries.

This is the reality our country faces as we consider various proposals for improv-
ing the capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community to meet 21st century prob-
lems.

It is a reality borne out by the work of the 9/11 Commission and by the continuing
review of intelligence prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom by the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, as well as the good work done by this committee, the House
Armed Services Committee, the House Intelligence Committee, and other commit-
tees of Congress.

In the face of this reality, and enlightened by the experience of the last 43
months, I come to this subject with a healthy respect for the magnitude of the task
our country is tackling.

I also come to it with an adage in mind that I find useful: "To those who would
tear down what is falls the responsibility of putting in place something better." I
would remind that it is far easier to critique and find fault than it is to build.

HOW MIGHT THOSE RESULTS BE ACHIEVED

A variety of proposals for achieving the objectives I outlined have been advanced.

My experience as Secretary of Defense and in the pharmaceutical and electronic
industries persuades me that the attributes we seek in the Intelligence Commu-
nity — imagination, intuition, and initiative — are best encouraged and developed by
organizations wherein planning is centralized but the execution of plans is decen-
tralized.

An Intelligence Community organized around areas of substantive expertise — for
example, foreign, domestic and military intelligence — would possibly be more likely
to generate, in a timely fashion, the indications and warning of crises and provide
the intelligence support needed by the executive departments of government in the
performance of their respective missions than is one organized around a single and
preeminent national intelligence organization.

As some have suggested, organizing the U.S. Intelligence Community around the
national collection agencies — NSA, NGA, and NRO — now located in the DOD, and
aligning them under direct NID leadership, could conceivably lead to some effi-
ciencies in some aspects of intelligence collection and some modest but indefinable
improvement in the support those agencies provide to other elements of the govern-
ment. At the same time, however, it is possible that by their sheer size and the
broad extent of their activity, those collection agencies could come to form the "cen-
ter of gravity" of the NID's organization.

If a consolidation of the NSA, NGA, and NRO outside DOD were to be considered,
we should be certain that it would help resolve the intelligence-related problems and
difficulties we face and not create additional problems. As an example of the latter,
we wouldn't want to place new barriers or filters between the military combatant
commanders and those agencies when they perform as combat support agencies. It
would be a major step to separate these key agencies from the military combatant
commanders, which are the major users of such capabilities.

With respect to solving problems that have been identified, my impression is that
the technical collection agencies — NSA, NGA, and NRO — collect more than we can
analyze today. This suggests we need more analysts and capability to process data.

It is also my impression that we must repair our human intelHgence (HUMINT) ca-
pabiHties. They were especially hard hit in the budget cuts beginning in the early
1990s.

The President has not yet made a decision on these issues. He will undoubtedly
continue to listen to the debate and take different views into consideration in reach-
ing decisions. He has not ruled anything out.

It is my belief that any changes that are made to meet the objectives identified
earlier need to focus on building an Intelligence Community for the 21st century
along 21st century lines:

• networked and distributed centers of analysis within executive depart-
ments and agencies, with access to all available data;

• focused on emplo3dng instruments of collection wherever they reside as
tools for exploring hypothesis and conducting alternative analysis; and

• whose activities, priorities, and production schedules are directed by the
NID.

This implies a NID with authority for:

• tasking collection assets across the government,

• setting analytic priorities and ensuring all source, competitive analyses
throughout the Intelligence Community,

• the personnel management and training to alter the culture in the com-
munity,

• information security and access policies,

• information technology standards and architectures across the commu-
nity, and

• reallocating resources in the year of budget execution.

As I said, the precise extent of such authorities, and other issues, are under con-
sideration by the President and Congress. But an NID likely will need some authori-
ties of this sort.

I have been asked about the commission's recommendation for shifting para-
military operations to DOD. We will give that recommendation careful consider-
ation. This, like other recommendations, is complicated. The executive and legisla-
tive branches will need to be comfortable that any changes that might be made take
account of the difference in the authorities and capabilities of the CIA and DOD and
the changing needs of a President for access to a broad range of capabilities to meet
the various challenges the Nation will be facing.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DOD

The Department of Defense seeks and welcomes changes in the way the Nation
does its intelligence business. It is greatly to the advantage of the U.S. Armed
Forces that the Intelligence Community is better able to serve it and the other exec-
utive departments of the government, especially those associated with our Nation's
homeland security. If the government as a whole is better able to act in a timely
fashion, the frequency and duration with which the men and women of our armed
forces will be called for combat operations abroad might be reduced.

I believe DOD's experience with changing the way it does its business over the
last decade, and especially since 2001, might help inform the proposals being offered
to change the Intelligence Community.

For example, the Department, through the Services and the combatant com-
mands, has worked hard to break down stovepipes between foreign and military in-
telligence that support DOD activities. The impetus for this effort was the lessons
learned from Operation Desert Storm. You may recall General Schwartzkopfs dis-
appointment with the timeliness, speed, and scope of intelligence support to the op-
erations he commanded.

The result of a decade's effort to establish a timely and seamless interaction be-
tween DOD and CIA activity has become apparent in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the
ongoing war on terror. We are as well connected as we ever have been, but we're
probably not as well stitched together as we could or should be; gaps and seams
may still exist. But any change to the Intelligence Community should be designed
to help us close further those gaps and seams, not reopen them.

I hope that the change in the relationship between foreign and military intel-
ligence and operations that has occurred since Operation Desert Storm will be
matched by similar changes between domestic and foreign intelligence as the result
of any reform. I am sure much has been done since September 11 to improve that
relationship, but very likely more can and should be done.

Second, DOD is pursuing a network-based intelligence, operations, and commu-
nications capability to replace its hierarchical and serial practices. As part of this

effort, the DOD is developing and deploying new sensors, communications systems
and establishing new standards and protocols to permit the secure transmission of
a high volume of classified and unclassified data and information at the lowest pos-
sible levels of operations. This will permit the armed forces to conduct highly decen-
tralized operations in response to centralized direction.

This has enabled quicker decisionmaking, increased the prospect for immediate
action in response to actionable intelligence, improved the precision of military oper-
ations, and provided combatant commanders at all levels with far greater situa-
tional awareness. A similar approach to networks and decentralized execution with-
in the Intelligence Community would likely yield for it similar results.

Third, as part of the effort to network its capabilities, DOD has tightened the con-
nection between the operating forces and the combat support agencies — NSA, NGA,
and NRO. I know General Myers will say more about this.

This connection has been crucial to improving the effectiveness and capabilities
of the U.S. Armed Forces in combat against enemy conventional forces, unconven-
tional forces, and terrorists.

We now have an opportunity to create government-wide networks that can
strengthen the connection of the components of the Intelligence Community located
in other executive departments — especially on the domestic side — to NSA, NGA, and
NRO. Extending access to the network infi^astructure DOD is already building to
other Departments would help in this regard. The NID could well establish the
standards and protocols governing the construction and use of the resulting net-
works for intelligence purposes.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The 9/11 Commission has focused the Nation's attention on questions related to
strengthening the Intelligence Community. It would be unfortunate if we were to
lose sight of the commission's reflections on the nature of the world in which we
live and the recommendations for the national security policies needed to protect
and defend the Nation and the American people.

In addition to the recommendations offered by the commission, we could usefully
consider the following:

1. Further improving U.S. domestic intelligence capabilities while preserving U.S.
civil liberties:

• As part of this initiative, appointing a bipartisan, blue-ribbon panel, not
unlike the Minow Panel we set up in DOD, to look at the ways and means
of enhancing our domestic intelligence capability, consistent with our laws
and values, to help counter 21st century threats.

2. The President has been actively engaged in developing initiatives that engage
peoples at risk to subversion by extremist ideologies. In no case is this more evident
than his Broader Middle East Initiative. Those initiatives could be embraced by
Congress so that:

• Educational institutions abroad that emphasize religious toleration are
supported, including provision of information technologies for schools

• Foreign scholarships and fellowships for exchanging American and for-
eign students and scholars are established to improve cultural understand-
ing.

• Economic aid and assistance programs that utilize private-public partner-
ships are more widely developed to encourage small business development,
banking sector development, and local infrastructure improvement, and to
teach skills that workers will need in the 21st century.

• Private philanthropy and non-governmental groups are mobilized to pro-
mote the ideas and amplify those local voices that oppose transnational ter-
rorism and extremist ideologies, and provide counterweights to terrorist-re-
lated organizations.

3. Providing the executive branch with the necessary freedom to manage the 21st
century war on terror:

• Congressional approval of the administration's requests for funds for the
combatant commanders use in the field to aid in humanitarian relief and
reconstruction.

• Adoption of contracting rules to streamline contract awards while retain-
ing appropriate oversight to the circumstances so that critical projects like
equipping local security forces are not unduly delayed.

• A reexamination of "train and equip" authorities and missions to explore
opportunities for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of such assist-
ance programs.

100

4. Realigning and reorganizing the U.S. Government's functions and responsibil-
ities to meet the challenges of the 21st century:

• Consider undertaking a fundamental re-look at the roles and missions of
the U.S. Government to meet the national security challenges of the 21st
century. Consider developing a new National Security Act — not simply an-
other incremental update of the 1947 act. This new organizational design
could be coupled to a Unified Executive Branch Plan, outlining responsibil-
ities and assigning lead and supporting responsibilities among departments
for national security tasks, as we do for military forces.

• Introduce Goldwater-Nichols type reforms to increase "jointness" across
Federal agencies. Consider establishing a National Security University (like
National Defense University for the Department of Defense) to educate na-
tional security officials and an interagency training exercise process to build
capacity for interagency crisis management and national security planning
and operations.

• Establishment of a Reserve Force of civilians for a new Office of Stability
and Reconstruction Operations in the Department of State, including incen-
tives for service and commitments to train and deploy overseas when di-
rected.

• Consideration of the creation of Joint Interagency Task Forces, led by
statutory members of the National Security Council (NSC), to conduct inte-
grated planning for the employment of all instruments of national power for
particular missions (e.g., attacking/disrupting terrorist networks, protecting
homeland, and engaging in ideological struggle).

• Consideration of the conduct an Interagency Roles and Missions Study to
rationalize responsibilities and authorities across the U.S. Government to
meet 21st century threats.

MOVING WITH DELIBERATE SPEED

In pursuit of strengthening our Nation's intelligence capabilities, I would offer a
cautionary note. It is important that we move with all deliberate speed; however,
moving too quickly risks enormous error, as this committee has heard from former
senior officials, military and civilians, with broad experience in this matter. We are
considering these important matters while waging a war.

National security is not easily achieved in this new century. If we move too un-
wisely and get it wrong, the penalty will be great. The National Security Act of 1947
established the DOD. By 1958 it had undergone no fewer than 4 major statutory
or organizational changes. Another round of major change was inaugurated with the
Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. We shouldn't think intelligence reform will be com-
pleted at a stroke, either.

Intelligence is expensive. The Intelligence Community suffered substantial reduc-
tions in its budget in the last decade. Those reductions were made on the theory
that, with the end of the Cold War, U.S. reliance on intelligence for security would
not be as substantial as it had been. Events have proven otherwise. It was a mis-
take, and we are pa3dng the penalty.

It was with that in mind that the President developed his "Strengthening Intel-
ligence Initiative." It seeks to increase the number of HUMINT operators, linguists,
and analysts and provide them with needed infrastructure support. The first incre-
ment of funding for the initiative was included in the fiscal year 2005 budget re-
cently enacted by Congress. Between now and 2009 that initiative seeks to add
thousands of personnel to the Intelligence Community. They are needed.

George Tenet and I worked over recent years to increase the numbers and capa-
bilities of HUMINT operators in our respective areas of responsibility. More will
need to be done in this area. But HUMINT operators are not created overnight.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, let me return to where I began, before this committee in January
2001. I am still concerned about our Nation's intelligence capabilities. That concern
stems not from a lack of confidence in the men and women of the Intelligence Com-
munity. They have fashioned important achievements over recent years. Our coun-
try owes them a debt of gratitude. It will be a long time, if ever, that many of their
achievements are fully and broadly known and appreciated.

DOD and its counterparts in the Intelligence Community are forging, in the cru-
cible of war, a strong, interlocking relationship between intelligence and operations,
between national and tactical intelligence, and between foreign and military intel-
ligence. We have worked hard to close the gaps and seams these terms imply. Our

101

people, our budgets, and our activities are closely intertwined. That close relation-
ship between DOD and CIA is a driving cause of shared successes.

My concerns are rooted in the realities of the 21st century. Our Intelligence Com-
munity will need to improve to meet the challenges we face, and DOD is ready to
work with you to further strengthen our ability to live in this new and dangerous
world.

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Director McLaughhn?

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. MCLAUGHLIN, ACTING
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, as this committee considers reorganization pro-
posals by the President, the Kean Commission, and Congress, I
want to speak for a moment about the structure and capabiHties
of the U.S. Intelhgence Community, as it exists today, not in 2001.
I think it's important that we do that at the beginning of these de-
Hberations.

I beUeve that today's Intelhgence Community provides a much
stronger foundation for any changes you want to make as we move
forward than most people might realize. That said, there is no
question we can still do better, and I'll close with some thoughts
on how that can be accomplished.

Three years of war have profoundly affected the American Intel-
ligence Community. Since September 11, our capacity and effective-
ness have grown as our resources have increased — a very impor-
tant point, our resources have increased dramatically — and as we
have taken steps to address many of the issues that others have
highlighted. This has been the most dramatic period of change in
my personal memory.

Some examples:

Our policies — the Nation's, and the Intelligence Community's
have changed dramatically. We're on the offensive against terror-
ists worldwide, and many of the most dangerous are captured or
dead.

Our practices have also changed. Intelligence, law enforcement,
and military officers serve together and share information realtime
and on the front lines around the world. Here in Washington, I
chair an operational meeting every day with Intelligence Commu-
nity and law enforcement officers present. Decisions made there go
immediately to officers in the field — immediately — whose penetra-
tion and disruption of terrorist groups yields the kind of increas-
ingly precise intelligence you've seen in the last couple of weeks.

Our worldwide coalition has changed. It is broader, deeper, and
more committed than before or at September 11. Where terrorists
found sanctuary before, they now find our allies, and we are seeing
the results from Panama to Mexico City.

Our laws have changed — the Patriot Act has given us weapons
in the war we did not have then — and we've saved lives because
of them.

Our institutions have changed. The Terrorist Threat Integration
Center did not exist then. It enables us to share intelligence col-
lected abroad with law enforcement information collected at home,
and plots have been stopped in the U.S. because of that.

102

Twenty-six different data networks now flow there, to the Terror-
ist Threat Integration Center, to be shared by officers from the
widest array of foreign and domestic intelhgence agencies ever as-
sembled in one organization. People who think we can't break down
the so-called stovepipes need to visit the Terrorist Threat Integra-
tion Center.

In turn, such changes affected our ability to wage war, and the
impact of change has been striking. It was imaginative covert ac-
tion, CIA officers working with the U.S. military, that helped drive
military operations and ousted the Taliban from power in Afghani-
stan, and broke up the sanctuary that al Qaeda had used.

Terrorist arrests are increasing steadily. You see that in just
about every morning newspaper.

CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Treasury, and other
partners at home and abroad are starving al Qaeda of its lifeblood:
money.

CIA has worked with the FBI as it has taken down extremists
in Lackawanna, Columbus, and New York City.

Our coalition partners include, by varying degrees, Libyans and
Russians, Chinese and Hungarians, Pakistanis and Saudis, and
more, along with our traditional allies in Europe and in Asia.

In short, the situation has changed dramatically from where the
9/11 Commission left off. Two things, however, are still true: al
Qaeda and other terrorists remain dangerous, and there is still
room for improvement in the Intelligence Community.

But the image that many seek to perpetuate, of a community
that doesn't share information or work together, a community of
turf-conscious people competing with each other for influence, I
must tell you, that's not the community I lead. It's a caricature
that does a great disservice to the men and women who put it on
the line every day, 24/7.

Because of this committee's special responsibilities, I need to say
a word, as the Secretary did, about the Intelligence Community's
support for the warfighter. As we discuss various proposals for re-
structuring the Intelligence Community today, let me be clear
about one thing: No matter what course the administration and
Congress choose, intelligence support to the military, especially in
time of war, should not be allowed to diminish. I believe such sup-
port can and will be preserved under any of the options being con-
sidered. No one would think about it in any other way. Everyone
in the Intelligence Community understands that NSA, NGA, NRO,
all vital parts of the National Intelligence Community, are also
combat support agencies.

Let me give you the assurance that the relationship between the
Intelligence Community and the uniformed military — and the mili-
tary, in general; the Defense Department, in general — has never,
in my personal experience, been closer. The Secretary alluded to
this.

Some data points:

The Secretary of Defense, to his great credit, has met frequently
with George Tenet and myself to coordinate policies across the
board in an almost unprecedented manner, in my experience.

A Navy SEAL three-star. Vice Admiral Callon, sits right across
the hall from me at CIA headquarters with the mission of ensuring

103

that we and the miUtary are connected and that both sides are get-
ting what they need. I see him two or three times every day.

CIA and U.S. mihtary officers have been hving and fighting to-
gether in Afghanistan for 3 years in the mountains and plains,
where they have al Qaeda on the run. Our collection, operational,
and analytic support to military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq is
close and continuous, as I think most of you have seen during your
trips to those areas. I have a lot of data here about the number
of operations, liaison teams that we've sent to U.S. Central Com-
mand (CENTCOM), and so forth.

I have frequent video conferences with CENTCOM Commander
General Abizaid to personally assure that we understand his per-
spective and his needs.

We've upgraded information technology support to the military in
the field so that Intelligence Community products are now avail-
able in 80 military intelligence centers around the globe.

It is a different world from the one that General Schwarzkopf,
I think, described accurately after the first Gulf War.

Looking ahead now, it's important to note that the terrorist
threat is in no way stagnant. We've had victories. But these organi-
zations learn, and they adapt. It's not enough for us to keep up.
We have to anticipate and keep ahead.

As we seek to build on the improvements we've made in recent
years, we should keep in mind a few of what I would call "first
principles."

First, speed and agility are the keys to the war on terrorism and
profoundly important to the Nation's other intelligence challenges.
We sometimes have literally only minutes to react to a lead that
allows us to go after terrorists. Speed and agility are not promoted
by complicated wiring diagrams, more levels of bureaucracy, in-
creased dual-hatting, or inherent questions about who is in charge.

Second, as in architecture, form should follow function. The func-
tions intelligence must perform today are dramatically different
than during the Cold War. Back then, we focused heavily on large
strategic forces — where were they, for example — and where coun-
tries stood on the bipolar competition that characterized that era.
Today, the focus is more on locating people, sometimes one person
in a city of 17 million, tracking shipments of dangerous materials,
understanding politics, now down to the tribal level, in a world
where the only constant is change.

Third, in this world, clear structure and a clear chain of com-
mand is better than the opposite.

Fourth, most important to knowing how and what to change is
consensus on what we want from our intelligence agencies, along
with constancy in resource and moral support for them, through
good times and bad, and patience. The 9/11 Commission says that
the country cannot be patient. But to quote a saying I learned dur-
ing my Army years, "If you want it bad, you will get it bad."

Drawing on these principles, I believe that short, clear lines of
command and control are required in whatever structure you estab-
lish, regardless of what you call its leader. Three words are key:
agility, flexibility, and speed. You need to build these into any new
structures and procedures.

104

No matter how successfully we anticipate future challenges, we
won't foresee them all, so we will need the ability to adapt our or-
ganizations to change easily and quickly. We will need flexibility
in shifting resources, people, and money to respond to shifting pri-
orities.

The DCI can do some of this now, with existing authorities; but,
frankly, it's too complicated, cumbersome, and ponderous. It in-
volves more negotiations and sign-offs than current requirements
permit.

That's why, should the President's proposal to create a National
Intelligence Director be adopted, I believe that that individual
should have the clear authority to move people and resources, and
to evaluate the performance of the national intelligence agencies
and their leaders. This should be accomplished in the cleanest and
most direct manner you can devise.

People often remark that the DCIs allow too much in the Intel-
ligence Community to be — the phrase often used is, "CIA-centric,"
whether it's the staffing of centers or the preparation of national
estimates. Well the reason is simple. It's because a DCI can. That
is, these are the troops he directly commands and can task and
move with little effort or resistance. If the DCI had enhanced au-
thorities along the lines I've suggested, or if you create a National
Intelligence Director like that, you should expect to see much more
integration of effort in the community, and a greater capacity to
create cross-community task forces and centers in a more agile and
seamless way. You should also see more progress by a DCI, or a
National Intelligence Director, on things like common policies for
personnel, training, security, and information technology.

Now, as you consider all of this, here is a key thing to think
about:

Who will you hold responsible, not just when things go well, but
when something goes wrong with intelligence? Today, it's the DCI,
even though his authorities over the rest of the community outside
CIA are limited.

If, in the future, it will be a National Intelligence Director, what
authorities would be commensurate to that kind of responsibility if
that's the person you choose to hold responsible?

What would that person actually be responsible for? What the
community concludes substantively about major issues, like Iraq,
North Korea, or terrorism? If the answer is yes, that person will
need direct access to sizeable numbers of collectors and analysts,
just as the DCI has today. The question then arises about where
those people will come from and with what impact.

Or would the National Intelligence Director be responsible less
for substantive matters and primarily for the management and in-
tegration of resources? Can substantive and management respon-
sibilities be separated? If they can, will responsibility and account-
ability be harder to pin down than it is now, especially in view of
the fact that the person you now hold responsible, the head of CIA,
would then be at least a layer away from the top?

I regret to close with a series of questions, but I believe they il-
lustrate the complexity of these issues and the need to proceed cau-
tiously and with care as we contemplate changes to an intelligence

105

system on which the Nation must depend more than ever for its
security.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McLaughHn follows:]

Prepared Statement by John E. McLaughlin

Mr. Chairman, as this committee considers reorganization proposals by the Presi-
dent, the Kean Commission, and Congress, I want to speak to the structure and ca-
pabiHties of the InteUigence Community as it is today, not as it was in 2001. I be-
lieve that today's Intelligence Community provides a much stronger foundation than
many people realize for whatever changes you decide to make. That said, we can
still do better, and I will close with some thoughts on how this can be accomplished.

intelligence community today

Three years of war have profoundly affected the Intelligence Community. Since
September 11, our capacity and effectiveness have grown as our resources have in-
creased and as we have taken steps to address many of the issues others have high-
lighted. This has been the most dramatic period of change in my memory. Some ex-
amples:

• Our policies — the Nation's and the Intelligence Community's — have
changed — we are on the offensive against terrorists worldwide and many of the
most dangerous are captured or dead.

• Our practices have changed — intelligence, law enforcement, and military offi-
cers serve together and share information real time on the front lines at home
and abroad. In Washington, I chair an operational meeting every day with In-
telligence Community and law enforcement elements represented. Decisions
made there go immediately to officers in the field whose penetration and disrup-
tion of terrorist groups yields the kind of increasingly precise intelligence you
have seen in the last 2 weeks.

• Our worldwide coalition has changed — it is broader, deeper, and more com-
mitted. Where terrorists found sanctuary before, they find our allies now — and
we are seeing the results from Manama to Mexico City.

• Our laws have changed — the Patriot Act has given us weapons in the war we
did not have and we have saved lives because of them.

• Our institutions have changed — The Terrorist Threat Integration Center
(TTIC) enables us to share intelligence collected abroad with law enforcement
information collected at home — and plots have been stopped in the U.S. because
of that. Twenty-six different data networks now flow there to be shared by offi-
cers from the widest array of foreign and domestic intelligence agencies ever as-
sembled in one organization. People who think we can't break down the so-
called "stovepipes" need to visit TTIC.

In turn, the changes affected our ability to wage war and the impact of change
has been striking.

• It was imaginative covert action — CIA officers working with the U.S. mili-
tary — that helped drive military operations and ousted the Taliban from power
in Afghanistan and broke up the al Qaeda sanctuary.

• Terrorist arrests are increasing steadily. That evidence comes with your
morning newspapers nearly every day now.

• CIA, FBI, Treasury, and other partners, at home and abroad are starving the
al Qaeda of its lifeblood — money.

• CIA has worked with the FBI, as it has taken down extremists in Lacka-
wanna, Columbus, and New York City.

• Our coalition partners include, by varying degrees, Libyans and Russians,
Chinese and Hungarians, Pakistanis and Saudis — and our traditional allies in
Europe and Asia.

In short, the situation has changed dramatically from where the 9/11 Commission
left off. Two things, however, are still true: al Qaeda and other terrorists remain
dangerous and there is still room for improvement in the Intelligence Community.
But the image that many seek to perpetuate of a community that does not share
information or work together, a community of turf-conscious people competing for
influence — that is not the community I lead. It is a caricature that does a great dis-
service to the men and women who put it on the line every day, 24/7.

106

SUPPORTING THE WARFIGHTER

Because of this committee's special responsibilities, I need to say a word about
the Intelligence Community's support to the warfighter. As we discuss various pro-
posals for restructuring the Intelligence Community today, let me be clear about one
thing: no matter what course the administration and Congress choose, intelligence
support to the military, especially in time of war, should not be allowed to dimin-
ish — and I believe such support can and will be preserved under any of the options
being considered. Everyone in the Intelligence Community understands that NSA,
NGA, and NRO, all vital parts of the National Intelligence Community, are also
combat support agencies. Let me give you the assurance that the relationship be-
tween the Intelligence Community and the uniformed military has never been clos-
er. Some data points:

• The Secretary of Defense has met frequently with George Tenet and my-
self to coordinate policies across the board.

• A Navy Seal Three Star — Admiral Calland — sits right across the hall
from me with the mission of ensuring we and the military are connected
and that both sides are getting what they need.

• CIA and U.S. military officers have been living and fighting together for
3 years in the mountains and plains of Afghanistan where they have al
Qaeda on the run.

• Our collection, operational, and anal5rtic support to military efforts in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq is close and continuous.

• The CIA deployed 12 Crisis Operations Liaison Teams to CENTCOM spe-
cifically tailored to work side-by-side with Special Operations and conven-
tional forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

• I hold frequent video conferences with CENTCOM Commander Abizaid
to personally assure that we understand his perspective and needs.

• We have upgraded information technology support to the military in the
field, so that Intelligence Community products are now available in 80 mili-
tary intelligence centers around the globe.

THOUGHTS ON REFORM

Looking ahead now, it is important to note that the threat from terrorist organiza-
tions is not stagnant. These organizations learn and adapt. It is not enough for us
to keep up, we must anticipate and keep ahead. As we seek to build on the improve-
ments we've made in recent years, we should keep in mind a few of what I would
call "first principles":

First, speed and agility are the keys to the war on terrorism, and profoundly im-
portant to the Nation's other intelligence challenges. Speed and agility are not pro-
moted by complicated wiring diagrams, more levels of bureaucracy, increased dual
hatting, or inherent questions about who is in charge.

Second, as in architecture, form should follow function. The functions intelligence
must perform today are dramatically different than during the Cold War. Back
then, we focused heavily on large strategic forces and where countries stood in the
bipolar competition of the day. Today, the focus is more on locating people, tracking
shipments of dangerous materials, understanding politics down to the tribal level
in a world where the only constant is change.

Third, in this world clear structure and clear chain of command is better than its
opposite.

Fourth, most important to knowing how and what to change is consensus on what
we want from our intelligence agencies, constancy in resource and moral support for
them through good and bad times, and patience. The commission says that the
country cannot be patient. But to quote a saying I learned during my Army years:
if you want it bad; you will get it bad.

Drawing on these principles, I believe that short, clear lines of command and con-
trol are required in whatever structure you establish, regardless of what you call
its leader. Three words are key: agility, flexibility, and speed. You need to build
these into any new structures and procedures.

No matter how successfully we anticipate future challenges, we wiU not foresee
them all. So, we will need the ability to adapt our organizations to change, easily
and quickly. We will need flexibility in shifting resources, people and money to re-
spond to shifting priorities. The DCI can do some of this with existing authorities.
But frankly, it is too complicated and ponderous. It involves more negotiation and
signoffs than the times will allow.

That is why, should the President's proposal to create a National Intelligence Di-
rector be adopted, I believe that individual should have the clear authority to move
people and resources and to evaluate the performance of the national intelligence

107

agencies and their leaders. This should be accomplished in the cleanest and most
direct manner you can devise.

People often remark that DCIs allow too much in the Intelligence Community to
be "CIA-centric" — whether it is the staffing of centers or the preparation of national
estimates. Well, the reason is simple. It's because the DCI "can" — that is these are
the troops he directly commands and can task and move with little effort or resist-
ance. If the DCI had enhanced authorities along the lines I've suggested or if you
create a NID like that, you should expect to see much more integration of effort in
the community and a greater capacity to create cross-community task forces and
centers in a more agile and seamless way.

You would also see more progress by a DCI or NID on things like common policies
for personnel, training, security, and information technology.

As you consider all of this, here is a key thing to think about: who will you hold
responsible not just when things are going well but when something goes wrong
with intelligence? Today, it is the DCI even though his authorities over the rest of
the community outside CIA are limited. If in the future it will be a National Intel-
ligence Director, what authorities would be commensurate with that kind of respon-
sibility? What would that person actually be responsible for? What the community
concludes substantively about major issues, like Iraq, North Korea, or terrorism? If
the answer is yes, that person will need direct access to sizeable numbers of collec-
tors and analysts, just as the DCI has today. The question then arises about where
those people will come from and with what impact.

Or would the NID be responsible less for substantive matters and principally for
the "management" and integration of resources — and can the two be separated? If
they can, will responsibility and accountability be harder to pin down than it is
today — especially in view of the fact that the person you now hold responsible — the
head of CIA — would then be at least a layer away from the top?

I regret to close with a series of questions, but I believe they illustrate the com-
plexity of these issues and the need to proceed cautiously and with care as we con-
template changes to an intelligence system on which the Nation must depend, more
than ever, for its security.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Director McLaughlin,
for a very frank and candid appraisal of this situation, drawing on
many, many years of experience that you've had at the Agency.

General Myers?

STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General Myers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and
members of the committee, for your support of our ongoing efforts
to improve our intelligence capabilities.

Our military has been working diligently since September 11 to
break down intelligence barriers and to better integrate with other
agencies of our government and our allies. We've accomplished a
great deal, but we still have much work left to do. I can think of
no more important issue to our national security and to the men
and women of our Armed Forces in harm's way around the world.

Reorganizing the Intelligence Community is a complex and dif-
ficult task, and the decisions made will have enormous con-
sequences far into the future. Opportunities like this only come
along once in a long time, perhaps in a lifetime. The last intel-
ligence reform of the magnitude we're now considering was in 1947.
So we have to be careful as we proceed.

While I support the concept of a National Intelligence Director,
I'd like to articulate what I think are some critical parameters as
we move forward.

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am continually mind-
ful of the fact that the DOD's intelligence capabilities are an impor-
tant part of the Nation's overall Intelligence Community, and these
assets support national security in the broadest sense.

108

At the same time, to the warfighter, from the combatant com-
mander down to the private on patrol, timely, accurate intelligence
is literally a life-and-death matter every day. In my judgment, the
military's dependence on intelligence is unique and on a scale un-
paralleled in our government. In fact, in today's threat environ-
ment, we no longer have a distinct boundary between operations
and intelligence.

Traditionally, we thought of intelligence as support, a support
function. That's an outmoded, outdated way of thinking. DOD's in-
telligence people are an integral part of the warfighting team.

When coalition forces captured Saddam Hussein in December
2003, we saw this integrated team in action as they turned infor-
mation into action quickly. That's just one example out of thou-
sands. But intelligence reform initiatives need to further this abil-
ity to integrate operations and intelligence.

As we move forward, we cannot create any institutional barriers
between intelligence agencies — and, of course, that would include
the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office — and the rest of
the warfighting team. We've made great progress integrating this
team, as was evident in our military successes in Afghanistan and
Iraq.

I share the concerns of the Secretary and others who have testi-
fied on this issue, that we proceed with caution on any decision
that increases centralized control of intelligence. In some areas,
greater centralization might improve coordination, create resource
efficiencies, and clarify responsibilities. On the other hand, we
must absolutely protect the competition, the inherent cross-check-
ing function that comes from independent, all-source analysis. The
combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs have also voiced this
same concern.

We must also protect the dynamic we have today that encourages
innovative thinking. I believe the more you have centralized con-
trol, the less you have the kind of entrepreneurial spirit and agility
that I see in our service men and women every day. The officers
and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and civilians in the field who
see a problem and create a solution contribute immeasurably to our
overall intelligence capabilities.

Traditionally, we have used the terms "national," "strategic," and
"tactical" to define intelligence functions, assets, and customers.
Today, I believe those terms highlight, and even perpetuate, stove-
pipe thinking. The data that the private in the foxhole needs right
now might be the same information the President needs, and the
reverse could certainly be true. The same, by the way, is true of
the terms "intelligence," "surveillance," and "reconnaissance," or
ISR. I often challenge people to convince me there's a functional
distinction between them. No one has succeeded yet. I point it out
for two reasons. One is to show that there are still stovepipes out
there that we need to overcome, but also to highlight the challenge
in dividing tasks and assigning responsibilities in a way that will
be productive and effective. We simply haven't caught up to infor-
mation-age warfare in this new national security environment that
we find ourselves.

109

Above all, intelligence reform must further result in better infor-
mation-sharing. We have to get beyond the thinking that intel-
ligence is proprietary. This really is a cultural issue. Traditionally,
the producer of intelligence has been considered the owner of that
intelligence. That's clearly unsatisfactory, as September 11 showed.
As Director McLaughlin said, we've made a great deal of progress
in that area, as well. In my view, we still have more to do.

We have to move from the thought process of "need to know"
that dominated our Cold War mindset to a "need to share" mindset.
We need to reexamine how we balance risk, from a security and
classification perspective, versus the benefits that come from shar-
ing information.

Right now, I believe we depend, in large measure, on personal re-
lationships and memoranda of understanding to force information-
sharing across organizations and agencies. In fact, I've dropped a
roll of duct tape on the podium during a speech to emphasize this
point, because, in a sense, we're duct-taping together organizations
and processes that weren't designed to be well-connected. We've
made progress, as said, but, again, there is more to do.

We have to, to the best we can, institutionalize information-shar-
ing to provide a much greater degree of transparency for all intel-
ligence customers. I think that's one function a National Intel-
ligence Director might perform very well.

We also tend to focus on vertical information-sharing, getting in-
formation up and down the chain of command. We have much room
for improvement, not just in sharing information between the head-
quarters and the foxhole, but also between foxholes. Here, I'm
using the term "foxhole" figuratively, of course. It's also the ship
and the aircraft and the guard-posts of the front gate of a base.

A National Intelligence Director should also oversee needed inte-
gration of intelligence resources. Competition for resources is a big
challenge for the Intelligence Community, and we need an im-
proved process for coordinating intelligence programs — and here,
I'm thinking of the major procurement programs — perhaps modeled
after the Joint Requirements Oversight Council that we use in the
DOD. This process must be transparent within the entire intel-
ligence communities and those departments and agencies that are
concerned.

I appreciate the efforts of this committee to stay focused on intel-
ligence reform at its broadest level. Certainly, the terrorist attacks
of September 11 and the struggle to defeat violent extremists are
at the forefront of this debate. But we can't lose sight of the fact
that we are making decisions that will have ramifications well be-
yond the war on terrorism. We don't know with any certainty what
the next threat to our security and our prosperity will be, but we
do know we can't afford to be taken by surprise. That was the most
important lesson, of course, from Pearl Harbor and the most impor-
tant lesson of September 11.

As Senator Levin said, and the Secretary said, we have to be
very thoughtful and, at the same time, proceed with the proper
sense of urgency. As we get more and more clarity on the gaps and
deficiencies in our intelligence today, we have to guard against cre-
ating new problems.

110

The details matter very much. I highly recommend an inter-
agency tabletop exercise to work through any recommended options
to war-game the second-, third-, and fourth-order effects, and high-
light problems before they're institutionalized.

Once again, on behalf of the men and women in uniform, I thank
you for your support. This is a sacred responsibility that we share,
protecting the lives of our service men and women, preserving our
way of life for future generations. I look forward to working with
you in this important work, and to answering your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General, for an im-
portant contribution.

We'll now proceed to a round, 6 minutes per Senator.

I want to approach my questions just in a very practical way.
Let's face the realities of where we are — Congress, the executive
branch and, indeed, how our Government is functioning at this
very moment.

We're in recess. Nevertheless, some 20 committees have come
back — or held 20 hearings. I think that shows strong participation
by Congress.

The President has indicated — and I read his statement today,
"Today, I'm asking Congress to create the position of National In-
telligence Director." Now, that person will serve as the President's
principal intelligence advisor and will oversee and coordinate the
foreign and domestic activities and intelligence. This is a broad
mandate. The National Security Advisor, in response to a question
put to her, said, "We expect the National Intelligence Director
would have significant input into the development of a budget."
We're awaiting further clarification from the administration, maybe
actually a bill, itself.

Now, it's important that we try to do what we can, given the re-
alities that we're in an election of our President, we're in an elec-
tion of the entire House of Representatives, a third of the Senate,
and we have but a few weeks time left after we come back here
in September. I, personally, think something can be done, providing
it's constructive and adds to strengthening.

But I pick up on your comment, Secretary Rumsfeld, and, I
think, a very wise one, as you recited the history of reforms that
this country has had, beginning in the 1947 Act, the Goldwater
Act, and so forth; we didn't do it in a single stroke.

So as I approach my individual responsibilities — and, of course,
our committee will meet and decide how we condense the informa-
tion we've received and forward it to other committees, and pos-
sibly to the President — but I'm of the opinion that we should not
try and do the whole 9/11 Commission recommendation in a single
stroke. That's my view. If you'll look at the one provision, which
I think is most important, here on page 412, "Second, the National
Intelligence Director should manage the national intelligence pro-
gram and oversee the component agencies of the Intelligence Com-
munity, would submit a unified budget," and it goes on.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I'd have to ask you, very bluntly and strong-
ly, if we were to rubberstamp that provision and enact it into law
in the next few weeks, would that put at risk, in your judgment.

Ill

the ability for this country to perform as well as it's performing
today in its intelligence collection activities?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, those are issues that are
being discussed extensively in the executive branch, as well as here
in the committee. They're important questions. Trying to find that
right balance, I think it might be useful, just for the record, if we
took the two big issues with the National Intelligence Director, per-
sonnel and budget

Chairman Warner. Budget. All right.

Secretary Rumsfeld. — and explain how it currently works.

The Director of Central Intelligence today has very broad, exten-
sive authorities in being. They may be executed in varying ways by
different DCIs over time, but, in fact, in writing, there's tremen-
dous authority. I wouldn't think of suggesting somebody to the
President for the NSA or the NGA or for the NRO without develop-
ing criteria with the DCI, without discussing candidates, without
interviewing candidates, without each agreeing that those can-
didates — this individual is the right individual, and making a joint
recommendation. That's how it's done. With respect to the budget,
the current Director of Central Intelligence does develop that budg-
et. The issue, I think, is not so much that as it is the reprogram-
ming authority, and part of that is bureaucracy in the Agency, in
DOD, and in the Office of Management and Budget (0MB), and
part of it's bureaucracy in Congress. John McLaughlin is here and
can comment on that. But the role, today, on both budget and per-
sonnel, for the DCI is extensive, and my guess is, it ought to be,
for a NID.

Chairman Warner. Then one route, which I strongly endorse,
could be that we could, if necessary, formalize, in statute, what ex-
ists today by way of joint cooperation between yourself and the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence in the formulation of the budgets, and
those budgets could be, in a sense, jointly submitted. Am I not cor-
rect?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I would have to go back and refer to the
statute to see what's already in there, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. I think you'll find that that is the spirit of
it. I think if we did that, that would remove some of the concerns
that the 9/11 Commission had. If we did the same, in terms of ap-
pointments, as you point out, you wouldn't think of putting some-
one in there that was not acceptable to the DCI — so formalize that
and have a joint submission of the nominations of the heads of the
various departments at DIA, NSA, and the like. Would that seem
to you to be an acceptable advancement?

Secretary RUMSFELD. It is the practice we're using.

Chairman Warner. Fine.

Secretary Rumsfeld. I've found it, working with George Tenet,
that it worked very well. We communicated extensively about these
individuals, and made the recommendation to the President, saying
that each of us agreed that this was an appropriate thing, to ap-
point or nominate or to extend the term of any one of those individ-
uals. Except for DCI, less formal there. Certainly with the national
collection agencies. With the Director of Defense Intelligence, with
that post, we had the same discussion. But it is a slightly different

112

role, and I don't know that I would include it if you're going to be
doing something with a statute.

Chairman Warner. We could look at that. But if this sweeping
proposal here of the 9/1 1 Commission — and I don't mean to be criti-
cal of it; I'm just being bluntly factual about it — if that were to be
adopted as stated here, would that derogate your, I think, prime
responsibility — namely, the Tactical Intelligence and Related Ac-
tivities (TIARA) budget — which supports the warfighter?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we are still looking at these
things. They're considerably important, and I am not in the posi-
tion to say anything other than, the devil's in the details.

Chairman Warner. Right, I accept that. But the work of Con-
gress is moving ahead. We have some momentum in these commit-
tees. We're coming up with ideas. The sooner we can get those
guideposts from our President and the administration, the better
we will be able to form our work.

I would ask you. Director McLaughlin, I've suggested possibly
that Congress would enact such laws to change the position so that
the Director is on an equal footing with the members of the Cabi-
net — most particularly, the Secretary of Defense. Could you, if not
now, show the committee your recommendations of what legislative
actions need to be taken to strengthen the DC I such that he can
stand on an equal footing, with regard to budget matters and other
matters, with the Secretaries of Defense and State?

Mr. McLaughlin. Mr. Chairman, if I'm not mistaken, the cur-
rent statute really accomplishes that.

Chairman Warner. I think it does, but others do not think it
does.

Mr. McLaughlin. The existing statute gives the DCI the author-
ity to put together the budget for the Intelligence Community. In
fact, I could walk you through the steps by which that's done, if
you wish. So that exists in the statute currently.

Chairman Warner. I ask you to examine the balance of the stat-
utes and advise the committee. In the first place, you're a level two,
which is one step below the level of the Secretary of Defense. Is
that correct?

Mr. McLaughlin. That's correct. But, in fact, the process cur-
rently works as the Secretary described. The DCI, based on intel-
ligence priorities that are now established by the DCI in consulta-
tion with the National Security Council, puts together an intel-
ligence budget by suggesting to each of the constituent agencies
what their budget ought to include, what the priorities ought to be.
Those agencies put their budgets together

Chairman Warner. My time is going along. But my point is,
you're a level below, in terms of protocol, pay, and otherwise. We
could raise it to the same level as the Secretary, could we not?

Mr. McLaughlin. You certainly could.

Chairman Warner. All right. That's, I think, an important mat-
ter.

Mr. McLaughlin. Why would I argue against that? [Laughter.l

Chairman Warner. Fine. No, no [Laughter.]

I understand that. But yesterday's panel — a very distinguished
panel, of Dr. Schlesinger and Frank Carlucci, who know a great
deal about these issues were concerned, together with Dr. Hamre,

113

that even though there is the law there, because of your level-two
position, not level-one, you could be — not you, personally, but that
person occupying — at some disadvantage in the customary competi-
tion that goes on among the cabinet officers — I'm not suggesting
you become a cabinet officer — but the cabinet officers as they work
through the budget and the personnel appointments. So that's my
point. Perhaps we could change it so you're on an absolute coequal
status, and give you the title of NID, and try it for a while, and
see if it would work. Otherwise, I guess we're awaiting further
comments from the administration. [No response.]

All right.

Senator Levin.

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to ask the Secretary his personal view, then, on some of
the specific recommendations of the 9/11 Commission relative to
the powers of the National Intelligence Director and the proposed
National Counterterrorism Center. It's clear to me that we should
create both. We will create both, I hope, and do it promptly. The
issue is going to be the powers and responsibilities. I'd like your
personal view on those issues.

First, should this proposed National Counterterrorism Center be
able to assign operational responsibilities to combatant commands?
Your personal view. Do you agree or disagree, or can't you answer
one way or the other simply?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Are you talking about the center or the
NID?

Senator Levin. This is the NCTC.

Secretary Rumsfeld. The NCTC. Right now, the folks in the
interagency process are working hard to find out

Senator Levin. You don't have a personal view you can share
with us now?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I think that the statutory responsibilities of
the departments and agencies pretty much establish where respon-
sibility for operations ought to be, and

Senator Levin. There's a proposal

Secretary Rumsfeld. — number one-

Senator Levin. There's a proposal — I just want to know, because

Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I'm doing

Senator Levin. — I mean, I'm trying to

Secretary Rumsfeld. — my best.

Senator Levin. Well, I know, but if you can't give us "personally,
you agree," "personally, you disagree," or, "it's not that simple," I'll
accept that you can't give us one or the other. That's acceptable to
me. You can either agree, or you disagree, with that. I mean, that's
a specific recommendation. Mr. Secretary, we got specific rec-
ommendations

Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand.

Senator Levin. — from the 9/11 Commission. I'm quoting them. I
just want to ask your personal agreement or disagreement. If you
can't give us that, that's okay, but just say you can't give us a per-
sonal yes or no from your perspective.

Secretary Rumsfeld. I can't do it with a yes or no

Senator Levin. Thank you.

114

Secretary Rumsfeld. — that's for sure.

Senator Levin. Thank you.

Secretary Rumsfeld. It's a vastly

Senator Levin. Now, the next

Secretary Rumsfeld. — more complex question.

Senator Levin. Okay. Well, it's a very specific recommendation.

Now, by executive order now, the reprogramming authority is in
the Secretary of Defense. That's by executive order. The 9/11 Com-
mission is recommending, essentially, that we give the new Na-
tional Intelligence Director the budget reprogramming authority.
Do you agree or disagree with that, personally?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Certainly an effective NID would need to
be intimately involved in reprogramming. How the authority ought
to work, whether DOD, NID, or 0MB, is something that, just by
its very nature, requires coordination among all three and Con-
gress. Quite honestly, Congress has been one of the biggest difficul-
ties with respect to that issue.

Senator Levin. I'm going to ask that the five questions which I
asked for specific agreement or disagreement be answered. Mr.
Chairman, I'm going to ask, for the record, that our witnesses an-
swer whether they agree or disagree with those specific rec-
ommendations, because of the time requirements here. Is that all
right, for the record?

Now, this is for Mr. McLaughlin. Whatever the reforms are, we
must promote objectivity and the independence of intelligence as-
sessments. The 9/11 Commission said that the report of a meeting
in Prague between the lead hijacker, Atta, and the Iraqi Intel-
ligence Officer, al Ani, was not supported by available evidence.
Yet that report of the meeting was repeatedly referred to in public
statements of the administration as key evidence of a link between
Iraq and al Qaeda. CIA had doubts. We found out later, because
those CIA doubts were in classified documents. The CIA had
doubts about the reliability of the reports of that meeting. Why
were the doubts of the CIA left classified, while the report of the
meeting, which clearly was reported — there was a report — was just
repeatedly referred to? Why were your doubts classified until re-
cently?

Mr. McLaughlin. This is a story that evolved over a long period
of time.

Senator Levin. Very specifically, though, why were your doubts
left classified until recently? That's my question.

Mr. McLaughlin. They were spelled out very explicitly in a clas-
sified paper

Senator Levin. But the-

Mr. McLaughlin. — published on January 29.

Senator Levin. — report of the meeting was used repeatedly as
evidence of the link between al Qaeda and Iraq. That report of the
meeting was repeatedly referred to by administration sources as
being credible, and yet your doubts about the meeting, in the CIA,
remained classified. My question to you is, why did the CIA, in its
public statements, just simply say that, "Yes, there is a report
which can neither be confirmed nor denied," but why did you leave
the fact that you had doubts about that meeting classified? That's
my question.

115

Mr. McLaughlin. The vast majority of what we produce is clas-
sified. It goes to members of the administration and it's available
to Congress so that people have a very clear understanding, at any
moment, what we

Senator Levin. Not the public.

Mr. McLaughlin.— what we think.

Senator Levin. But the public did not know that you had doubts.

Mr. McLaughlin. Our job is to make our views available as
clearly and objectively as we can to the policymaker and to Con-
gress, frequently in classified — almost always in classified chan-
nels, because the information is sensitive. We're dealing with liai-
son sources here. We're dealing with intelligence collection tech-
niques. That's why it's classified. It's then there for anyone who
wishes to draw on it, as they wish to draw on it, in shaping their
public comments.

Senator Levin. Mr. McLaughlin, the CIA said

Mr. McLaughlin. But the 9/11 Commission was, I think, careful
in saying that we were objective on this point. This is one of the
points where the 9/11 Commission

Senator Levin. No, they

Mr. McLaughlin. — gave us

Senator Levin. — they didn't say that. It was the Intelligence
Community that made a reference to that.

Mr. McLaughlin, the CIA said, in a classified document, that as-
sisting Islamic terrorists would be an extreme step for Saddam
Hussein. Why was that left classified, when the administration was
saying that Saddam Hussein would give Islamic terrorists a weap-
on of mass destruction at any day, any moment? Why did you leave
that critical fact classified?

Mr. McLaughlin. I think the answer to that is simply that — the
one I gave before, that our job is to say, as objectively and clearly
as we can, what we think to be the case — and we did that — for the
benefit of both polic3miakers and Congress. It was there

Senator Levin. Classified.

Mr. McLaughlin. — it was there for all to draw on. I think most
of our work is classified.

Senator Levin. Many of your statements, though, however, were
unclassified.

Mr. McLaughlin. I think, on that point, we issued one or two
unclassified statements

Senator Levin. Right.

Mr. McLaughlin. — largely in response to questions from Con-
gress. As I recall without consulting them, those statements were
very carefully phrased, in terms of the limitations we put on de-
scribing that relationship. In an unclassified form, as well.

Senator Levin. And

Mr. McLaughlin. I believe, in response, actually-

Senator Levin. — you believe it's that

Mr. McLaughlin. — to a letter that you-

Senator Levin. — you believe that statement, when it was finally
unclassified, that it would

Mr. McLaughlin. Yes, sir.

Senator Levin. Excuse me. When the statement was finally un-
classified, that the CIA believed it would be an extreme step for

116

Saddam Hussein to give a weapon of mass destruction, you believe
that that was consistent with what the administration was saying
about the hkehhood of Saddam Hussein giving al Qaeda a weapon
of mass destruction?

Mr. McLaughlin. Well

Senator Levin. Is that your judgment?

Mr. McLaughlin. We've talked

Senator Levin. I'm asking you a direct question.

Mr. McLaughlin. — we've talked about this before, and I don't
think it's our job to comment

Senator Levin. We've never gotten a clear answer to that ques-
tion. Let's get it now.

Mr. McLaughlin. I don't think it's our job to comment on the
public statements of the administration or of Congress. There are
times, as we've explained in the past, when we will take someone
aside — either a Member of Congress or a member of the adminis-
tration — and quietly tell them, "That's — there's new information on
this, and I would describe it differently."

Senator Levin. My time is up.

Thank you.

Chairman Warner. Did you feel you had adequate time to re-
spond to those questions?

Mr. McLaughlin. I do.

Chairman Warner. Fine.

Senator McCain?

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for
announcing that we'll have the hearing in September. I hope that
we also have a hearing on the latest administration proposal on
troop realignment.

Chairman Warner. Yes. We will.

Senator McCain. I'm concerned about it, and I hope we can get
as full an explanation as possible. I'm particularly concerned about
moving troops out of South Korea when North Korea has probably
never been more dangerous than any time since the end of the Ko-
rean War. I hope, as some critics allege, this is not a retreat to For-
tress America. So I'll look forward to hearing from the administra-
tion on this very important announcement.

Chairman Warner. I assure you, Senator and other colleagues,
Senator Levin and I discussed that yesterday, and we will promptly
advise the committee of a date.

Senator McCain. Also, I think we need a hearing on this latest
mismanagement identified by the DOD Inspector General of $2.6
billion being spent on C-130 aircraft that can't be used in combat.
Remarkable. Same people that were involved in the Boeing deal.

Director McLaughlin, the reports, from whatever source, indicate
that our greatest — or certainly the top two or three greatest
failings has been in human intelligence. Mr. Lindh, from Califor-
nia, was able to join and train with the Taliban and fight against
the United States, but we've never been able to insert any kind of
person into the al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations. What, in
the 9/11 Commission recommendations, do you believe will help us
in this issue?

Mr. McLaughlin. First, Senator, with all due respect, I would
dispute the premise. In closed session, I could explain that we have

117

been able to achieve what you suggest we haven't been able to
achieve.

Senator McCain. It's not my suggestion; it's the suggestion of the
9/11 Commission.

Mr. McLaughlin. I'm talking

Senator McCain. It's a conclusion of the 9/11 Commission.

Mr. McLaughlin. The way I would characterize it is, at the time
of September 11, we clearly had human sources within the sanc-
tuary, or we would not have been met on the ground on September
27 by people welcoming us into Afghanistan. So we had a network
of human sources in Afghanistan at that time. I believe the 9/11
Commission notes that.

Senator McCain. I only have 6 minutes

Mr. McLaughlin. Since September 11

My comment, at the outset, frankly, was more about the post-
September 11 period, when I think our human intelligence
(HUMINT) has improved.

Now, in terms of your question about what, in the 9/11 Commis-
sion recommendations, would help us acquire better HUMINT, I
think

Senator McCain. I guess I have to rephrase my question. Do you
believe that we need to improve our human intelligence?

Mr. McLaughlin. Absolutely. Absolutely.

Senator McCain. Then what is it that needs to be done?

Mr. McLaughlin. Director Tenet's comment before the 9/11
Commission, that it would take 5 more years, I think, was mis-
interpreted by almost everyone who heard it. He was not saying,
at the time, that, "We are starting now, and 5 years from now we'll
be in good shape." What he was saying, and what I would strongly
endorse, is that we probably need about 5 more years to get to
where we need to be.

But you have to appreciate where we started from. In 1997, at
the end of those reductions of about 25 percent in our overall capa-
bility, I would say we were in Chapter 11. We were only training
about a dozen or two dozen, what we call, case officers, the people
who recruit human spies. Over the last 5 to 7 years we've rebuilt
that capability, thanks to the resources that Congress and the ad-
ministration have provided — and that's extremely important — to
the point where we're now graduating the largest classes of
HUMINT source collectors in our history. We now have an array
of people around the world, and an array of HUMINT sources, in-
cluding sources — the very people who are allowing us to capture
people like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. That was a HUMINT
source operation. The people who are allowing us to bring forth the
kind of information that we brought forth in the last couple of
weeks on the casing reports of major financial institutions, that
came about as a result of HUMINT source operations.

Are we where we need to be? Absolutely not. We need more core
collectors — case officers, if you will — who are out there recruiting
spies. We need more people with languages that help them do that.
We need more people in our clandestine service, who don't look like
me, who can circulate freely in parts of the world where people like
me would stand out.

118

So bottom line here is, that's what we need to get to the point
where we need to be on HUMINT source collection.

Senator McCain. In your written statement, you said, "Should
the — that's why, should the President's proposal to create a Na-
tional Intelligence Director be adopted, I believe the individual
should have the clear authority to move people and resources, and
to evaluate the performance of the national intelligence agencies
and their leaders." Does that include control over their budgets?

Mr. McLaughlin. The Secretary said, this is all being debated.
If you want my personal view, I would say yes.

Senator McCain. Thank you very much. Director McLaughlin. I
also want to thank you for your outstanding service to the country
for many years. We're very appreciative of it, and we know it will
continue.

Finally, could we talk about stovepiping again? Do you believe
that the recommendations will prevent a reoccurrence of such has
happened when FBI agents reported that people were taking pilot
training in Phoenix and the information never got to the right peo-
ple?

Mr. McLaughlin. I think we're close to fixing that problem now,
and I think some version of a National Counterterrorism Center
would take us even further.

The reason I think we're close to fixing that now, a whole series
of things have changed since September 11. It goes to the kind of —
let me start at the top — personal relationship that exists between
the Director of the FBI and the Director of the CIA. During these
last 2 weeks, for example, when we were struggling with the ter-
rorism alerts. Bob Mueller and I were on the phone continuously
with each other, working through issues. There's no impediment
there.

We now have senior FBI officers embedded in our Counter-
terrorism Center. One comes every day, a senior officer, to my
meeting at 5 o'clock, where we work through terrorism problems
around the world, and that person is responsible for making sure
that everything at that table, the most sensitive intelligence, is
available back in the FBI.

In the Terrorism Threat Integration Center, it's not inconsequen-
tial what's going on there. It's not built yet, entirely, but we now
have FBI officers, CIA officers, officers from Homeland Security,
and any number of other agencies sitting in one building, a stone's
throw away from each other, exchanging information.

So I actually think — oh, and the other thing I'd point out — and
Bob Mueller needs to speak for himself on this, but I work closely
enough with him that I think I could characterize something he's
doing that relates to the problem you've just pointed out. He has
underway a vigorous effort to develop a reporting system from all
of his constituent field offices coming into a central hub where that
reporting would then be funneled out to people who need it. That's
essentially the kind of reporting system we've had in the foreign
intelligence arena for many years. Case officer meets someone in
a back alley in Egypt, sends in a report, that's distributed to people
all around the world who need to see it. That's what Director
Mueller's working to create, and making progress in creating.

119

Not to say there aren't problems to go here, but we're moving in
the right direction.

Senator McCain. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator McCain.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. Welcome, gentlemen.

Secretary Rumsfeld, you referenced that civil liberties — the com-
mission emphasized by the 9/11 panel — do you have any problems
with that being included in any proposal that would pass Con-
gress? [Pause.]

I want to keep moving. I know you want to give things a com-
plete answer, but I

Secretary Rumsfeld. I am not in a position to answer yes or no
to questions on issues that the President and the interagency proc-
ess is discussing.

Senator Kennedy. Well, I

Secretary RUMSFELD. I clearly believe that the issue of domestic
intelligence is an important one and requires that we address the
questions of privacy and our values as a society.

Senator Kennedy. If I could join in, perhaps I'll add that on to
Senator Levin's questions for the panel to see what's your reaction.

Because there is a very specific proposal on that. We're looking
at these proposals. It's a matter of enormous significance and im-
portance no matter what we do in this area. We'll have more of a
chance to deal with it in the Judiciary Committee on Thursday, but

I did want to get your response.

As the Commission Report — Lee Hamilton — summarized, we
need the best intelligence we can for our troops. But as September

II made clear with 3,000 Americans, we also need to protect the
American people from terrorists. Clearly, the status quo is not suf-
ficient.

Now, if we look back on what has been stated by the intelligence
agencies, going back to a quote that was mentioned yesterday, De-
cember 4, 1998, DCI Tenet, at that time, issued a directive, "We
are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, ei-
ther inside the CIA or the community."

Now, that was on December 4, 1998. Coming into 1999 — Feb-
ruary 2, 1999 — George Tenet said, at the worldwide threat briefing,
"Let me mention two specific concerns. First, there is no slightest
doubt that Osama bin Laden, his worldwide allies, his sympathiz-
ers are planning further attacks against us." He continues, "Bin
Laden's overarching aim is to get the United States out of the Per-
sian Gulf. He'll strike whatever in the world he thinks we are vul-
nerable."

Then he continues in February 3, 2000, "Osama bin Laden is still
foremost among terrorists because of the immediacy and serious-
ness of the threat he poses. Everything we have learned recently
confirms our conviction he wants to strike further blows against
America."

Then in the 9/11 Commission, you were noted — and I read from
page 208, "Rumsfeld noted to us his own interest in terrorism
which came up after — in his regular meetings with Tenet. He
thought the Defense Department, before September 11, was not or-

120

ganized adequately or prepared to deal with the new threats, like
terrorism. But his time was consumed with getting new officials in
place and working on the foundation documents of a new Defense
policy, the Quadrennial Defense Reviews, the Defense Planning
Guidance, and the existing contingency plans. He did not recall any
particular counterterrorism issue that engaged his attention before
September 11, other than the development of the Predator un-
manned aircraft system."

That is the problem. That's the problem that the 9/11 Commis-
sion is dealing with. Evidently Secretary Scowcroft believed the
same. I'm asking, Mr. Secretary, will you support the request of the
chairman of the committee and Chairman Roberts to declassify the
Scowcroft Commission, as well, since it's dealing with this same
issue as the September 11, in terms of the accountability issue and
intelligence-gathering? Will you?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I have been briefed on the Scowcroft Com-
mission Report. I don't see any reason why there shouldn't be a
process, going through and see what portion of it can be declas-
sified. I don't know who classified it in the first place. It wasn't the
DOD, to my knowledge.

Senator Kennedy. No, it was a presidential request, and, there-
fore, it's a presidential decision about the declassification, not
yours. So the only question is — it's right on target on the issue that
we're trying to consider here before the committee, the 9/11 Com-
mission, and it is made by a very distinguished figure that's served
with President Bush-one, serves with President Bush-two, served
with Republican and Democratic Presidents, and also understands
the importance of intelligence-gathering and that the current sys-
tem is not functioning.

So I gather that you will at least — it's your position that you
would welcome the Scowcroft Commission Report. It's been re-
ported in the newspapers. It's on this issue. Do you think it would
be useful for us to have that?

Secretary Rumsfeld. As I say, I've been briefed, I haven't read
it recently, and it would have to be declassified.

Senator Kennedy. When you were briefed, was there an3rthing in
it that bothered — that you didn't think could be classified?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Not that I can recall.

Senator Kennedy. Thank you.

Let me ask a question about — we've talked a good deal about
what is the actual statutes that govern the allocation of respon-
sibilities between the Secretary of Defense and the head of the in-
telligence agency. But if I ask the head of the intelligence agency —
if you had a dispute, for example, with the DOD. Say it was on
Syria. You wanted to have a program to find out about the penetra-
tion of al Qaeda in S3rria, and DOD wanted to have a report on
whether the Syrian bridges could hold American tanks, do you win
on that, or does the DOD make the final judgment decision? If you
wanted to have a satellite to gather radioactive information tech-
nology, in terms of being able to further your different interests in
a particular targeted area, and the DOD wanted to use that sat-
ellite for other purposes, who makes the final cut on those kinds
of issues?

121

Mr. McLaughlin. In truth, now, Senator, it's a negotiation.
When we have

Senator Kennedy. Who makes the final cut?

Mr. McLaughlin. The

Senator Kennedy. Who makes the final judgment? Someone has
to say

Mr. McLaughlin. If we

Senator Kennedy. — this is-

Mr. McLaughlin. — if the two of us can't agree — and typically we
do come to an agreement, because of the consultation process — it
goes to the President as a tiebreaker, which is one of the reasons
why a DCI has always

Senator Kennedy. Has that happened, in your recent memory?

Mr. McLaughlin. It has not. It is one of the reasons why a DCI
always consults with the Secretary of Defense, because no DCI
wants to put the President in the position of being the tiebreaker.

Senator Kennedy. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.

Senator Roberts?

Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just say again that Senator Rockefeller and I have writ-
ten to Mr. Scowcroft, and he is perfectly willing to come, I think,
before Congress, either in a classified setting or a non-classified
setting. He is the president of the President's Foreign Policy Advi-
sory Group, which puts him in a category that does not permit him
to come before Congress and make a classified document public.
The person who would make that decision, I think, is the National
Security Director, and we are working on that, and I am very hope-
ful that we can have his testimony. I would agree with Senator
Kennedy, it would be very helpful.

Director McLaughlin, I've, along with others, tossed a few
brickbats over in your shop, and then I asked you the other day
if you could provide me with a list of some things that have
changed since the infamous National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of
2000 and also since September 11. You've done that, and I would
like to ask permission, Mr. Chairman, to put this list of nine posi-
tive changes that the CIA has made in the record at this point.

Chairman Warner. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:!

122

Intelligence Community 2001...InteIIigeoce Community Today

Since September H, 2CX)l, the Intelligence Community changed its priorities, its
approach, and its organization. Many of the names on the organizational boxes look
familiar, but their contents and the way they operate are dramatically differenL

Fighting the War. The most important change since 9/11 is that the United States is on
the offensive in the war on torroiism. The Intelligence Community joined with the armed
forces as the point of the offensivo spear. Intelligence and military forces live together
and fight together. They share intelligence on the battlefield.

• Predator imagery goes directly to the field where both military and intelligence
ofEcers can use it on the spot

• Human intelligence reports go directly to warfighters in the field.

• Intelligwic© Comrmmity officers task collection to support all aspects of the war.

Managing the War. Today, the Director of Central Intelligence persooaJly and directly
drives the Intelligence Community's role in fighting the war. Virtually every day senior
officers from the Military, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence Community hear the latest
intelligence report*; discuss their implications; and decide what to do. The DCI directs
action on the spot.

Enforcing the Law. The Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities are much
more closely linked than they were before September 1 1 . They work together from the
Oval Office to the streets of Lackawanna, Columbus, New York, and Islamabad,

The number of FBI officers serving in CTC has doubled since 9/1 1. CIA sent officers to
Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country. When the FBI needed help to track
terrorists in the US, CIA sent 10 people to the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force.
When the FBI needed help in establishing a reports officer cadre, CIA sent experienced
reports officers to FBI Headquarters,

Protecting the Homeland. The best intelligence provides little protection if it is not
linked to homeland defense. The Terrorirt Threat Integration Center is a direct response
to lessons learned, TTIC fuses foreign intelligence with data from 21 information
networks of other federal agencies. It also fuses people — professionals fi:t>m CIA, FBI,
NSA, State, DIA. DHS, and other agencies are assigned to TTIC. Several hundred
officers from CIA's Coonterterrorist Center and the FBI's Counterterrorist Division will
work together in a new building in order to Improve collaboratioa. TTIC's information
becomes ammunition to support our defenses from the visa lines at embasaies to the flight
lines in the US. It is the basic data for our watchlists. It tcUs the law onforccmont officer
whether he is lookbg at an innocent traveler or a deadly terrorist.

123

Changing the Intelligence Community. Most of the names are the same, but efter
September 1 1, the missions of the Community members are substantially different. The
President's collection priorities are the IC's collection priorities. Al-Qa'ida and other
terrorist groups who threaten US interests are at the top of tha list. The IC operates under
the DCI'e strategic plan and its budget is driven by that plan. Information is shared
among IC agencies through community computer networks. Security standards are
designed to facilitate rather than to restrict iirfonnation sharing.

Changing the CIA. The CIA*g clandestine senice provides the Agency's frontline
troops in the war against terrorism. The service has tripled its hiring. It is growing in
numbers and in capabilitios. Its methods of operation also have changed. The DO is using
innovative strategies and technologies to bring terrorists to justice or bring justice to
them. Since 9/11, CTC has evolved, too. It tripled in size and, as a result, its woridwide
capabilitiea grew dramatically. The impact of its expertise and reach can be seen in the
number of teiiorists dead or captured and terrorist attacks disrupted. The Directorate of
Intelligence also changed. It shifted entire analytic units to CTC immediately after 9/1 1 .
It sent analysts to support the FBI and now is providing another 60 analysts to TTIC to
augment the cadre of officers already assigned there.

Sharing Information. Much of the change since 9/1 1 involves sharing infonnaiion. Part
of thai comes from more efficient information architecture; part of it from integrated
operations; part of it from better standards and attitudes. But all of it is integral to
fighting the war.

Resources for the War and the Future. The Intelligence Community that the 9/U
Commission studied was just emerging from the offocts of a long period of declining
resources — both money and people. Today, more money and more people enable the IC
to help fight the wax and, in time, to win it.

Senator ROBERTS. I'm not going to read them all, but I would just
simply say that when we go to war, why, the intelligence and the
military forces do now live together, they fight together; the mili-
tary, law enforcement, and Intelligence Community does hear the
latest intelligence reports; and the acting Director does direct ac-
tion on the spot. The intelligence and the law enforcement commu-
nities are much more closely linked than they ever were before,
and that's all across the world. The number of FBI officers serving
in the NCTC has doubled. I think the number in the clandestine
service with the CIA has tripled. You sent 60 people over to Terror-
ism Threat Integration Center (TTIC). I could go on and on, but I
think that's a good-news story, from one who has been very critical
of the CIA, more especially after our Senate inquiry.

Let me just say the snapshot that we are taking today of the CIA
is a different snapshot than we took with our inquiry and dating
back to the NIE 2000 and also September 11.

Now, you said, on page 12 of your testimony, you would also see
more progress by a DCI or NID on things like common policies for
personnel, training, and security and information technology. My
question, does the current structure allow the DCI to set common
policies for personnel, training, security, and information and tech-
nology? My answer to you is that it does, because, in 1947, the Na-

124

tional Security Act, you and your predecessors have had that au-
thority. But my question to you is, can you enforce those pohcies?

Mr. McLaughlin. You put your finger on the issue. Senator. We
have the authority to set the pohcies, but it's difficult to enforce
them. We do our best, and we have a process for making progress,
which we have made, but the enforcement is not as strong as

Senator Roberts. Then all this talk about the 1947 National Se-
curity Act and you have all the authority that you need, if, in sim-
plistic terms, you would just enforce it, everything — well, it
wouldn't be fine, but it would be better. I don't think you can en-
force it, because of the way — this breakdown, in terms of TIARA
and National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and Joint Mili-
tary Intelligence Program (JMIP). I'm not going to go into all these
acronyms, but that's the tripod of what the Intelligence Community
and the DOD simply has now.

Yesterday, Mr. Secretary — and I'm talking about Secretary
Rumsfeld — we had two former Secretaries of Defense and a key
member of the DOD. I asked them, do you support a NID? Do you
support a NID with budget authority and also reprogramming au-
thority? Without getting into the fact that we would obviously leave
the tactical part in the military — I am talking more about the
NFIP and the CIA, NSA, DIA, NGA, NRO, FBI— it's a real mouth-
ful — Homeland Security, State, Treasury, and Energy — we didn't
talk about moving those agencies over to the NID, just whether or
not he had the authority to reprogram and hire and fire and have
some control over the budget, and the answer was no.

Yesterday morning, why. Senator Collins and Senator
Lieberman, in the Governmental Affairs Committee, had three wit-
nesses — they were former CIA directors — asked them the same
question, and they said yes.

Nobody has dared to wander onto the thin ice on how we reform
our own situation here with the fractionalization and the way we
handle, say, intelligence. We are having 20 hearings. I think we've
had eight; 12 more to come, as the Chairman has indicated. We'll
have one tomorrow in the Intelligence Committee. We are going to
have a lady who wrote a book about the history of the National Se-
curity Act. Since 1947, 15 times we have tried to implement re-
form — if, in fact, it is reform — and 15 times, we've failed. She's
going to say why. We have David Kaye to talk about intelligence
centers. Everybody's talking about intelligence centers. The Iraq
Survey Group (ISG) is probably a good one. We have Charles Boyd,
who's a four-star from the Air Force, and somehow got Julian
Bond, Newt Gingrich, Gary Hart, and Warren Rudman all to agree
on one premise. That's almost a miracle. He's going to talk about
the Bremer Commission, the Gilmore Commission, the CSIS study,
Aspen-Brown, and Hart-Rudman, and say why on Earth haven't we
moved prior to this time.

The Intelligence Committee is drafting legislation. So we're going
to share it with Susan Collins and with Joe Lieberman, and we're
going to share it with this committee. We have already started the
business of sharing it with the administration. We have also
shared it with you, sir. We're going to share it with the Armed
Services Committee. We think that it follows along the lines like
the Chairman has indicated, and at least it's a step forward.

125

Let me ask you a question, since my time has run out and I've
made a speech. Practically speaking, how could a National Intel-
ligence Director who did not possess the ability to control execution
of the budget or control over personnel decisions, effectively break
down stovepipes in the Intelligence Community and improve the
sharing of information across the community? How could he not do
that — I mean, how could he do that if he didn't have that author-
ity?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I think it's possible to give a National In-
telligence Director, or a Director of the CIA, the authority to break
down stovepipes and give that direction to the entire community
and have it accomplished, quite apart from the budget question.

It seems to me that — to go to your earlier comment on budget
flexibility — the problem we have, one of the problems, is that the
budget is developed in 1 year, it's worked on by Congress in an-
other year, and it's executed in the third year. It's obvious that it
doesn't work that way. The world changes out there. Flexibility is
necessary.

Now, if a portion — a same piece of intelligence can simulta-
neously be a piece of national intelligence and a piece of battlefield
or tactical or military intelligence. The idea that either the DOD
or CIA should go in and, without consultation, reprogram, it seems
to me, would be unwise. You could disrupt things because of not
understanding the fact that that same piece of intelligence is si-
multaneously national and military or battlefield. Therefore, it
takes — simply because of the complexity of it, it takes both to be
involved in a reprogramming process. That's not bad; it's prudent.

Senator ROBERTS. I'm not advocating anything other than what
you have said, in terms of the cooperation. If you had a Special
Forces trooper in Afghanistan, and he was involved in battle, which
they are today, that's tactical. If all of the sudden he happens to
be in the no-man's land where Osama bin Laden is, that becomes
strategic, and then the NID would be involved, just as well as you
would be involved there. There has to be a way to put this to-
gether.

I thank you all for coming.

Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator Roberts.

General Myers. Senator Warner, can I just

Chairman Warner. Yes, of course. I want to just say one word.
I want each witness to feel that you have adequate time to re-
spond. Take it, and if you're not getting it, draw the attention to
the Chairman. I'm tr3ring, best I can, to give that opportunity to all.

General, please proceed.

General Myers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to
comment on Senator Roberts' question to the Secretary on, really,
how you force change. I think everybody knows this, but you can't,
just by moving boxes around on a chart or appointing a National
Intelligence Director, even if he has it in statute, say there will be
change. We're talking about some very ingrained cultural issues
with a diverse group of organizations, and it's going to take more
than creating that position. You're going to think very seriously
about how you empower him and what tools you give him or her
to do their task.

126

When you wanted to reform the mihtary and make us more joint,
in Goldwater-Nichols — and most of you know this a lot better than
I do — but I think the debate went on for 3 years. At least 3 years.
There was, obviously, philosophical debates before then, but the de-
bate here on Capitol Hill and in the offices of Washington, DC, for
3 years. Then you created some new offices — and I can think of the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff— and some new proc-
esses — and I can think of the Joint Requirements Oversight Coun-
cil. But you also mandated some personnel policies that we have
to report on to Congress today — however many years later that is,
16-17 years later — and education. You mandated certain edu-
cational matters, as well.

So I don't think we should — and I'm sure everybody understands
this, and I know Senator Roberts understands it, but for those who
don't, this is more than just creating somebody and saying, "Okay,
good, we got that done."

This is going to be a tough job. This is leading cultural change,
which is the most difficult. We have a community that is, I think,
performing very well today. What we're trying to do is tune it up
and enhance its performance, but it's going to take some of those
items, I believe, if you're going to get there.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you.

Yes, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your inviting
us to feel that we have been able to respond fully.

I'd like to comment on a question that Senator Levin raised
about the NCTC and operations, and make very clear that the
President has indicated that — not in public announcements, but in
private comments, internally — that he does not want anybody in
between him and operations. So, in terms of the operations in the
Central Intelligence Agency or operations in the DOD, the Presi-
dent would not have that NCTC in the middle of that, from an
operational standpoint, and I didn't want any doubt about that.

The second thing I'd like to clarify is, I welcome the idea of hear-
ings on global posture. We have provided extensive congressional
briefings. We have had extensive briefings with our allies around
the world. There is nothing in it that even begins to approximate
Fortress America.

The Cold War is over. We are not expecting a Soviet tank attack
across the North German Plain. It is appropriate to adjust that
force posture. We have met with a great deal of support in the
briefings we've had with our friends, with our allies. With respect
to North Korea, I would not want the implication to be left that we
would, in any way, weaken that deterrent.

The Korean War ended 50 years ago. South Korea has a gross
domestic product (GDP) that's probably 25 or 30 times the North
Korean GDP. We have been working with the South Korean Gov-
ernment to transfer responsibilities so that the deterrent would re-
main strong. General LaPorte has done a superb job in working
with them. They are — over a period of years, will be incrementally
assuming additional responsibilities.

The Defense Department has, in addition, been investing in, and
making arrangements for, other kinds of capabilities to be avail-
able, and I don't think there will be any doubt but that the com-

127

bined capability of the South Korean miUtary and the United
States of America will be fully adequate to the task.

I would say one of the things that we're really having trouble
with — change is hard for everybody, and I understand that. There's
a great resistance to it. We're just going to have to work our way
through it. But I think, in the 21st century, we have to be very
careful to not equate quantities of things with capability.

If you have a "smart bomb" that can do the work of 8 "dumb
bombs," the fact that you go from 10 "dumb bombs" to 5 "smart
bombs" does not mean you've reduced your capability. What we are
doing, we have incrementally improved our capability over time in
that theater. We intend to remain with a presence and strength.
I think there will be no doubt in the minds of the people in that
region that we have maintained the proper balance and the proper
types of capabilities that fit the 21st century and the cir-
cumstances. We've been very pleased with the cooperation of the
South Korean Government, in terms of that, taking over some of
those responsibilities — and we'd be happy to come up and have a
full hearing and testify on it — and have benefitted from the many
briefings that have been given to the staffs and offered to members
over a sustained period of time on this subject.

Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, could I just comment very
quickly? I have neither been offered nor received any briefing, nor
do I know of any member of this committee who has.

Chairman Warner. Senator, I think that we can show you that
there have been some staff briefings on this

Senator McCain. There have been staff briefings. No member
that I know of has been offered a briefing. I would have liked to
have one — received one, with alacrity.

Senator Sessions. I asked for one, and got one, and several of
us made a trip to Europe to look at the bases there.

Chairman Warner. I think there's been a record of

Senator McCain. I've been to Europe many times, too.

Senator Sessions. We went down to look at bases that may be
closed and may be strengthened.

Chairman Warner. Let me just say, for the record, there have
been, I think, communications on this subject. We knew it was
forthcoming. You've actually made public pronouncements on it on
several occasions, am I not correct?

Secretary Rumsfeld. This has been going on for close to 3 years.

Chairman Warner. Correct.

Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll be happy to arrange for a briefing for
any Member or any staff person.

Chairman Warner. Right.

Secretary Rumsfeld. It is important. It is just in its early stages
of beginning discussions with foreign countries, in terms of specif-
ics. It is something that will roll out over a period of probably 5
to 10 years. It is not something that's going to be done precipi-
tously. As I say, we'd be happy to come tomorrow if appropriate.

Chairman Warner. I think we've covered it. I think it's impor-
tant that we took a few minutes on that.

Senator Reed.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

128

Mr. Secretary, you have carefully avoided any opinions about
many of the proposals of the 9/11 Commission, but I think it's im-
portant to get another one on the table, and that's the suggestion
that the DOD assume all the covert paramilitary operations — those
conducted by the CIA, as well as operations conducted by the DOD.
Do you have an opinion, for the record?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll say this. There are clearly things that
the Central Intelligence Agency does that are covert that the DOD
ought not to do. There are things in the middle where we both do
things and where we have individuals involved in teams that are
led by them or led by us, and there be a mixture from time to time.
I think it's a subject that lends itself to a classified hearing better
than a public hearing. But the short answer is, I have not proposed
such a thing. It is something that we've asked our people to look
at and the agency to look at, but, at the moment, I certainly
wouldn't recommend it. It's something that is being discussed inter-
nally.

Senator Reed. Now, Mr. Secretary, are some of your concerns
based upon the different frameworks that soldiers operate, vis-a-vis
CIA operatives — both legal, ethical, and cultural dimensions — or is
this simply a — the practical, that they do things that we don't want
to do?

Secretary Rumsfeld. They do things that are authorized by stat-
ute and by findings that we're not organized, trained, or equipped
to do, and don't want to do. There are things that involve prepara-
tion of a battlefield which are not public, but eventually become
public, which we, in the DOD, do do, as we should. I think that,
again, that's about as far as I'd want to go in a public hearing.

Senator Reed. Let me just — again, the final point is that, from
your answer, there are things that they are authorized to do by law
and custom that the DOD is not authorized to do, is that correct?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.

Senator Reed. So this consolidation would require Congress to
change the law, as well as just simply authorizing a consolidation
of effort — or change several laws.

Secretary Rumsfeld. That, I don't know, because I don't know
what anyone would propose by way of responsibilities. We have re-
sponsibilities that are authorized by law — preparation of the battle-
field — and they have responsibilities that — no one that I know of
is suggesting transferring out of the agency. So whether or not —
I doubt that a law would have to be changed, but I simply don't
know, because I don't know what anyone would propose to change.

Senator Reed. Mr. McLaughlin, do you have comments on this
topic?

Mr. McLaughlin. Yes, I would — as the Secretary has pointed
out, this is being discussed in the administration, and we've actu-
ally been asked to consult on it and come up with a position. If you
want a personal view, I would not accept that recommendation, for
a couple of reasons. I mean, this is, again, personal view. I think
we have a perfect marriage now of CIA and military capabilities.
CIA brings to the mix agility and speed. The military brings
lethality. That was the combination that was so effective in Af-
ghanistan. There are also special authorities that the DCI has by
statute — Section 8 authorities, for example — that allow the DCI to

129

do things — for example, to purchase equipment that's useful in
paramilitary operations, without competitive bidding. It's a small
point, but — actually, a large point. It means that the DCI, under
current statute, is empowered to move quickly on things that have
a paramilitary nature.

It's important to realize there's a vast difference in scale here.
Without giving the numbers, we're tiny on this score. DOD is large
when it comes to special operations. So we have a niche role here
that I think is very important.

The other thing I would say is that — not well understood — is the
fact that our paramilitary capability undergirds our whole covert-
action program. It isn't just the kind of image that comes across
in the movies about what we do; it's that our covert-action pro-
gram, across the board, which covers many different areas, has, as
part of its infrastructure, for a very wide array of things, this para-
military capability.

Senator Reed. General Myers, do you have a comment, particu-
larly from the perspective of a uniformed-military officer, about the
blending of these two different cultures?

General Myers. I think my advice would be along the same lines
that you've heard from the Secretary and from the acting director
in that, right now, we have well-defined military missions in the
world. This would change some of that, if we were to adopt that
recommendation. I think we have to think very carefully about
that.

I know there is — as we have begun to consider it, there is not a
lot of enthusiasm at this point for that kind of change. I think it's
important that, as people see the military uniform around the
world — and we are around the world, we work with — over a couple-
of-year period, we probably work with most nations in this world,
in one form or another — and that they — that we maintain that,
that we are the U.S. military, and we're not involved in other
things.

Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, the 9/11 Commission was a very
intensive review — after-action report, if you will — of a major intel-
ligence failure. We've had similar failures with respect to Iraq. Has
the DOD conducted a major after-action review of the intelligence
failures in Iraq? If so, what are the recommendations for change,
not only within the DOD, but coordination with the CIA and other
agencies?

Secretary Rumsfeld. The DOD, through the Joint Forces Com-
mand, embedded a cluster of people in the beginning of the war,
and as it went along it conducted a lessons-learned, a portion of
which included intelligence. They then completed that, and then
initiated a series of interrogations of Iraqis and looked at lessons
learned, not from our standpoint, but from what the Iraqis thought
they were doing and what they thought they knew or didn't know.
That was then completed.

In addition, the CIA has conducted some aspects of it from their
perspective.

Senator Reed. These reports are available and

Secretary Rumsfeld. We'd be happy to give you or the committee
a briefing on the lessons learned. I've found them fascinating. I've

130

probably spent 20 hours being briefed on those two lessons learned
that the DOD did. I have not been briefed on the agency's piece.

Senator Reed. Thanks, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.

Senator Sessions?

Senator Sessions. Chairman Myers, can you share with us how
the military officers, maybe your chiefs, feel about the new Na-
tional Intelligence Director proposal? I know there's some frustra-
tion. I sense that we wish that we had had better intelligence on —
I guess in every conflict we've ever been in. But how are your — do
your people respond to this?

General MYERS. One of my responsibilities, of course, is to rep-
resent, to the Secretary and others in the National Security Coun-
cil, and the President, of course, is the thinking of our combatant
commanders, and, for that matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Let me
start out by saying, we clearly have the greatest military in the
world. Part of the reason it is the greatest military in the world
is because we have this integration of operations and intelligence
that I talked about earlier in my opening statement.

So with that as a backdrop, we have talked now, on many occa-
sions, with our combatant commanders and to the service chiefs on
intelligence and intelligence reform. I think they would sign up to
my opening statement and some of the tenets in there and some
things that we hold very important. They're clearly in favor of
breaking down any bureaucratic barriers to getting information,
and information-sharing, and they addressed that. As we had this
discussion, that's one of the primary topics that comes up.

They strongly believe that it's hard to differentiate between the
national, strategic, and tactical levels of intelligence. They under-
stand that, and think that intelligence needs to move seamlessly,
not only vertically, but horizontally between organizations, serv-
ices, analytical elements, whatever, as well as vertically. So they
understand that.

They would make a big point, if they were sitting here, about the
need for competitive analysis. I mentioned that in my opening
statement, again. But they think all-source analysis, it's — with sev-
eral different elements, is the way you get to the — to understand
what the intelligence probably really means and

Senator Sessions. In other words, they don't want to be — to have
only one source of information. They prefer that other entities and
agencies would be able to share information directly if they thought
it was appropriate.

General Myers. Senator Sessions, that's absolutely right. The
need for

Senator Sessions. The other Secretaries of Defense that testified
yesterday expressed that concern quite clearly, also.

General Myers. Competitive analysis is certainly to all our bene-
fits, and then we can make whatever judgments we have to make.
But that would be important. Then as they get into the details —
and, of course we were — when we were talking when I was — the
last time I solicited their opinions, we were talking about some of
the fundamentals, not some of the specifics, of the 9/11 Commission
Report, although we referred to that. We said there are rec-

131

ommendations out there, but they would not be for any other bu-
reaucratic hurdles that removes the warfighter or the com-
mander — be it a combatant commander or a joint task force com-
mander — from the intelligence process — collection and dissemina-
tion and so forth. They've worked that very hard.

In my opening statement, I talked about the entrepreneurial
spirit that exists at the other end of this intelligence chain as being
important to providing our best intelligence, not just to the
warfighter, but to the national community, as a whole. They're part
of that entrepreneurial spirit. That's where it resides, and further
down, as well. So they'd like to preserve that. I think those were
their overall concerns. They're very engaged in this process, and
will follow it along.

Senator SESSIONS. I think there's a pretty firm belief on this
committee that we ought not to undermine the success that we've
had with regard to intelligence, and we should strengthen it, not
weaken it.

Director McLaughlin, thank you for your service. I think you
have every right to speak aggressively about the good things that
have occurred since September 11. I think that after that date ev-
erything changed and people began to reevaluate entirely, whether
it's the FBI, the DOD, or any other agency. A lot of policy changes
have occurred. Senator Roberts mentioned nine specific ones that
I think have dealt with many of the problems that the 9/1 1 Com-
mission has referred to, or at least attempted to deal with them.

So let me ask you briefly just your opinion. Do you feel like, with
regard to the 9/11 Commission's report and recommendations, that
many of those recommendations have already been accomplished
and that — you indicated the report seemed to stop as of September
11. Were they fully informed on the changes that have occurred
since when they made the report?

Mr. McLaughlin. I would say. Senator, a lot of the things that
they recommended or spotted as problems have been dealt with.
My sense is that the 9/11 Commission did spend some time looking
at post-September 11. But that isn't in their report, particularly.
Their report seemed to have been written from a September 11 per-
spective.

There is still more to do.

Senator SESSIONS. I know, but you have taken care of a lot of
those things.

Mr. McLaughlin. But I don't want to — it's important that I not
convey a sense of complacency or satisfaction here, because in this
business there is, frankly, never any perfection, and there never
will be. The nature of the business is such that you're constantly
finding — as you've solved one problem, another one comes up on
the horizon.

Senator SESSIONS. Yes.

Mr. McLaughlin. So, yes, we've made a lot of progress, but
there's still a lot to go.

Senator SESSIONS. I was present during the time we did the drug
czar. The drug czar, as I understand it, had the power to review
the budgets of all agencies affecting narcotics. It establishes, by
consulting with the agencies involved in narcotics, a national drug
policy. The President then is asked to sign off on the national drug

132

policy. Then the drug czar reviews the budgets of the agencies to
make sure that they're spending their money on things that accom-
phsh the agreed-upon strategy.

I guess my question would be — in some sense, that's supposed to
be, in theory, CIA's role. Some suggest that, "Well, you can't do it,
because you have operational responsibility, as well as oversight
responsibilities." Could CIA fulfill that role? Can it today? If it
needed some additional legislation, and that were passed, could you
do it, as well as a new National Intelligence Director?

Mr. McLaughlin. To make sure I understand your question,
Senator, are you saying, could the DCI, with some augmentation,
carry out the duties that are laid out in the report for a National
Intelligence Director?

Senator SESSIONS. Or at least with regard to the powers and
compared to the drug czar.

Mr. McLaughlin. The short answer would be yes. The DCI, as
many people here have noted, has extensive authorities. Some of
them — they're all — the ones recorded in statute give the DCI the
power to do various things that we've talked about here. To some
degree, though, any DCI's authority stops at a certain point, and
persuasion takes over, so that the effectiveness of a DCI depends,
to a large degree, on the personal relationship that he or she devel-
ops with leaders of the community, with the Secretary of Defense,
and just how he runs the operation.

I meet with — as George Tenet did — all of our program managers
every couple of weeks to go over everything. We harmonize policies.
There is a point, though, where I think Senator Roberts was lead-
ing with some of his questions, where your ability to enforce these
policies drops off. So you can coordinate, you can improve, you can
approve, you can launch, but there is a point where, as DCI, you're
basically in a negotiation and persuasion mode.

Senator Sessions. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. But I
thank you, Mr. Director.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.

Colleagues, as we know, the Governmental Affairs Committee
started in quite early this morning with a hearing. It would be my
intent now, out of respect to — Senator Collins, the chairman, and
Senator Lieberman worked to schedule our hearings — I'd like to
turn to Senator Lieberman, but understand a colleague has a very
critical — Mr. Nelson, you were next. Can you two sort it out, who
would go first here?

Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have a little problem
back home, called Ground Zero, named Punta Gorda, that I'm
going back to.

Chairman Warner. Would you, then, go ahead — and then I'll go
to Senator Lieberman.

Senator Lieberman. I'll be glad to yield to Senator Nelson.

Chairman Warner. Thank you.

Senator Bill Nelson. I thank you.

Gentlemen, thank you for your public service, and thank Senator
Collins for her graciousness in allowing me and others to sit in on
her hearings, of which we've just had testimony from the members
of the families of September 11.

133

Senator Clinton had been gracious to the famihes to offer to ask
questions, and — that the famihes would like to — and since I was
last in the pecking order, a family member passed up a question
to me that I think gets to the heart and soul of a lot of this discus-
sion as we try to exercise our legislative prerogative under the Con-
stitution and our congressional oversight.

If I may, gentlemen, direct this question to you from Carol Ash-
ley, who is a member of the Family Steering Committee.

Chairman Warner. Senator, would you yield?

The Chair notes that a number of the families have joined us
here at the conclusion of the hearing that Senator Collins and Sen-
ator Lieberman had.

Please proceed.

Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The question is. General Myers, please explain why giving the
National Intelligence Director control over intelligence funding
causes problems with an effective military response to terrorism
overseas.

This is one of the significant policy issues that we are facing in
deciding with regard to the new National Intelligence Director.

General Myers?

General Myers. I think the Secretary has talked a great deal
about the budget and the implications of the budget. I would go
back to the fundamentals that I had in my opening statement, in
that it's not the budget authorities that are the problem at all.
That can be whatever people decide it is, as far as I'm concerned.

The thing that you have to maintain through this is the fact that
we now have, in terms of overseas, a warfighting team. It's a
warfighting team that operates in peacetime or wartime. It pro-
duces intelligence that is used at the national level and is used at
the tactical level. This team depends on all the different depart-
ments and agencies that have intelligence responsibilities, not just
those that are in the DOD. They are, as Director McLaughlin
talked about, pretty tightly integrated today. So I've never said,
one way or another, where the budget authority should be. That is
still being debated inside the administration; it's being debated
here today.

I would just say, as we look at placing budget authorities we
need to make sure that this extremely important element of our in-
telligence apparatus — and I will call it "military intelligence," but
it doesn't really do it justice because we're so tightly linked and in-
tegrated today — but we don't break that apart. That, whatever we
do budget-wise, we don't — that everybody has a voice in the proc-
ess. Today, that pretty much happens.

So, as has been said before, the first thing we should do is, do
no harm. It's a lot better than it was on September 11. As I said
in my statement, it's pretty good. We can still improve that.

Senator Bill Nelson. As a uniformed military officer, do you
think that giving the NID budgetary authority is going to cause
you a problem, militarily, to respond to terrorism overseas?

General Myers. The devil's in the details, and I don't think, in-
herently — inherently, no, I don't think that will necessarily cause
a problem. But the devil is in the details. In this town, we have
people that have certain authorities, but there is no czar in this

134

town. That's not how the business works. It is a town where we
collaborate and coordinate. That's certainly true in the Intelligence
Community, where, again, there are many different agencies and
departments that are involved in that work.

No, I have no problems with moving budget authority around, as
long as we work through the details to make sure that the collabo-
ration and the coordination that needs to take place recognize the
things that I said earlier.

Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Cambone, same question.

Dr. Cambone. Sir, the question is how the budget and its alloca-
tion translates into front-line capabilities, and that, in turn, is rep-
resentative of the various interests that are at play in building that
budget at the direction of the DCI today.

Within the DOD, something like 68 percent of personnel in the
NFIP budget are from DOD, so the budget that is built by the DCI
is 68 percent personnel from the DOD. Among those 15 agencies
that everyone talks about, 83 percent of all U.S. intelligence, NFIP/
JMIP/TIAEA, the personnel are DOD personnel. DOD personnel
are integrated across all of the activities of the Intelligence Com-
munity, and they are there to be certain that two things happen
simultaneously. One is to assure national support. The Secretary
of Defense is obliged, under title 50, to lend that support to the
DCI. They are obliged to be assured that the DCI — that the Sec-
retary of Defense is able to discharge his title 10 responsibilities
relative to the Armed Forces of the United States.

The budget, all in one place, with all of those decisions being
made in one place, Defense or the DCI or the NID, would probably
be changing those relationships in ways that we don't understand
today. That's why today we actually have a bargain here, a part-
nership between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. The DCI
builds the budget, the Secretary of Defense is expected to see that
it's executed against those priorities that were set for national in-
telligence and meets the military intelligence requirements. So
that's the bargain we struck.

Senator Bill Nelson. So you would think that there might be
a problem created if someone outside the DOD — namely, the Na-
tional Intelligence Director — has budgetary authority over all intel-
ligence, which, as you said, huge part of that personnel and money
is within the DOD.

Dr. Cambone. I'd be concerned about two words, Senator: "sole"
authority and "all" activities. So you have to work — again, it's a
partnership, and it was designed that way, by Congress and by
Presidents and DCIs and Secretaries of Defense in the past, to
make sure it is a partnership so that no one has sole authority or
all of the authority.

Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, would you care to re-
spond?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I would agree with what I said earlier and
what Dr. Cambone just said.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator, particularly
for asking the question on behalf of the families.

Senator Collins, again, we commend you for the series of hear-
ings that you've held on this important subject. I've been able to

135

attend two of them myself. The Chair now recognizes you for pur-
poses of questioning.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I say it three times — I'll
get it loud enough, eventually. [Laughter.]

Director McLaughlin, I know there's been discussion before I was
able to join the panel today about the issue of budget authority, but
I want to probe that a bit further with you. When I read the 9/11
Commission Report, I was struck by the information on a directive
issued in December 1998 by DCI Tenet in which he said, "We are
at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either
inside CIA or the Community." The 9/11 Commission concluded
that — despite that call for action, that, in fact, very little happened
within the Intelligence Community, that there wasn't a marshaling
of resources. That's one reason that I think the issue of budget au-
thority is so important.

It's my understanding that the National Security Act gives you
the authority to guide the Intelligence Community agencies as they
prepare their budget submissions for the NFIP; but you don't, how-
ever, have budget execution authority over any of the NFIP, except
that portion that goes to the CIA and the Community Management
Program. As I interpret that, that means that you help set the
budget levels for the Intelligence Community, but then you don't
have any control over the funds once they are appropriated, except
in the CIA direct control; rather, it's the DOD that has that con-
trol, and we know that's more than 80 percent of the total intel-
ligence budget.

The 9/11 Commission recommends that budget execution author-
ity — that is, the control over the funds once they've been appro-
priated — be given to a new National Intelligence Director, as you're
well aware. Perhaps, to me, the strongest rationale for this rec-
ommendation is, it would allow the NID to marshal the resources
in a way that George Tenet apparently could not, according to the
findings of the 9/11 Commission.

Now, ironically. Dr. Cambone summed up the rationale for giving
this authority very well last week when he testified before the
House Armed Services Committee (HASC). He was talking about
the need for the National Intelligence Director to set information
technology standards for the entire Intelligence Community. This
quote is not in the August 11 HASC testimony.

To me, that sums up why you need to have budget execution au-
thority — not just the ability to shape the budget submissions, but
execution authority vested, at least for the NFIP, in the new Na-
tional Intelligence Director.

So, with that rather long introduction, I'd like to ask you wheth-
er you believe the NID does need to have budget execution author-
ity if our goal is to have the Director successfully be effective in
overseeing and coordinating the Intelligence Community. As Dr.
Cambone said, when talking about intelligence standards, if the
person doesn't have the ability to, "push the money in the right
places to get it done, or withhold it," can the NID truly be effec-
tive?

Mr. McLaughlin. As we've said several times, Senator, discus-
sions are ongoing within the administration on this, and nothing

136

is off the table, from the administration's point of view. So I can
give you my personal view on that

Senator COLLINS. That is what I'm seeking.

Mr. McLaughlin. — based on personal experience, but without
any sense that that is "the view" that would prevail.

There's a couple of things you have to say at the outset to frame
this a bit. First, I think we're talking principally about the NFIP
agencies, not about all 15 of the agencies.

Senator Collins. Right.

Mr. McLaughlin. A number of the agencies in that 15 fall into
the TIARA. We're talking about the service intelligence organiza-
tions and so forth. I don't think that the National Intelligence Di-
rector should have budgetary authority over all 15 of these agen-
cies. I think it ought to be narrowed to the NFIP agencies, which
would be, of course, NSA, NRO, NGA, and CIA. So when you're
looking at the NFIP, it's that.

Second, another thing that needs to be said is, in any arrange-
ment — and I mentioned this in my testimony — but, fundamentally,
in any arrangement that you have, whoever has this authority
would have to accept ironclad accountability for support to military
intelligence requirements. That would have to be built in, either by
understanding or statute or executive direction, because you just —
as I said, these agencies are combat support agencies, and everyone
in the intelligence business realizes that, even though they serve
more than one department, which is what makes them national.

Against that backdrop, a third point. While we don't have execu-
tion authority in the year of the budget, we do have the authority
to reprogram. I think you and I have talked about this once before.
The reprogramming, as it currently works, works; but it is cum-
bersome. It requires that when I'm — and you reprogram for a num-
ber of reasons. Sometimes you do it because one program is doing
better than another, another time because someone is not doing as
well as they should, another time because something else is more
essential, in your judgment. Typically, you require the approval of
the agency that's surrendering funds; you require the approval of
the department head who oversees that agency, usually the Sec-
retary of Defense; you require the approval of 0MB; and you re-
quire the approval of six congressional committees. Typically that
takes about 5 months. So you can see that's not very agile to the
needs of today.

So what does all of this, my long answer to you, add up to? My
view is that that National Intelligence Director ought to have the
authority to move those funds, because — with the caveats that I
built into this: absolute accountability for military needs. Frankly,
even in that circumstance, with that authority, a National Intel-
ligence Director, I can safely predict, would consult closely with the
Secretary of Defense as funds were moved around; but in the cir-
cumstance that you and I have just discussed, that person would
have the final decisionmaking authority.

I think if you look within the NFIP, the National Foreign Intel-
ligence Program — just as another fact to put on the table, I think
about 30 percent of the personnel in the NFIP are military.

So all of that has to go into the mix. Sorry for the long-winded
answer. But as all of us have said, this is complicated.

137

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman Warner. I feel that question is so important that I'm
going to ask Senator Lieberman to defer. Frankly, Mr. Secretary,
your views in response to that question would be helpful.

Again, Senator Roberts has drawn up a bill, you're drawing up
a bill. Senator Levin and I may contribute some language. We re-
spect the fact that the President hasn't come forward as yet. He's
not — he's going to do it. I suggested that he wait until the commit-
tees work through their — this was my own personal recommenda-
tion yesterday — work here, these 20 hearings. But as we do our
work, to the extent we can get some of the personal views and
guideposts, I think it would be very helpful to us.

So the question propounded by our distinguished colleague from
Maine, I think, Mr. Secretary, would you desire to have an oppor-
tunity to respond?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll add to what I've already said in my re-
marks. I've pointed out that the role of an NID at least implies —
although the administration's not come forward with specifics — but
it implies authority for tasking collection assets across the govern-
ment. The DCI currently has that. It implies setting analytical pri-
orities and ensuring all-source competitive analysis throughout the
Intelligence Community; the personnel management and training
to alter the culture in the community; information, security, and
access policies; information technology standards, as Dr. Cambone
mentioned in a hearing, and architectures across the community;
and reallocating resources in the year of budget execution.

Now, what does the DCI currently have? He currently has the
authority for directing collection and production, currently has the
responsibility for developing the budget, and currently has the au-
thority to recommend reprogramming, which, for the reasons I stat-
ed earlier, avoiding — I mean, the principal user of intelligence is
the DOD; that's the major user. So reprogramming — once the budg-
et's set, reprogramming is difficult, as he says. It's difficult because
government's a big bureaucracy. It's difficult because the congres-
sional committee system is what it is. But there is not — neither the
DOD nor CIA ought to be reprogramming without very close co-
ordination, for fear of disrupting the process that each has already
agreed to.

Now, the real problem is, as I said, that the budget's developed
in 1 year; it takes a second year for Congress to deal with it, and
a third year for its execution. Any budget's going to require change.
It is not a budget to be executed; it is a plan to be tested against
what actually happens in the world, and then adjusted as those
changes and events occur. So it's going to take the ability for the
DCI, the Defense Department, 0MB, which is — the ultimate deci-
sion-maker is certainly not the DOD or DCI, currently; it's 0MB —
the President and 0MB as its instrument.

Now, it seems to me that this is very important. It needs to be
discussed, as it is being in this committee. I think it merits a great
deal of care and attention.

138

Chairman WARNER. I assure you, I think Congress is giving it a
great deal of attention, and I thank you, and we're trying to get
such guideposts as we can at this time.

Now, Senator Lieberman?

General Myers. Senator?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Could General Myers

Chairman Warner. Oh, General Myers, yes, of course.

General Myers. Sir, could I make a comment to the budget exe-
cution business?

As I tried to answer with Senator Nelson, I think you're talking
budget execution authority. Again, this has to be done in a collabo-
rative way. Creative tension in the intelligence business is the only
way, I think, that policymakers, Congress, or people are going to
understand the situation. There cannot be a czar that just starts
pointing and pulling levers. There is no "Wizard of Oz" here that's
going to solve this, in my opinion. It has to be a collaborative effort.
Creative tension, in this case, is good.

I would add one other thing to this mix in budget, and it goes —
it's not execution authority, but it goes back to the budget prepara-
tion.

I think that anything we could do to reform the process by which
we decide on major systems procurement would be a very good
thing to do. In the DOD, we have such a process. A major part of
that process came out of Goldwater-Nichols. We have a fairly new
process in the Intelligence Community, but it's far from perfect, in
my judgment, and it needs to have more visibility inside the com-
munity, inside those departments and agencies that have systems
that are affected, and it ought to be end-to-end, and we don't — we
often don't think about the end-to-end pieces of this system. So
when we're talking about major systems, major procurement of
those systems, something like our Joint Requirements Oversight
Council that was mandated by Goldwater-Nichols would be a fairly
good process for us to — perhaps, to at least look at for the Intel-
ligence Community.

So that's — but it's not execution; it's planning and programming,
more appropriately. But I make that comment.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Any further com-
ments to that important series of questions?

Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Warner. Yes?

Senator SESSIONS. One question. With regard to this large
amount of money that goes to Defense for intelligence, General
Myers or Dr. Cambone, does that include every military officer in
the military? Do you know, does it go down to the brigade or the
military intelligence (MI) units out there or

Dr. Cambone. Sir, it does.

Senator Sessions. So

Dr. Cambone. That's how we get to such a large fraction of the
total.

Senator Sessions. Yes, that explains some of that.

Dr. Cambone. But, just for the clarity, as Mr. McLaughlin says,
there is the NFIP, in which there are U.S. military personnel cov-
ered. The individuals you just asked about, the Service people,
doing Service jobs, if you will, are in either the TIARA accounts.

139

or in a JMIP, which are inside the DOD and on which, by regula-
tion and custom, the DCI consults. So there are three pockets of
dollars here that we're talking about, and military personnel are in
all of them.

General Myers. But where the rubber meets the road — and
that's with combatant commanders and joint task force command-
ers and our troops out there doing peacekeeping to combat — they
don't understand these budget classifications and the systems they
deal with, they don't care where the intelligence comes from. They
don't care if it's an NFIP, a JMIP program, a TIARA program. In
fact, at that level, they're all mixed, and the people are all mixed,
and they're all working to the benefit of the mission. So if you were
to pick one piece of this up here and say, okay, now we have some-
body with budget execution authority, and thinking that that's not
going to have some impact on this entrepreneurial mix that we
have down here that's really making things happen. That's not
benefitting just the soldiers in the foxhole, that's also benefitting
the President, because it enables all sorts of intelligence capabili-
ties. It's something that has to be considered as we think about
this. You can't separate the parts. It's not as easy, if you go to al
Dhofar, if you go to Baghdad, to separate these parts. They don't
care. It's easy here in Washington, I think, when we are used to
looking at lines in a budget.

Mr. McLaughlin. Senator, the cryptologic support group that
might be in Baghdad belongs to the NFIP out of NSA, supporting
a special operations team that isn't in the intelligence budget at
all, working with the tactical HUMINT team member from the
Army down in the TIARA accounts, working to bring together the
information from a satellite, which is in the NFIP account, and an
airplane, which is in the JMIP account. They don't see any of that.
It's all information and data flow down to the point of operation.

Secretary Rumsfeld. If I could add one thing as I notice people
are thumbing through the 9/11 book, it seems to me it's important,
when we're talking about a possible change, that we connect it to
a problem. If you think about it, that 9/11 report, it talked about
communication problems between CIA and FBI; it discussed the
law enforcement orientation of FBI; it talked about the need for do-
mestic intelligence-gathering; it talked about the need for all-source
intelligence; it talked about the problem of stovepiping; it talked
about the need for congressional reform; it talked about the need
for accelerating the clearance, the ethics approvals, the security
clearances, and the confirmation process so that people didn't end
up, like the DOD, with 15, 20, 25 percent vacant in presidential ap-
pointees that require Senate confirmation; it talked about group-
think; and it talked about deficiencies in human intelligence.

Now, we have to ask ourself, okay, if those are the things that
they identified — and I think that's probably at least three-quarters
of things they identified — the question is, what reform is going to
fix those things? What reform is going to improve the situation?
What reform or change is going to add more value than it's going
to cause in disruption or difficulty. Those are tough questions. They
really are tough questions, and it's hard for me to see how the
question that has been elevated here is — necessarily bears on any
or all of these things.

140

Chairman Warner. I think your observation is well taken, and —
I don't mean to criticize the Commission — they've also suggested
some reforms in areas in which they have not identified a problem.
Now, do you concur in that?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm trjdng to think of one.

Chairman Warner. I want go to Senator Lieberman, and we'll
come back to that.

Senator Lieberman?

Senator Levin. If Senator Lieberman would just yield for one
second

Senator Lieberman. Go right ahead.

Senator Levin. As I indicated, I want to make something part of
the record at this point. First of all, that yesterday in the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee, we asked former DCIs Webster,
Woolsey, and Turner that very question, as to whether there was
any relationship between the recommendation relative to budget
execution and the problems that the 9/11 Commission had identi-
fied. I think it's fair to say that at least two of the three unequivo-
cally said there was no relationship between that recommendation,
relative to budget execution, and the problems which had been
identified by the 9/11 Commission.

What I would like to make part of the record is not just that ref-
erence, which I think reinforces what Secretary Rumsfeld was just
saying, but also Executive Order 12333, because it is that executive
order which allocates the budget execution to the DCI. By the
stroke of an executive pen, that could be — let me start over again.

It is that Executive Order 12333 which allocates budget execu-
tion to the DOD. Before that, as one of our witnesses pointed out
yesterday, the budget execution authority under the Carter admin-
istration was in the DCI. It was shifted after that to the DOD. It
could be shifted back, if that's desirable. With all of the qualifica-
tions that have been mentioned here, it could be shifted back to the
DCI or to the new Director of National Intelligence, if we adopt
one, by an executive order, by the stroke of a pen.

I only want to put this order in the record here now to make it
clear that this is not necessarily a legislative issue, since that
budget execution power has been allocated by executive order, cur-
rently to the DOD, that previously had been in the intelligence
agency, and could be reallocated back. So that's the portion of the
executive order that I'd like made part of the record at this point.

Chairman WARNER. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

Executive Order No. 12333— Dec. 4, 1981, 46 F.R. 59941

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 1.11 The Department of Defense

(j) Direct, operate, control and provide fiscal management for the National Secu-
rity Agency and for defense and military intelligence and national reconnaissance
entities;

Chairman Warner. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and witnesses, thank you for being here.
Mr. Secretary, I wanted to share this experience. As I arrived
late from the earlier hearing, I said to a few of my colleagues.

141

"How are things going?" They said, with a certain unease, "The
Secretary, contrary to what we normally expect of him — opinion-
ated — refreshingly opinionated, quite often — is not responding to
specific questions about the authority of the National Intelligence
Director proposal." I found the kind of unease that you'd have on
a day when your dog stopped barking. You'd say, "He's not feeling
well."

But I understand the reason why you're doing it, and I want to
say that I find it encouraging. I find it encouraging in that you
have said, and others at the witness table, that the administration,
the White House, has not finally decided where it is on some of
these critical questions.

I was first puzzled — I was pleased when the President endorsed
the National Intelligence Director, Counterterrorism Center, puz-
zled by some of the vagueness of the language used that day about
the powers of the NID, troubled when Andy Card specifically, I
thought, said that the NID, as he saw it, would not have any budg-
etary authority of real consequence. I was encouraged last week
when the National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that, in
fact, "It seems to be going in a better direction, as far as I'm con-
cerned," and I'm, in that sense, encouraged by what you have said
about — and the others have said — about where the process is.

Yesterday, we had three former DCIs at our committee, one. Bob
Gates, Acting DCI under President Reagan, CIA Director under the
first President Bush — submitted written testimony, because he
couldn't be there, and had a very strong statement, "The President
recently announced his initial decisions in response to the Commis-
sion's recommendations. I hope, as the White House spokesman
has suggested, that these decisions are only a first step, because
the new National Intelligence Director, as described, will impose a
new layer of bureaucracy, but have no troops, no budget authority,
and no power. In its present form" — I took that to mean in the
form of the discussion — "the new position would be worse than the
current arrangement."

So I hope that we're in a process here that ends, as it should,
in a non-partisan executive/legislative branch agreement on what
should happen to improve our intelligence apparatus.

I think you spoke — incidentally, in the list of budget authorities,
or authorities that the NID would have that you read from your
initial statement, you mentioned the reprogramming authority, but
the Commission clearly recommends much greater authority, that
the whole intelligence budget be in the National Intelligence Direc-
tor, almost the opposite of what exists now, that all — 95 percent,
from what I can tell, of the intelligence budget goes through the
DOD, including the CIA's budget.

So let me ask you a question about one part of this that, after
I arrived, you did speak to, and that is the National Counter-
terrorism Center, and what you take to be the President's clear po-
sition. I believe you did say it, that they announced the support of
these recommendations, that there not be anybody between himself
and the Secretary of Defense with regard to operations. I under-
stand that completely.

I do think that the counterterrorism — that the Commission
makes a strong recommendation about these counterterrorism cen-

142

ters, that if you have essentially everybody involved around the
table sharing information on intelligence, that it makes sense to
have them work together on planning operations. I want to ask you
whether there isn't a way, perhaps borrowed from your current
joint operations with CIA, for instance, where you couldn't have the
Counterterrorism Center's planning operations — but then subject it
to a review or a veto by the Secretary of Defense so we don't lose
the plus, the synergy, of everybody being around the table together.

Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, first, the reason the dog didn't
bark is clear. Number one, the executive branch is wrestling with
these issues

Senator Lieberman. Right.

Secretary Rumsfeld. — and they are tough issues, and the Presi-
dent has not come to final conclusions on them. Second is, I have
been inviting in former Secretaries of Defense, former DCIs, former
National Security Advisors, as — I met at lunch with — Dick Myers
called in the former Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. I've called people to talk about these issues, because
they're terribly important. I've spent a lot of time. I have not devel-
oped conviction on a lot of the details that — and, as we said, the
devil's in the details — you darn well better get it right, because
we're dealing with very important things for our country. I just
haven't gotten conviction down to the third and fourth level in this
yet, to feel that I can sit here and say authoritatively something.

Senator Lieberman. I understand that, and I respect it.

Sir, if I might, Stansfield Turner, retired admiral and former Di-
rector of CIA, DCI, it would be interesting to talk to, as Senator
Levin suggested. I hadn't realized this, but he testified yesterday
that President Carter, by executive order, essentially made him an
NID, National Intelligence Director, with the authorities fun-
damentally that the Commission has recommended now. The com-
bination of his military background plus that experience, I think,
makes him somebody interesting to talk to.

Secretary Rumsfeld. One thing that's not come up in this hear-
ing, or in the — at least that I recall — in the 9/11 report, is an issue
that we ought to think about, and that is, has this government lost
the ability of keeping a secret? I don't know the answer to that.
But it seems to me it's worth asking that question and whether
there are changes or reforms that we ought to think about in that
connection. Because what's taking place is, we are systematically
advantaging the enemy. They go to school on us, they learn a lot,
and we help them. We help them with a hemorrhaging of informa-
tion from the United States Government on a regular basis, and
that's a problem.

Senator Lieberman. I agree with you. I want to quote some-
thing

Chairman Warner. Senator, I must say that in the time allo-
cated the Senators

Senator Lieberman. Yes.

Chairman Warner. — I have to get to moving.

Senator Lieberman. I wonder if I could just ask for a quick

Chairman Warner. All right.

Senator Lieberman. — answer to the question that I posed about
the Counterterrorism Center, whether you'd take a look at whether

143

it's possible to create — to not lose the synergy of the joint operation
planning, but still protect the chain of command from your
warfighters to you to the President.

Secretary Rumsfeld. The idea of someone planning and passing
a plan off to the executors, I think, is a poor idea. Executors need
to be involved in the planning.

Second, in those instances where more than one agency is going
to be involved in an operation, there already is joint planning.
There has to be.

So I cannot imagine quite how that would work, myself. I think
that once you get down to the point where you have a plan that's
executable, it darn well had better have been intimately crafted
and shaped to fit the circumstances and the talents and the skill
sets and the assets and the circumstances of that situation.

Chairman Warner. I thank the Senator.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I'll tell you, that issue actually did come up yes-
terday in our hearing. Former Secretary Carlucci cited the specific
problem that you just alluded to, and he even gave an example of
how, when he was Secretary of Defense, he was able to protect a
source that, today, he did not think he'd be able to protect. You're
exactly right, that's one of the major problems we have. We lay ev-
erything out in public hearings, and there's no town in the world
that has leaks greater than what comes out of this town. So that's
an entirely separate problem, obviously.

The one thing that I have gleaned from everything you've said
thus far is something I alluded to yesterday, and that is the fact
that, whatever we do relative to reorganization or changes that we
might make, this is such a complex issue that, if we're not careful,
we're going to mess this thing up and create a lot more problems
if we're not very careful in the direction in which we go.

The major reform that's recommended by the 9/11 Commission is
the total restructuring of the Intelligence Community relative to
the creation of the Director of National Intelligence and who re-
ports to him, not just the budget authority. So I want to stay
away — you've discussed the budget issue, I think, pretty thor-
oughly, and I think we all have a general idea of what you're talk-
ing about there. But in this reorganization recommendation, the
chart that the 9/11 Commission has set forth, on page 413 of their
report, is critically important. What it does is spell out who reports
to who under the National Intelligence Director.

I'd like for each of the three of you to comment on this and re-
spond in this way. If you think that flow chart and that restructur-
ing of the Intelligence Community will work, fine. If you think it
will not work or there are problems associated with it, I wish you'd
comment on that.

Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't have it in fi'ont of me, but I can re-
call seeing and not understanding it sufficiently.

Chairman Warner. Let us take a moment to provide it to the
Secretary.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Oh, I don't need it. I remember looking at
it, and I remember that a chart is a chart, an organization chart.

144

and I could not tell from it — and I could not if I had it in front of
me now — how it would work. I think that the — all of the granu-
larity that is necessary underneath that is what either makes it
work or not work, or — in the last analysis, frankly, you can have
the best organization chart and bad people, and you're not going
to have much of an organization; and vice versa, you can have good
people and a lousy organization chart, and it works pretty darn
well. But I'm uncomfortable with what I see there.

Senator Chambliss. General Myers?

General Myers. It's one of those issues that I think is fundamen-
tal as you decide what it is — what responsibilities and authorities
you want this National Intelligence Director to have. This organi-
zation under him is fundamental to that. I think we're wrestling
with the first part. Until you decide that, I think it's very difficult,
then, to start plugging in the boxes underneath that. We need to
wrestle with the first part before I'd be comfortable saying that
particular recommendation in the 9/11 report is the right rec-
ommendation.

Mr. McLaughlin. Senator, I think Chairman Myers hit the nail
on the head, and this was why I emphasized, in my testimony, that
it's critically important, at the outset, for form to follow function
here; meaning that we have to decide what we want this NID to
actually do. As an acting DCI, I have a list of about 30 things long
that I do.

Would you want this person to be the person who walks in to
brief the President every day? Would you want this person to be
the person who came up here and sits where the DCI normally sits
to brief you on, say, the worldwide threat posture each year? Would
you want this person to be the person who speaks for the Intel-
ligence Community on what's happening with North Korea's weap-
onry? Would you want this person to be the person who defines the
requirements for the community?

Those are currently things the DCI does. If you had this person
assigned those tasks, the person sitting, I think, a layer down in
that chart, heading the CIA, would have more limited responsibil-
ities for all-source analysis, clandestine operations overseas, covert
action, and science and technology.

So if you were to choose to assign all of those responsibilities
that I just enumerated to this National Intelligence Director — as
distinct from a more limited range of responsibilities having to do
more with the czar responsibilities that involve basically composing
a budget, coordinating it, ensuring that it's carried out, and so
forth — but if you assigned that full block of responsibilities to this
individual, as General Myers says, that would really affect that or-
ganizational chart. My reaction to it is similar to the Secretary's.
I'm uncomfortable with it, because, first, I don't know exactly what
this person would do day-to-day, in a practical sense; and, second,
if you had this person doing, day-to-day, the range of things that
I just laid out, I think it's awfully complicated, and it would make
it harder to do those things than it currently is, because a number
of the people in those seats down there are dual-hatted; it wouldn't
be clear what the reporting chains are, and so forth.

145

I have, in my own mind, a chart that I would draw up if I were
doing this, but I'd leave that to another day, because I think we
have to first talk about what this person actually does.

Senator Chambliss. I think it's pretty clear that what the rec-
ommendation from the 9/11 Commission does do is that it takes
away a lot of the jurisdiction, a lot of the power and authority of
the Director of Central Intelligence, and it gives that power and
authority to the National Director of Intelligence. It does call for
reporting requirements to go from the NID to the President, as op-
posed to the CIA to the President, so it makes drastic changes in
who's going to report to who. I know my time is up, but, just very
quickly, John, what would that do to morale in the agency? Do you
have any thoughts on that? — if the role of the Director of the CIA
is diminished?

Mr. McLaughlin. I speak as a career CIA employee, so I come
here with a certain bias that I can't erase. People who work in the
Intelligence Community — in the NFIP, not just the CIA — have
grown up with the thought that the DCI is the leader of the com-
munity. I think an3rthing that diminished the role of the person
who sits in that chair would take quite a bit of adjustment on the
part of CIA employees.

Senator Chambliss. Thank you.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Senator.

Senator Ben Nelson.

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to go back to the movement of troops. There's merit in
moving, I believe, troops from Germany and Europe, realigning our
force structure, location of troops in that area, because I think the
threat, we all understand, of communism and of the threat of the
former Soviet Union is no longer what it once was. Also, I think
it's an important thing to design a personnel structure that
lengthens stays at a particular Army or Air Force base or a naval
station. General Schoomaker has already talked about this, and
clearly that's, I think, desirable to the families of almost every per-
son in uniform, and has merit.

But moving troops from South Korea, as a matter of interest, I
think might be a different story. South Korea, as we all know, faces
a conventional threat from North Korea, just as Asia and the
United States face a strategic threat from North Korea. I know
that you've thought about this. Although our forces in South Korea
are not as large as those in Iraq, I worry about removing any
troops at this time so — to avoid having it viewed as a sign of weak-
ness or, some might suggest, a reward to a regime that's proliferat-
ing weapons and weapons technology to the highest bidder. I know
that we're engaged in multiparty talks with North Korea, and it's
important that we keep that in mind, keep in mind the audiences
of South Korea, the region, and, unfortunately, Kim Jong II. Be-
cause of his insular and isolated position, I am very concerned that
this will, in some way, suggest to him preemptive — as I think re-
tired Lieutenant General Daniel Christman said — some sort of pre-
emptive concession, as opposed to simply a realignment of troops
and reassessing our strength needs/requirements in that particular
area.

146

I wish you would comment on that. I know that you've thought
about it. I certainly agree that moving the troops from Seoul south
to another location so they're not right in the heart of the city has
been under consideration. I assume that may be part of the overall
restructuring there. But perhaps, Secretary Rumsfeld and General
Myers, you might be able to share your thoughts on this.

Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll be very brief. The deterrent will not be
weakened in any way. It is a mistake, in my view, to equate num-
bers with lethality and capability. Speed, agility, and precision are
enormously important — more important than numbers — simply
counting up numbers of people or numbers of bombs or numbers
of something else — and we're going to have to get our thinking ad-
justed to that.

The process will take place over time. It's been 50 years since the
end of the Korean War. South Korea is vastly more powerful and
more capable, from an economic standpoint, than the North. We
are in a process that General LaPorte has been undertaking of
transferring responsibilities to the South Korean military. They're
accepting those responsibilities. We are rearranging our forces on
the peninsula, and we are adding capability. That costs money.
That adds lethality. That is not trivial. The suggestion that that
deterrent will be weakened, in my view, is inaccurate. I would like
General Myers to comment on it.

General Myers. I would just add to that. The South Korean
Armed Forces, they have 560,000 people on Active Duty. They have
3.8 million in Reserves. We're going to make a modest change in
our force structure there — by a fraction, a small fraction of those
numbers. But it really does come down to capability. It comes down
to the speed, agility, and precision, as the Secretary said. It also
comes down to our ability to command and control, to battle-man-
age our assets. Any comparison of the security situation in the
South and our abilities to deter and dissuade the North are unmis-
takable. Our deterrent posture will not change. If anything, it's
going to get better over time.

It was just a couple of years ago, this committee, we were consid-
ering a paucity of precision-guided weapons. Through your action,
our coffers are pretty full. It was only a couple of years ago when
the commander of U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Com-
mand worried about not having those precision weapons. Today, I
mean, just a couple of years, that situation has changed dramati-
cally, where it is the bedrock of General LaPorte's war planning.
So there should be no mistake, I think, on anybody's part that ac-
tually our capability is increasing day by day. It is also important
that the Republic of Korea take the steps necessary to assume
those missions to gain that capability so they can be, with their re-
sources, with these tremendous numbers in their Armed Forces,
prepared — better prepared, and continue to evolve too. So it is not
an issue of numbers; it's an issue of capability in their case, as
well.

So we're working this really hard. We talked about this with the
Joint Chiefs. We've talked about it with the combatant command-
ers. There's nobody currently responsible for this part of the
world — or, for that matter, anywhere in the world — that thinks this
is going to diminish our capability to deter, dissuade, or influence

147

North Korea. In fact, we think it is all for the better, for all the
reasons. Senator Nelson, some of which you stated, and some of
which we stated here.

Secretary Rumsfeld. Actually, I just add that the force adjust-
ments on the Korean Peninsula have absolutely nothing to do with
the four-, or five-, or six-party talks with the North Koreans with
respect to their nuclear activities. They know it, we know it, the
other participants know it.

Senator Ben Nelson. Do you think the North Koreans under-
stand that, exactly, with such an isolated position that they hold
in the world and totally an insular government, as I understand it?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I guess, let me rephrase — or let me answer
this question. I absolutely do not think that there's any risk that
the North Koreans are going to misunderstand the combined mili-
tary capability — yesterday, today, and tomorrow — of South Korea
and the United States of America.

Senator Ben Nelson. Our resolution to stay and support that
Republic?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.

Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator.

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.

Chairman Warner. Senator Dole.

Senator Dole. Gentlemen, there are no shortages of proposals to
reorganize the Intelligence Community. A spectrum of ideas can be
found in the recommendations advanced by the 9/11 Commission,
the administration, the Scowcroft Commission, numerous legisla-
tive efforts, and the proposals by distinguished individuals, such as
Secretary Hamre, whom we heard from yesterday. Bob Gates, just
to name a few.

Now, these proposals, all well-intentioned, are worthy attempts
to achieve unity of effort in our Intelligence Community and en-
hance our national security. The diversity among these numerous
proposals affects the operations of numerous governmental depart-
ments and agencies, as we all know, all of which fall under the ju-
risdiction of multiple congressional committees. As a result, attain-
ing a comprehensive assessment and comparison of these proposals
has been elusive, at best.

The testimony and subsequent debate that we heard yesterday
in our hearing illuminated numerous concerns about intelligence
reform, as well as the merits of reform. The assessments spanned
the spectrum. Secretary Hamre noted that connecting the dots and
avoiding group-think are in tension with each other. Implementing
an organizational solution to just one of the problems will worsen
the other.

The 9/11 Commission suggested that we, as lawmakers, look our-
selves in the mirror. I touched on this point in yesterday's hearing.
There are those who have called congressional oversight "lax," "un-
even," and even "dysfunctional." Problems raised include overlap-
ping jurisdiction and turf battles.

Now, as a freshman Senator, I don't claim to be an expert in con-
gressional oversight. But as a veteran of a number of different
branches of government, perhaps as much as 35 years in the execu-
tive branch, I do have concerns with some proposals that have been

148

made, and I believe rushing to judgment on implementing them
would be a mistake.

The Department of Homeland Security serves as a perfect exam-
ple. While we have been at war, Secretary Tom Ridge and his top
deputies have testified at 290 hearings in the past year and a half,
they've received more than 4,000 letters from Congress requesting
information; furthermore, 88 committees and subcommittees assert
jurisdictional interest over this Department.

I'm not sure how many committees would have jurisdiction over
a National Intelligence Director, but I imagine it would be more
than a few. A back-of-the-envelope survey suggests at least seven
full committees, just in the Senate.

Dr. Lowell Wood, of Stanford University, I think made a key
point, and I want to quote at length from him: "Only when Con-
gress makes major changes in its own ways of doing business in
any area does the rest of the government take note and begin to
believe that it's really serious about the corresponding change and
that things, indeed, must change. Really big changes are needed in
the Nation's strategic intelligence functions, and just tinkering
with executive structures and titles and organizational arrange-
ments and locations is a fooling-some-of-the-people-some-of-the-
time type of solution. It surely won't fool, even for a moment, the
hard-eyed types that infest the mean streets of the present-day
world. Instead, Congress must significantly change itself, as well as
the executive. Difficult though this may be, anything less simply
fails to rise to the demands of the present challenge posed to Amer-
ica.

I spoke last week with former Director of Central Intelligence
Bob Gates, who advised against the temptation to find a middle
road, a compromise that mitigates controversy and unhappiness
both in the executive and legislative branches, but does not solve
the problems identified by the 9/11 Commission.

Secretary Rumsfeld, Henry Kissinger has called for a pause for
reflection to distill the various proposals into a coherent concept. A
small group of men and women with high-level experience in gov-
ernment could be assigned this task with a short deadline. In your
opinion. Secretary Rumsfeld, how does the current committee
structure in Congress have to be reformed in order to be able to
deal with a massive intelligence overhaul without running into ju-
risdictional issues and turf wars? Based on your experience, do you
feel that Dr. Kissinger's proposal for an outside panel of experts —
elder statesmen, let's say — should be considered for implementing
the Commission's recommendations?

I would like to ask just this one question — or these two ques-
tions — of each of you on the panel, please.

Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Dole, thank you.

With respect to the last question, I have not seen the specific rec-
ommendation that Dr. Kissinger made, but I have been, in effect,
doing that, inviting in outside experts, senior people, elder states-
men, to use your phrase, because I value their thoughts and their
ideas. I've had in Secretary Cohen and Secretary Brown, and Dr.
Kissinger. I've talked to about these things, and any number of
other people from both parties. I think it's a useful thing for this

149

committee to do. Whether it ought to be formahzed, I guess, is for
others to decide.

With respect to your question on Congress, I guess — I haven't
served in Congress for 35 or 40 years, so I don't think I'm really
current. Further, I guess it's really none of my business, tech-
nically. On the other hand, I appreciate the invitation.

Chairman Warner. Don't feel any constraints. Go ahead and let
us have it. [Laughter.]

Secretary Rumsfeld. I appreciate the invitation.

It is a problem. Let me first look at it in a macro sense. We are
conducting a global war on terror with peacetime constraints, in
large part. If you think of the different circumstances we can be
in — we can be at peace; we can be in a partial emergency situation,
where we have partial authorities; you could be over in full mobili-
zation; you could be in a declared war — and the authorities that
Congress delegates to the executive branch change. They change
depending on which circumstance we're in.

What is the global war on terror? Where does it fit across that
spectrum? How ought we to be arranged for this period, which
could be a long, tough period, a dangerous period, in the 21st cen-
tury where technologies have evolved, where things move faster?
That would be a very useful thing for Congress to address. I think
it could be done usefully, and I think it could be — significantly in-
form what we do so we could look at it in a macro sense rather
than each little piece.

Do we need better contracting authorities in a crisis? Ought the
DOD to be — ought we to be able to do more with respect to training
and equipping foreign forces, so we can use them instead of our
forces, when it costs a fraction as much? Yet we're all tangled up
in that issue, for 3 years now. We weren't able to do the training
and equipping for the Afghan army after the war. We had to go
around tin-cupping the world. So there's a — this is a big issue. It's
an important issue.

Now, with respect to the committee situation, sure — I mean, I'm
not an intelligence expert, and I don't have to testify on intelligence
matters, normally. But if we're worried about keeping a secret, if
we're worried about congressional oversight and assuring that Con-
gress has a full role in a fast-moving world, I would think that
smaller committees or a joint committee on intelligence might very
well serve that need better. I would think that — it's none of my
business, again — but the idea that there's a — people who get to be
experts on intelligence then have to leave the committee, as I un-
derstand it, on a rotating basis — maybe that's a good idea; maybe
it isn't a good idea. I think there are things that Congress could
do.

Clearly — you mentioned the homeland security situation, and the
multiplicity of committees — Dr. Cambone, I think, and John
McLaughlin mentioned the number of committees that have to ap-
prove reprogramming. If we're building a budget one year, getting
it approved the next, and not implementing it until the third year,
the idea that you have to spend 4, 5 months trying to get a change
in a budget that you know you're going to need changes in is mind-
less in the 21st century. We have to fix that.

Chairman Warner. Dr. McLaughlin?

150

Senator Dole. Thank you.

Mr. McLaughlin. Senator, those are really important questions,
and I welcome the chance to comment on them.

First, for the Intelligence Community — and CIA, in particular —
engagement with Congress is very important. In 2003, we had
something like 1,200 separate meetings with Congress. These
weren't with committees now. Some were with committees, but I'm
including in that count briefings to individual Members and so
forth. In 2004, the number is up to about 780. I'm not complaining.
This is important to us. It's important to us for a number of rea-
sons — those kinds of meetings, plus oversight.

With the military, the military's connected to the American peo-
ple in a variety of ways. So many people serve in the military,
every town has a recruitment station. People understand the mili-
tary.

People don't understand intelligence, generally. We don't have a
natural constituency. Our oversight process is the thing that really
ties us to the American people in very important ways. So let me
say that I start as a strong supporter of oversight, and believe it's
essential, actually, to the health of this community.

Now, I wouldn't make any recommendations about committee
structure — one, two, or more. At present, we typically report to
about six committees when we do our budget, and I think you
know which ones they are.

I would comment a little bit about the way oversight works. I
think the words, to me, that are most important — if I were charac-
terizing the ideal oversight situation, the two words I would use
would be "continuous" and "constructive." In other words, oversight
has tended to focus, I think, very heavily on our faults and our mis-
takes. I would not ask that it do anything less on those issues. In
other words, when we make an error, when we make a mistake,
it needs to be brought forward, and we need to address it with our
oversight committees.

I think there is more scope for what I would call the "construc-
tive" — that's constructive, in its own way — but for a different kind
of oversight that also includes frequent engagement with us on
issues of the day. Oversight committees ought to have more hear-
ings on things like what's going on in China, what's going on in
Iran, exploring the issue. Oversight committees also ought to look
more carefully at our successes, not to give us a pat on the back,
but to learn from why we've succeeded somewhere. How is it that
we took down the A.Q. Khan network? How did that happen? How
is it that we have captured so many leading figures in al Qaeda
since September 11? How did that happen? Now, it isn't just an
academic question, because embedded in the "How did it happen?"
is "What do we need?" to do more of that. My own view, in my own
experience, not enough of that goes on in the oversight process.

Chairman Warner. Thank you. I must

Mr. McLaughlin. — I would just stop there.
Chairman Warner. — interrupt, if I may.
Senator Dole. Thank you for excellent comments.

151

Chairman Warner. This panel has to be at the White House at
promptly 2:30. We have five, six Senators that have yet to have
their opportunity.

So I thank you, Senator, and I thank you, Dr. McLaughlin. You
may extend your remarks, for the purpose of the record, volumi-
nously, if you so desire.

Mr. McLaughlin. I was finished.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you.

Senator Dayton.

Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen.

Mr. Secretary, the 9/11 Commission report, according — here on
page 43, states, "In most cases the chain of command authorizing
the use of force runs from the President to the Secretary of De-
fense, from the Secretary to the combatant commander." President
Bush, because of — by his account and others, communications prob-
lems onboard Air Force One that morning, was having difficulty es-
tablishing communication with the Vice President on a consistent
basis. The Commission goes on to say here that the President
spoke with you for the first time shortly after 10 o'clock, which
would have been almost 2 hours after the first hijacking began. No
one can recall the content of this conversation, but it was a brief
call in which the subject of the shoot-down of these incoming hi-
jacked planes, authority, was not discussed. At 10:39, the Vice
President updated you on the air threat. The Vice President was,
understandably, under the belief that since he had communicated
twice, possibly three times, according to this report, through a mili-
tary aid to North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD), the authority from the President to shoot down an in-
coming plane that did not detour, that that was the instruction
that had been passed on. The NORAD commander told the Com-
mission — both the mission commander and the senior weapons di-
rector of NORAD indicated — and according to, again, the Commis-
sion report, they did not pass the order to the fighters circling
Washington and New York because they were unsure how the pi-
lots would or should proceed with this guidance.

What is the necessary chain of command to be established so
that an order directed from the President verbally from the Vice
President to NORAD is carried out — or is communicated, I should
say, to those who must carry it out?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Dick Myers and Dr. Cambone were with
me that day. The way you've stated it is not the way I recall it,
the 2-hour figure you used. My recollection is, the first tower was
hit sometime around 8:46, I think.

Senator Dayton. Sir, I said the first hijacking commenced at
8:14.

Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, the first hijacking, I beg your pardon.

Senator Dayton. You're right, though, about an hour and a half
after the first plane

Secretary Rumsfeld. I think the way to respond to this, Senator,
is as follows. Under the way the national security arrangement is,
and was — I should say "was" — the responsibility of the DOD was
essentially to defend our country from external threats. Indeed, the
responsibility for internal threats, which is obviously what was tak-
ing place on September 11, not an external threat — it was from

152

within the country — was the responsibihty of the FBI, and, in the
case of a hijacked aircraft, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). The responsibiUties of DOD was as a supporter of an attack
on our country, in the event we were asked. But Congress and the
country has, for many decades, kept the DOD out of the law en-
forcement business, out of the crime business, out of internal law
enforcement issues under the Posse Comitatus Act.

So the DOD was oriented externally. Our radars were pointed
out, not in. The FAA was the one that then had the responsibility
to say, "There's a hijack," and then ask the DOD, say, "will you
track and report on that hijacking?" — the hijacking, traditionally,
being a situation where a plane is taken for the purpose of going
someplace and then getting some political advantage for it, not fly-
ing it into a building.

So the way you characterized the chain of command is correct —
from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant
commander — but it applied to things from external threats, not the
responsibility of the FBI or the FAA.

Senator Dayton. I respect, sir, that the circumstances of that
morning were very different from what anybody had foreseen.
Given, however, that the Vice President, at that point, from the
command-control bunker of the White House is communicating —
again, I'm using the 9/11 Commission report's information here —
via military aide, to NORAD the President's verbal authority to
shoot down a plane, and that information is not — that instruction
is not communicated, then, to the fighter pilots circling the United
States Capital and New York City, is that the way it's supposed
to function? Would that happen again if we were to be surprised
again today?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm going to ask General Myers to add to
this, but the answer is, of course not. Since that day, a great many
adjustments and changes have been made, and we have various
types of fighter aircraft on alert. We have established an Assistant
Secretary for Homeland Security in the DOD. We have established
a Northern Command, that never existed, for the DOD to be ad-
dressing the homeland security issues from a Defense Department
standpoint. We have a new Department of Homeland Security that
exists. There's just a dozen things that are different.

The way to stop airplanes is, clearly, from the ground — that is
to say, to have air marshals and to have reinforced doors and to
have baggage inspections and to not allow terrorists on aircraft
that they can then take that aircraft and fly it into a building.

Now, as a last resort, is it possible that we could shoot down an
aircraft in the event that was necessary? Yes, it's possible. Air-
planes fly right past the Pentagon every 5 minutes, and what it
takes is simply to lower your nose and go into something. Could we
stop that? No. I mean, the fact of the matter is, with all the air-
planes flying around in the skies, it is not possible to do it in many
instances. We do spend a lot of money and a lot of effort to try to
stop it, both from the ground and from the air.

The answer to your question is, yes, a great deal has changed.

Senator Dayton. Anyway, my time has expired. Mr. Chairman,
if I may just ask the

Chairman WARNER. Let's have General Myers

153

General Myers. Yes, sir.

Senator Dayton. — may I ask him also — well, yes, sir.

Chairman WARNER. Go ahead, Senator.

General Myers. Senator Dayton, I would just add, to the Sec-
retary's remarks, now that NORAD is focused inward as well as ex-
ternally, that there are rules of engagement that have been pro-
mulgated, that are well-understood — in a classified session or out-
side this room we could talk about that, if you want to — but they're
very well-understood up and down the chain of command, and it's
practiced all the time.

Clearly, we're talking about some very serious issues here, as the
Secretary said. It also involves ground defenses, not just air de-
fenses. But the rules of engagement, the command and control
structure that's set in there is completely different because the mis-
sion for NORAD changed after September 11, and no longer were
they asked to look just externally, but also internally.

The relationship between NORAD and the FAA has also changed
dramatically, and we've worked those arrangements where we
have, I think, very good communications today. I talked to General
Eberhardt today about that particular issue, and he certainly
agrees.

Senator Dayton. Mr. Chairman, if I may just ask that he re-
spond, also — Mr. Chairman, if you would — in writing, to the — I
think it's inference, but it's also really an explicit accusation made
in the substance of the report on, particularly, page 34, that
NORAD's testimony, 20 months after September 11, to the 9/11
Commission about the sequence of events, particularly the failure
of the FAA to inform NORAD in a timely basis of three of the four
hijackings, was inaccurate. The statement made by NORAD pub-
licly 1 week after September 11, which is very similar to that testi-
mony made 20 months later, was also inaccurate, seriously mis-
leading anybody trying to assess the response and non-response
that day in a way that I think is far more alarming about FAA's
failure — proper response than NORAD's, but I — if you would please
review that testimony and see, because I don't believe anybody has
held those discrepancies — or anyone to account for those discrep-
ancies that I consider them to be — more than just oversights. I
think they're serious misrepresentations of the facts. Thank you.

Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Myers. Could I make just a comment on that, Senator
Dayton? I liken this to an accident investigation board when an
aircraft crashes. I've been a reviewing official at the table at many
of those. Normally what happens when an incident happens, there
is the first report, which has some accuracies and many inaccura-
cies. So statements, what people believe happened immediately
afterwards and in the next week or 2 weeks, is what they believe.
But as they continue to harvest the facts, and as we go to machines
that record things — like aircraft recorders, like radar scope record-
ers, and so forth — the facts become clearer, and what people
thought they saw or thought they understood or thought they
heard changes over time. That's the nature of these kind of inves-
tigations.

I think NORAD would be the first to say that, because of the ac-
cess that the 9/11 Commission had to certain parts of this appara-

154

tus that was collecting this data, that it sharpened their focus, too,
and things they thought happened turned out to be either different
or incomplete. It took a lot of work and a lot of months to come
to what was ground truth. The same thing is true in accident in-
vestigations. It takes us sometimes many months to come to
ground truth, and what people thought they heard, what they
thought they saw, will be changed as they review the facts. I think
that's the case.

I've talked to General Eberhardt about this. I do not know what
the motivation of NORAD would be to ever lie or deceive. I mean,
that's not what they're pledged to do. They're pledged to do the
same thing we all are, in uniform, and that's defend this country.
I would take exception to anybody that thinks they had any other
motive.

Chairman Wakner. Thank you very much, General.

Senator Dayton. If I could say, Mr. Chairman, this 20 is months
after — sworn testimony to the Commission 20 months after the
event, I think, is worthy of your scrutiny, please. Furthermore, be-
cause — I bring this up, not just for historical reasons — 2 months
ago — and if you have a chance to review the circumstances, the
plane that caused the evacuation of the Capitol complex, with thou-
sands of people running for their lives here, being informed to do
so by the Capitol Police because of, again, a failure of FAA — and
that's almost entirely based on the evidence I have — their failure
to communicate just basic information to air defense, to anyone
else, including the Capitol Police, that we had a situation there, the
closest simulation I think we could possibly have — because people
thought it was a real threat, until they found out otherwise — that
we could have — and here, 2V2 years after September 11 has oc-
curred, we find, basically, again, a complete breakdown of commu-
nication by the Federal authorities — and, again, primarily FAA —
but to National Defense Command and to others so that we don't
have a response. We talk about things not changing as a result of
September 11, this, to me, is the most horrific example that I could
imagine. If we don't deal with the fact that we failed

Chairman Warner. Senator

Senator Dayton. — now a second time on the basic elements of
communication and

Chairman Warner. Senator, I have to

Senator Dayton. — following protocols

Chairman Warner. Thank you.

Senator Dayton. — and procedures. Sir, I waited, sir, for 3 and 4

hours here

Chairman Warner. Yes

Senator Dayton. — if I just may finish.

Chairman Warner. — but you're cutting out the time of other

Senators to be able to ask

Senator Dayton. I've waited

Chairman Warner. — a single question.

Senator Dayton. — a long time, sir.

Chairman Warner. I ask your indulgence to supply, for the
record, please, so that I can turn

Senator Dayton. Before September 11 happens again, I ask that
we review that evidence.

155

Thank you.

General Myers. Senator Dayton, I'll respond to that, for the
record, if I may, Mr. Chairman and Senators.
[The information referred to follows:]

The incident in question involved the Governor of Kentucky's aircraft. Despite
communication shortfalls, the end result is that the checks and balances in effect
prevented a tragedy from taking place. The North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) took appropriate action and did not shoot down the aircraft.

The Kentucky Governor's aircraft did not have a pre-flight waiver for flying into
the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) without a transponder. Upon airborne
notification of a transponder malfunction, the pilot requested and the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) granted permission to continue to Ronald Reagan Wash-
ington National Airport. NORAD was not informed that the aircraft would be per-
mitted to fly into the ADIZ without a functioning transponder and that FAA control-
lers were in communication with the plane. However, NORAD assets tracked and
positively identified the aircraft prior to its landing.

Since the incident, FAA has made it mandatory that all aircraft must have an
operational transponder in order to enter the National Capital Region ADIZ. In ad-
dition, FAA has provided the same radar displays used by Potomac Terminal Radar
Control to people in the National Capital Region Command Center.

Chairman Warner. I'm going to have to ask, respectfully, that
you provide — this is an important colloquy, but I've had Senators
waiting just as long.

Senator Cornyn, it is your time.

Please reply for the record. General.

Senator CoRNYN. Undoubtedly, the 9/11 Commission has per-
formed an important public service. But, by definition, their focus
was on the causes of that terrible event on that terrible day. I
think we should all be chastened by some of the testimony we've
already heard here today that any solution should logically flow
from the problem that has been identified — or, I believe. Director
McLaughlin, you said the form ought to follow the function. I think
that's good advice.

It seems to me that a number of the solutions are directed to-
ward preventing another September 11. For example, the National
Counterterrorism Center, perhaps, something that's been described
as "TTIC on steroids," the congressional oversight reform, which I
think is an important subject, and which — it's been touched on a
little bit today. But I guess the question I have really relates to the
National Intelligence Director, because it seems to me that, in
some ways, what we're doing is creating a position and then trying
to find things for that person to do, which, to me, seems like the
opposite of how we ought to address it, because I do believe that
we ought to let the form follow the function, or the solution logi-
cally flow from the problems that have been identified.

Which leads me to the question — Director McLaughlin, specifi-
cally — you alluded to a number of things that have happened since
September 11 which have made America safer: passage of the Pa-
triot Act, tearing down the wall between law enforcement and in-
telligence authorities, creation of the Department of Homeland Se-
curity, creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. But
could you tell us, sir, today, what additional authority could this
Congress provide to you, as the Director of Central Intelligence, or
to the National Intelligence Director, that would make this country
safer and which would be more likely to prevent another Septem-
ber 11?

156

Mr. McLaughlin. I think — I would start by the things that, from
where I sit, I need most at this point in the fight against terrorism.
The first thing I would say is, I need more experienced people.
We've done a lot since September 11 and in the last 5 or 6 years
to build up our staff that is on the front line against terrorism, but
we need still more people, and we need them with experience.

The second thing I need in order to get that is still more time,
in the sense that you don't produce those kinds of people overnight;
they have to be in the pipeline, they have to be training, they have
to be in the field, they have to learn their business. So as much
as we have improved, there's still a ways to go on that score.

Looking through the 9/11 recommendations, the things that jump
out at me as things that would most improve our counterterrorism
posture are things like a common intelligence — a common informa-
tion-technology architecture for the Intelligence Community. At the
end of the day, sharing intelligence, sharing information, means
moving information. I think counterterrorism, at the end of the
day, is — apart from the people who fight terrorists — all about fus-
ing information. It's about taking the information you get from
some highway patrolman in Indiana, some agent of yours in the
Middle East, an overhead satellite, an intercepted conversation,
and having that all come together on a desk somewhere, where
someone looks at it and says, "I see connections that I didn't see
before."

So that means putting people together, as we have in TTIC. To
the extent that — if you walk through TTIC now, you would see that
the thing they probably most need to deal with the 26 networks
that flow into that place is a common information architecture to
merge them all together so that every individual has all of that in-
formation popping up on their screen every day.

Now, I should be brief here, but the other thing is, if you want
to look at these recommendations, and you wanted to pick out
something that would make a difference, I think a separate budget
appropriation for the NFIP would make a difference; that is, sepa-
rating that out so that it would have, just by virtue of its separa-
tion, fewer congressional committees to go through. It would make
a lot of things simpler.

I could go on, but those are the first things that occur to me.

Senator Cornyn. I know all of us are interested in improving our
intelligence outputs, and I hope we just don't look at budgetary in-
puts and minutia like that when we really need to be focusing on,
"How do we improve our intelligence and not do anything that
would harm what we currently have, or the improvements that
have occurred since September 11, and perhaps other unintended
results that would be detrimental to the security of our country?"

Mr. McLaughlin. That's why I say the fusion of data is most im-
portant. If you bring it together, and you see the picture, and then
you have the ability to act on it, as we must, literally within min-
utes, transmitting a picture that we've developed to someone in the
field who takes action, anjrthing that helps that fusion and trans-
mission is critical.

Senator Cornyn. Thank you, my time is up.

Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator, for your courtesy.

Senator Bayh.

157

Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country. I deeply
appreciate your grappling with these tremendously important
issues. I know they're not easy. While we want to move with as
much haste as possible, it is important that we get it right. So I
thank you for your dedication to that.

It seems to me that we, Mr. Chairman, have all gathered here
for the same purpose. We may have different ways of getting to the
goal, but it's to try and prevent a future September 11. It seems
to me that our ability to accomplish that objective is going to de-
pend upon how well we grapple with the profound change that has
swept the world since over the last 50 to 60 years when the Intel-
ligence Community was first organized, and particularly the last 15
to 20 — rogue nations, collapsed states, non-state actors, prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction that are difficult to con-
template.

My concern, gentlemen, is that in the private sector, there is an
engine for change. It's the bottom line. You either succeed or you
perish, and that's fought each and every day. In the governmental-
side thing, you don't have quite the same impetus to stay up with
the changing times, and so governments adapt more slowly. It
sometimes takes a great shock, as we have experienced, to serve
as the impetus for the kind of change that is necessary.

So I think, while we want to make sure we get it right, at the
same time, I hope we can think big, and use this as an — not just
as a challenge to be met, but as an opportunity to perhaps make
some of the changes that, in government, are too often too long in
the coming.

I am somewhat concerned, not by what you've said here today,
but just the general drift of events, that perhaps we have let the
moment pass, that the momentum for constructive change has been
dissipating, that perhaps the bureaucratic and congressional iner-
tia is reasserting itself. I hope that's not the case, but I am some-
what concerned.

So I have one question, Mr. McLaughlin, for you, and then two
observations that I'd like to make before my time expires.

My question, Mr. McLaughlin, is a followup on something that
Senator Collins first raised. I'd like to ask it in a little bit different
way. That is, the comment's been made by members of the commit-
tee and the panelists here today that we're at war. That is undeni-
ably true, we are at war. This observation was, I think, first made
by a previous DCI, Mr. McLaughlin, even before September 11,
when Mr. Tenet observed that Osama bin Laden has declared war
on us, and we are at war with him, and he sought to mobilize the
resources of the community. But, in the opinion of the 9/11 Com-
mission, apparently the message wasn't received or internalized by
enough people. I think the head of the NSA, when I asked about
that statement — and his response was, he wasn't aware that the
DCI had declared war on al Qaeda.

My question to you, George Tenet was not a wallflower. He was
a fairly strong personality. I can't think that he didn't make his
wishes known. What powers did he lack to put into effect the no-
tion that we were at war, and that we needed to mobilize ourselves
as if we were at war, and act as though we were at war? What

158

powers does the DCI lack that prevented him from acting upon his
observation?

Mr. McLaughlin. Well, it's a

Senator Bayh. — or getting others to act upon his observation.

Mr. McLaughlin. Yes. It's a complicated question and a com-
plicated answer, but I'll be brief.

I think the 9/11 Commission probably underrated, to some de-
gree, the responsiveness that we saw. That said, it probably wasn't
all that it should have been. There are many reasons for this. Part
of them may lie in authorities. Inevitably, if a Director has author-
ity to move people and money and individuals rather than relying
on the power of persuasion and the force of personality that you al-
lude to, the Director can do more things more rapidly.

TTIC is a good example. I was able to put 60 people in TTIC
overnight, because they were my people. I took them right out of
CIA and put them there. A week after I said go, they were going.
So there's a directness of authority that improves things.

Senator Bayh. But could I — I don't want to cut you short — for-
give me for that. Let me cut to the chase here. We had a long set
of discussions about the whole budget issue

Mr. McLaughlin. Yes.

Senator Bayh. — which is one of the things we need to do. I un-
derstand the administration is grappling with that. In your opin-
ion, if there had been a different alignment of budgetary authority,
as has been suggested by the Commission and the DCI, would it
have elicited a different response?

Mr. McLaughlin. If it would have hastened and made more di-
rect the Director's ability to put people together and determine
what they were doing, day in and day out, yes, it would have made
a difference.

Senator Bayh. I suspect it would have. Let me follow up

Mr. McLaughlin. There are other things in the climate. I just
need to say, though, that it isn't just — in that time, it wasn't just
budget authority; it was that — for lack of a better term, the
crystalizing event of September 11 had not happened. Even in the
summer of 2001, when we had high threat warning, it was still dif-
ficult, not just for people in the United States, but for our liaison
partners, our intelligence partners overseas, to digest the serious-
ness of it. Once that event occurred, as I said in my testimony, ev-
erything changed, and the limited authorities we had were more ef-
fective. So that's part of it, too.

Senator Bayh. We all see the world differently following Septem-
ber 11 than before. But it did strike me that it was with some re-
markable clairvoyance that he announced we were at war.

Mr. McLaughlin. Oh, and he said it in worldwide threat testi-
monies, in 1998, 1999, and

Senator Bayh. My two observations, and then my time has ex-
pired, are as follows. First, Mr. McLaughlin, you said that — I think
you asked — you said the most important question we needed to
keep in mind is, who will we hold responsible? I think that's right.
But I would disagree with you when you said that today it's the
DCI. From my point of view, if we were to ask those who were re-
sponsible to appear before us today, it would be three or four indi-
viduals. All of you have the authority. You have mentioned that ac-

159

tually enforcing the authority is sometimes difficult, takes the force
of personaUty, working collegially, those kinds of things. There may
be other issues there. It seems to me today the person we hold re-
sponsible is the Commander in Chief, the President of the United
States. I wonder if that situation serves him or the Nation well,
and that, regardless of how we come down — and whether it's a DCI
with more authority, a NID without — a super-empowered NID, a
NID that's just simply serving a coordinating function — we do need
to try, as much as we can, to answer that question, "Who do we
hold responsible?" In some ways, I think you were being a little
tough on yourself.

My final observation, Mr. Secretary, deals with something you
mentioned. I said to Senator Lieberman — he left the room — he said
he thought the dog hadn't barked. I said, "You missed the Sec-
retary's enthusiasm for the subject of congressional reform. That
certainly energized his testimony." My comment simply would be —
it's something that I think is absolutely appropriate — I hope that
Congress — Congress's zeal for reform will involve as much a look
in the mirror as it does a scrutiny of what you do. Because, from
my vantage point, we take up a lot of your time, and yet our over-
sight is more the appearance of oversight than efficient oversight,
in fact. So I hope that meaningful congressional reform will be a
part of this agenda. I think we will all know it has arrived when
some of us have been willing to cede some of our authority for the
cause of reform, as much as it is asking you to look at what you
do and perhaps cede some of yours.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rumsfeld. I do. Senator, very briefly. Thank you very
much. Senator.

Anyone in positions of responsibility who has lived through Sep-
tember 11 feels an enormous sense of urgency. Do not think for a
minute that that sense of urgency is not there. It is, and we are
determined to continue to force this system to perform better for
the American people and the country.

A second comment. You said, "Who's accountable?" I think the —
it's important to say, "Who's accountable for what?" Because there's
a tendency to equate counterterrorism — you said we're here to
avoid another September 11 — that's true, to be sure. But we're
dealing with the entire Intelligence Community, and the entire In-
telligence Community has tasks well beyond counterterrorism. We
have counterproliferation, we have intelligence for the warfighter,
there are tasks of deterring and defending — and, if necessary, fight-
ing — for this country that the Intelligence Community contributes
to all of that. We ought not to think that the task before us is to
redesign the Intelligence Community to fit one of the many impor-
tant functions that it has.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.

Senator Talent.

Senator Talent. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Bayh's comments and the Secretary's comments are a
good segue for me into my areas of interest.

First of all, empowering the DCI — I'm glad Senator Bayh said
what I've been thinking the whole hearing — the President can em-

160

power the DCI, anytime he wants to, to move budgets around or
personnel around, isn't that right, Mr. McLaughUn?

Mr. McLaughlin. There is a statute that determines all of that.
It's in the — there are legislative requirements, I think.

Senator Talent. Yes. I don't know that I want DCIs to be declar-
ing war on anything on their own authority, under this system or
a new system. I thought that's what the President did, and Con-
gress did.

Let me go into the whole issue. Rather than me going into the
whole issue, I'm going to focus on one thing, given the lack of time,
but on the National Intelligence Director proposal, and particularly
with regard to those aspects of the Intelligence Community that
today support warfighters, which Secretary Rumsfeld mentioned.

If Congress created a directorate, as has been proposed, and gave
the Director authority over budgets and personnel, and that Direc-
tor decided that too much of the NSA's or the NGA's or the NRO's
resources were going to support combat operations on the ground,
and wanted to draw resources away — under that scenario I've
painted, who could overrule that decision? If we empowered him
with control over budgets and personnel — by definition, the only
person would be the President, right? He'd be, effectively, a Cabi-
net-level officer, acting on behalf of the agencies in this depart-
ment.

Mr. McLaughlin. Yes, that's correct. I would say, though, that
it's very difficult for me to imagine circumstances in which anyone
who heads the Intelligence Community would arrive at the conclu-
sion you just arrived at. For example, I understand that in the case
of those agencies, NSA, NGA and so forth, I think there's a — the
Chairman will correct me if I'm wrong — biannual review of their
combat readiness, or their readiness to support combat. That would
have to continue. I would recommend that whoever has this au-
thority, that would have to continue. So I just can't imagine cir-
cumstances where someone would take away from that
accessability.

Senator Talent. I've heard this repeatedly, "We can't imagine
the circumstances where we give somebody a power and he would
not exercise it in a way that we don't agree with." Maybe that
would be the case in the next 6 months or the next year. We don't
know what's going to happen 2, 3, or 4 years from now. Probably
this Director is going to be somebody who comes from the civilian
Intelligence Community, comes from somebody who's interested in
covert operations or non-proliferation or domestic surveillance — I'm
not trying to argue with you, Mr. McLaughlin, I'm trying to air my
concerns here.

The only person I think could overrule him would be the Presi-
dent. Where is the President, under this scenario I've painted, get-
ting his view of intelligence and intelligence priorities? From this
person. So the President's hearing — and because we don't want him
to hear a whole lot of different views, he's getting one view from
this Director, who then says, after presenting it, "Mr. President, I
really think we need to take some of these resources and personnel
away from combat support operations, because that's okay right
now, and we need to put it into this counterintelligence. If we don't.

161

we can't prevent another September 11." What's the President
going to do?

Or, under the current system, this committee would have some-
thing to say about it, because we have jurisdiction over the activi-
ties of the armed services. But if we followed through with the rec-
ommendations and turned all congressional jurisdiction over to one
committee — and who would they be hearing from? Who would they
be getting their intelligence information from? This one person.

We're all presenting this as if this can't possibly happen. Let's
think back on people who have run intelligence agencies and who
have acquired a great deal of power, over time, at least over their
particular areas. I think we're rushing — as Secretary Schlesinger
said yesterday before the committee — that fools rush in where an-
gels fear to tread.

You say — near the end, Mr. McLaughlin, you say you'd also see
more progress by a DCI or NID on things like common policies for
personnel, training, security, and information technology. The NSA,
the NGA, the NRO, their personnel and training policies, and cer-
tainly their information technology, are designed to be compatible
with what's going on in the rest of the department that they sup-
port. Isn't that correct?

Mr. McLaughlin. For the most part.

Senator Talent. Yes, and so

Mr. McLaughlin. They also support other departments.

Senator Talent. I got you. But — so we could have a Director, the
NID who says, "I'm not so sure I agree with how the Army is set-
ting up the architecture for future combat systems. I don't know
that I want our satellite technology to fit in exactly with that."
Then if he decided that, who'd be in a position to tell him he was
wrong?

Mr. McLaughlin. I also said in my testimony — and bear in mind
now, it's important

Senator Talent. I understand you're not-

Mr. McLaughlin. No, but it's important to-

Senator Talent. I'm deliberately using you as

Mr. McLaughlin. — step back

Senator Talent. — a sounding board, because these are my con-
cerns.

Mr. McLaughlin. It's important to step back here and say the
Intelligence Community didn't raise this. We're all talking about it
because it was raised by the 9/11 Commission. You need our profes-
sional judgment on what would happen if you did what the Com-
mission recommends. That's just to get that in context here.

So my view would be, if you did what the Commission rec-
ommended here, with the National Intelligence Director, you would
need the assurance — you raise a valid question — that that National
Intelligence Director would not take away from the combat support
capabilities of those agencies. You might need to have that assur-
ance through an executive order. You might need to have it
through legislation. But you would need that assurance. Anyone
who enacts this would need to build that into the system.

Senator Talent. I appreciate that, and your service and your tes-
timony.

162

Mr. Chairman, I agree with something you said right at the out-
set of this. This is the committee — it's been our responsibihty and
our privilege to make sure that our men and women in the field
have what they need to defend us, and for as many of them to come
home as possible. I know you and the ranking member take that
very seriously. I think we need to look at this with that in view.

The one part of the intelligence operation that we all agree is
working is the support of these agencies of tactical combat oper-
ations, and we don't want to — we don't want to break what isn't
broken in an attempt to fix what is.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Senator Clinton. Thank you for your pa-
tience, Senator.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
holding these hearings.

There are so many questions, and so little time, and everyone
has been here for so long, I would ask unanimous consent to sub-
mit some additional questions for the record, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. The record will remain open until the close
of business today for further questions to the panel by all members.

Senator Clinton. Thank you.

Senator Clinton. There are a number of questions that the Sep-
tember 11 families have provided that I feel are very important,
and I want to submit them.

Senator Dayton was able to ask a variety of questions about the
activities on the day of September 11, the chain of command,
NORAD, et cetera. I think he will be furthering those, and I will
add to them, as well.

I don't think any of us disagree with the very strong assumption
that whatever we do cannot, and should not, in any way undermine
the provision of intelligence to our warfighters and our combatant
commanders. But I think there is a concern on the part of, not just
the September 11 families, but many people who have watched the
interplay between the DOD and the intelligence agencies and the
provision of information to the Commander in Chief over a number
of years, that, at the end of the day, the Defense Department has
an enormous amount of authority, both explicit and implicit, which
it operates under, and which it does use to influence how intel-
ligence is not only collected and analyzed, but how it's used for de-
cisionmaking.

So among the questions that the September 11 families have
asked me to pose to you. Secretary Rumsfeld, are the following:

Imagine, for the sake of argument, that there is an NID, as pro-
posed by the 9/11 Commission. What are the assurances that you
would need in the legislation that would enable you to feel com-
fortable that the warfighters and combatant commanders were pro-
vided for and that the primary obligation of providing tactical intel-
ligence was protected?

Second, with respect to tactical intelligence, I think it is impor-
tant, as I said yesterday, that we not go into this assuming that
everything is 100 percent perfect in the area of tactical intelligence.
I think that would be a mistake. I think that there are questions
that need to be raised, and among them are those that have been
raised by officers who have testified before this committee, starting

163

last spring, with respect to lessons learned. In the 9/11 Commis-
sion, pages 210 to 212, there is a description of the coordination
problems between DOD and CIA that resulted in what they call a
missed opportunity to use armed Predators to attack Osama bin
Laden. There have also been questions raised with respect to the
intelligence that was used, or not used, in the battle situation
known as Tora Bora. So I think that part of our obligation on this
committee is, not just to assume that everything DOD does has a
level of perfection, and we're only looking at the intelligence out-
side of DOD. I know that, inside DOD, there are lots of after-action
reports and lessons learned, and I think it's important that, as we
proceed with his inquiry as to how to reform intelligence, we have
the advantage of your recommendations with respect to changes at
the tactical level that could influence some of these decisions going
up the chain.

Finally — this is also directed to Under Secretary Cambone — it is
bewildering to me that there were pieces of information within
DOD, within CIA, within FBI that were not shared. That has noth-
ing to do with budget authority, it has nothing to do with human
intelligence capacity. It has to do with a breakdown somewhere in
the chain that would have gotten information pushed to the top
and shared among respective agencies. If any of you can lend any
light to the operational opportunities that were missed, again, as
set forth in the 9/11 Commission on pages 355 and 356, I think for
any of us who read this, it is very hard to understand how the FBI
wouldn't be given information that the CIA had.

That continued with respect to Iraq. As I understand the prob-
lems with the, so-called, source "Curveball," that information was
not conveyed to the CIA as to the background of this individual,
the reliability of his information.

So we can spend a lot of time talking about rearranging the
boxes on the organization chart, but unless there is a fundamental
commitment to the sharing of information at all levels — national,
strategic, operational, tactical — we're just spinning our wheels.

Finally, because I know you have to put in a lot of words before
the time goes up, this whole question of secrecy is something that
I think deserves a lot of attention. My predecessor, the late Senator
Moynihan, wrote a book called "Secrecy," which I commend to you
because in it he raises some very interesting questions about what
we need to keep secret and what we don't need to keep secret. In
fact, we have over-classified a whole lot of information that, if not
kept secret, could have actually helped people at all levels of our
government respond to situations that they were confronted by. It
is, I think, a legitimate concern that we have to figure out how to
keep secret what is worth keeping secret, but we have to quit this
over-classifying, and create almost an incentive for people to share
information, and sometimes to, I think, very detrimental con-
sequences, such as the outing of Valerie Plame and also the latest
outrage, which was the revealing of Mr. Khan's name. I find those
things just inexcusable and unbelievable, and it happens all the
time. So I think the whole question about secrecy, what should or
couldn't be classified needs to be looked at at the same time.

So, having exhausted, I'm sure, my time, I'd appreciate any re-
sponse that any of you might have to any of these points.

164

Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll leave the CIA/FBI piece to John
McLaughlin, but let me just say that you're exactly right, that the
problem of stovepiping and not sharing information is a serious
one. It is addressed in this report by the 9/11 Commission, prop-
erly. It's been addressed by the executive branch. It occurs not only
between organizations, as you suggest, but within organizations.

Second, I am familiar with Pat Moynihan's book "Secrecy," and
you're correct there, too, it is — when you're dealing with these
things every day, I very often ask, "Why is this classified," and,
"Give me a declassified version," that comes out almost the same.
It is because, I suppose, people are busy; they want to be safe, not
sorry; and there's a process, always, to review, after some period
of time. But the over-classification is, I agree, something that, very
properly, ought to be addressed in a serious way, and we'd be
happy to respond to some of the other questions and your com-
ments, for the record.

Senator Clinton. What about the issue of Curveball?

Dr. Cambone.

Mr. McLaughlin. That probably is — well, maybe Steve has a
comment on it, but it's properly in my arena, as well.

My sense, looking back at that one, was that the real problem,
Senator Clinton, was the fact that we, collectively — the Defense In-
telligence Agency and CIA — did not have direct access to that
source, which generated over a hundred technically — seemingly
solid reports from a technical basis. I think that was the key thing
that impeded our use of that source.

I don't know whether Dr. Cambone has something to add on that
or not.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much

Yes?

Mr. McLaughlin. May I just answer one or two of your other
points. Senator Clinton?

On the secrecy issue, I think this is a complicated question in our
age, and particularly when it comes to terrorism. If you think
about it, back in the Cold War, or even prior to September 11, the
kinds of secrets we had to go out and find were mostly in govern-
ments, ministries, cabinets, and so forth, overseas. Today, the
enemy we're facing, particularly in terrorism, compartments secrets
down to a handful of people in a cave somewhere. It's very well-
documented in the 9/11 report how few people knew about that.

So what I take from this is, they use secrecy as a strategic weap-
on. It's a strategic weapon for them. Because it's asymmetric —
asymmetrically, it works against us because we don't keep secrets
very well. Most of what we have to say, most of what — it's all out
there. As the Secretary said, they go to school on us.

So while I support a lot of what Senator Moynihan had to say —
and I'm familiar with his book — I just think we do need to rethink
the whole secrecy thing when we're going against terrorists.

On the information-sharing, this is another complicated issue.
We have to be careful not to point fingers on this, because it is
complicated. People have different memories of what was shared,
what wasn't shared. CIA has some differences with the 9/11 Com-
mission on this point, particularly on the issue of sharing with FBI.
We have pointed out to them that the original reporting, for exam-

165

pie, on the two hijackers — pointed out to the 9/11 Commission —
that the original intelligence on them was available to a wide array
of agencies, including FBI, CIA, NSA, State Department, and so
forth. We pointed out to them that we made an association, with
the FBI, between one of these hijackers and the U.S.S. Cole bomb-
er, one of the U.S.S. Cole bombers, Khaled, in approximately De-
cember 2000, I believe it was. For some reason, they didn't accept
that, and the report says what it does. That said, there were many
instances where information wasn't shared. But I just think it's
been a bit overdrawn in the report.

Chairman Warner. Thank you. Director McLaughlin.

Thank you, Senator Clinton.

Senator Graham.

Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McLaughlin, I've heard the story often repeated that
Zarqawi — is that the way you say the person's name?

Mr. McLaughlin. Abu Musab al Zarqawi, yes.

Senator Graham. Did he go to Baghdad, at any time, to receive
healthcare treatment?

Mr. McLaughlin. We think he did.

Senator Graham. Okay. We think he went to Baghdad when
Saddam Hussein was in power, is that correct?

Mr. McLaughlin. Yes.

Senator Graham. One thing that I've learned from looking at
this report very briefly is, it tells us a lot about the past, and some
things about the present, but it also tells us about the future. The
one thing that I get from this report that I think we're overlooking
a bit is that this war is going to go on a lot longer than any of us
begin to realize. The report says, "The enemy is just not terrorism,
it is the threat posed specifically by Islamist terrorism, by Osama
bin Laden, and others, who draw on a long tradition of extreme in-
tolerance within a minority strain of Islam that does not distin-
guish politics from religion, and distorts both. The enemy is not
Islam, the great world faith, but a perversion of Islam. The enemy
goes beyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement
inspired in part by al Qaeda that has spawned other terrorist
groups and violence. Thus, our strategy must match our means to
two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term,
prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism."

Do all of you agree that the American public needs to understand
that, for years to come, we will be at war with these groups? Is
that a correct statement? Do you agree with the 9/11 Commission's
findings there?

Mr. McLaughlin. I do.

Senator Graham. Having said that, the structural changes that
we're debating here today are important to me. Now, I've come
away with one conclusion. If we're going to have a National Intel-
ligence Director, he or she needs to be the person held accountable,
and they need all the power, not part of the power.

I came in here as a believer in that position. Now I'm not so sure.
The reason I'm not so sure is because the functions you just de-
scribed that you currently have — if given to the National Intel-
ligence Director, I don't know how you incorporate all those func-

166

tions and, at the same time, give the President a variety of options
and a variety of opinions.

But having said all of that, my question to you, Secretary Rums-
feld — the Commission tells us that if we're going to win this war,
we have to deny our enemies sanctuaries. Could you tell the com-
mittee, without disclosing any secret information, what countries,
in your opinion, are providing sanctuary to al Qaeda, or terrorist
groups like al Qaeda, and what strategy do we have to dry up that
sanctuary?

Secretary Rumsfeld?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, I'm doing something that's strange:
I'm thinking how to respond.

Senator Graham. Because that's a tough question.

Secretary Rumsfeld. It is a tough question.

Senator Graham. Who are they, and what do we do about them?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me answer the first question first. You
talked about whether or not the NID ought to have all the power.
I think it's terribly important that we ask ourselves the question,
"All the power for what?"

Senator Graham. Right.

Secretary Rumsfeld. You were talking about the global war on
terror. The Intelligence Community, as we said, has a much broad-
er set of tasks. We do not want to organize the Intelligence Com-
munity to fit one element

Senator Graham. Right.

Secretary Rumsfeld. — important, to be sure — but to fit any one
element, because the responsibilities are so broad.

Second, with respect to sanctuaries, you used the phrase, "Which
countries are providing it?" There are sanctuaries that are provided
by countries, as we know. There are also sanctuaries that are not
provided by the countries at all. They have portions of their coun-
tries that they do not govern effectively, and cannot govern effec-
tively. Then there are countries that aren't countries, that are — I
mean, Somalia is a situation that is a geographical country, but,
in terms of a government, it — I don't think it could be said—John,
correct me if you disagree — but I don't think it could be said that
they have a government that presides over the real estate in that
country in an effective way.

I guess the word "sanctuary" also is a problem, because you have
to define it. Is the ability to use the banking system a sanctuary?
Is the ability to use wire transfers, cyberspace, is that a sanctuary?

We know that seams are used effectively. The Pakistan/Afghan
border is a problem. The Saudi/Yemeni border is a problem. The
Syrian/Iraqi border is a problem. The Iranian border is a problem.

We know that countries vary in their behavior with respect to
terrorists, that some are aggressive and go after them, that some
tolerate them and don't do much about them, and, in effect, are,
kind of, fellow travelers with it, but not active

Senator Graham. Would Iran be in the country that tolerates
and does very little about them?

Secretary Rumsfeld. It's a mixture. I think John would be better
to answer this. But clearly they are active with Hezbollah, and
that's a terrorist organization by our definition. Clearly there have
been, and probably are today, al Qaeda in Iran that they have not

167

dealt with in a way that a country that was against al Qaeda
would have done. They have had the Ansar al Islam organization
back and forth across their borders.

John, do you want to elaborate? You're the expert.

Mr. McLaughlin. Those are all the right points, Mr. Secretary.
If you're talking about Iran — I think the Secretary said it accu-
rately — it's, on this score, a bit schizophrenic. You'll find elements
of the government that are uncomfortable with this, but the pre-
vailing elements in that government are tolerant toward terrorists,
and there's no question that they support, actively, Hezbollah.
Hezbollah draws its inspiration and origins from Iran, back in the
late 1970s, and continues, to this day, to be dedicated to the de-
struction of Israel and to receive support from Iran for that pur-
pose.

Chairman Warner. Senator, I thank you. I thank the witnesses.
We've had an excellent

Yes, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I apologize, Mr. Chairman. I do want to
have the record clear. Senator Warner, you and Senator Levin were
briefed on our global posture

Chairman Warner. That is correct

Secretary Rumsfeld. — at a breakfast

Chairman Warner. — in your office.

Secretary Rumsfeld. — in my office by me, by the Chairman, by
Andy Hoehn.

Chairman WARNER. Correct.

Secretary Rumsfeld. Since then, the committee's professional
staff have been briefed at least twice. Four or 5 weeks ago, brief-
ings were conducted for the personal staffs of all committee mem-
bers. There is, and has been, an outstanding offer to brief any com-
mittee member. We have briefed a significant number of Members
of the Senate and the House, and staffs of not just your committee,
but the Appropriations Committee, the Armed Services Committee,
the Foreign Relations Committee, and the MILCON Subcommittees
of some House and Senate Members. We have made a major effort
on the global posture because it is a big and important issue; and
I would not want the record to suggest that those opportunities
have not been available to staff members, because they have.

Chairman Warner. I've indicated to you that I verified those
facts. There has been a complete disclosure by you to the Senator
and myself and others over the course of time.

Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, just to clarify further, I thank the
Secretary for those briefings that he made reference to, including
the very general one in his office. However, I think it is fair to say
that the actual decision that was made, the details of it, were not
briefed to Members of the Senate, were not offered, as is usually
the customary courtesy, that, prior to an announcement of some-
thing of this dimension, that Members of the Senate would be of-
fered a briefing of that particular decision, to the details that were
so critically important that were outlined yesterday were not
briefed, either in your office, as far as I remember, or offered.

Secretary Rumsfeld. They were briefed, and they were offered.

Senator Levin. The details?

168

Secretary Rumsfeld. The details that have been released and
that we know. We're now at the very beginning of the process of
going to country after country and deciding, with them, what we
will do with them, and to what degree will we have usability of
their forces, but

Senator Levin. In which case

Secretary Rumsfeld. — there's no question

Senator Levin. — in which case, there weren't many details yes-
terday. I guess that's the summary, then.

Secretary Rumsfeld. There weren't. Because they will roll out as
each country is dealt with. When one country may be our first
choice, and we would go to them, try to work out an arrangement;
if it doesn't work out, we have other options. Then we would slide
off that and go somewhere else. But the broad thrust of it was
what we briefed, and what we have offered to brief. As I said ear-
lier, we'd be happy to hold a hearing on this and give you anything
we have.

Chairman Warner. That opportunity will be given.

I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I thank you, Director. I thank you.
General. We've had a very good hearing. We are adjourned.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

PROBLEMS in THE DOD IN THE REPROGRAMMING PROCESS

1. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, during the hearing we discussed the 9/11
Commission's recommendation on giving overall budget execution authority for the
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) to a new National Intelligence Direc-
tor (NID), including authority for reprogramming funds during the execution of the
budget. Could you provide any examples where there have been problems within the
administration within the last 3 years of getting approval to reprogram funds in
NFIPs?

Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department has not experienced problems getting ap-
proval to reprogram funds in NFIP programs. The DOD has not opposed any NFIP
reprogramming .

PROBLEMS IN THE CIA IN THE REPROGRAMMING PROCESS

2. Senator Levin. Director McLaughhn, could you provide any examples where
there have been problems within the administration within the last 3 years of get-
ting approval to reprogram funds to correct emergent problems in NFIPs?

Director McLaughlin. Over the last 3 years, there have never been formal writ-
ten objections by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense to NFIP reprogram-
ming actions. However, significant coordination issues occasionally increase the
amount of time required to obtain concurrence by the OSD and move the transfer
request through the approval process. For example, in 2002, OSD delayed concur-
rence for an NRO reprogramming action for 6 months to ensure sufficient General
Transfer Authority would be available for DOD reprogramming actions. Eventually
Congress appropriated funds for the project in a supplemental and NRO withdrew
its request.

3. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, during the hearing, you mentioned a fig-
ure of 5 months as representative of the time that is required to obtain approval
of an NFIP reprogramming request. Could you provide some specific examples of re-
programming actions, including the times it took to obtain Department of Defense
(DOD), Office of Management and Budget (0MB), and congressional approval, that
led you to this assessment?

Director McLaughlin. Each reprogramming request is unique, and the time re-
quired to obtain approval can vary depending on the type of reprogramming and the
authority under which the action is requested. On average, after the programs sub-
mit requests. Community Management Staff (CMS) and OSD staffing require about
a month to coordinate with the programs and General Counsel, prepare the transfer

169

documents, and obtain approvals. 0MB approval generally adds another 2 weeks to
the process and congressional notification takes up to a month. OSD apportionment
takes only a couple of days. Generally, the greatest delays arise as a result of the
staffing process, legal interpretations, or debates over offset choices within and
among the programs, CMS, OSD, and 0MB. All in all, reprogramming requests re-
quiring congressional notification require approximately 5 months; those that do not
take between 3 and 4 months.

CMS works closely with the programs on reprogrammings and transfers, even be-
fore requests are formally submitted to CMS, so specifying the exact amount of time
it takes for programs to submit reprogramming requests to CMS can be inexact. The
staffs also attempt to mitigate delays by working concurrently with OSD and 0MB
counterparts while formal approvals are being obtained. This allows the staff to ad-
dress concerns expeditiously and alleviate delays that are inherent in the sequential
approval process.

RESTRUCTURING CHECKLIST

4. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am going to list a series of recommenda-
tions that the 9/11 Commission makes and would appreciate your telling the com-
mittee whether you agree or disagree with each individual recommendation and
why:

• The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) should perform joint plan-
ning. The plans would assign operational responsibilities to lead agencies,
such as Department of State (State), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Defense and its combatant com-
mands. Homeland Security, and other agencies.

Secretary Rumsfeld. The DOD has had nearly 20 years of experience with
"jointness" and is proof of how powerful a joint perspective driving joint operations
can be as evidenced recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. I endorse adopting the DOD
model (following Goldwater-Nichols Act 1986) of centralized planning and decentral-
ized execution for the NCTC as a means of improving indications and warning and
more actionable intelligence in support of the counterterrorism mission. In this con-
struct, the NCTC would provide strategic guidance, mission parameters, and broad
operational concepts to the designated department or agency to facilitate operational
planning and mission execution. The department/agency would develop an oper-
ational counterterrorism plan, suitable for mission execution with close review by
the NCTC. The designated department/agency would execute those plans in receipt
of an executive order from the national authority. Throughout the process of oper-
ational planning and execution, the NCTC and the designated department/agency
would be generating intelligence at the strategic and operational level thereby en-
suring competitive analysis. In addition, the operations themselves would be creat-
ing new intelligence that in the end will enhance our ability to provide indications
and warning and a better intelligence product to the national command authority
and to the operator.

• The NID should have the authority to reprogram funds among the na-
tional intelligence agencies to meet any new priority.

Secretary Rumsfeld. The NID should have authority to reprogram funds among
the national intelligence agencies when there is a higher priority or unforeseen in-
telligence requirement. I can't imagine that the NID would not want to consult with
the head of the department or agency head.

• Should the President issue a new Executive Order 12333 that would give
a NID budget execution authority, including reprogramming authority, for
DOD intelligence agencies?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Since the August 17 hearing, the President has issued Exec-
utive Order 13355, "Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community,"
which expands the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence over reprogram-
ming of intelligence funds. On September 8, the White House announced that the
President supports providing this expanded authority to a newly created NID.

• The NID should approve and submit nominations to the President of the
individuals who would lead the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
FBI Intelligence Office, National Security Agency (NSA), National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO), Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of
the Department of Homeland Security, and other intelligence capabilities.

• Should Congress amend section 201 of title 10 which gives the Secretary
of Defense the authority: (1) to nominate, after seeking the concurrence of

170

the Director of Central Intelligence, the Directors of NRO, NGA, and NSA;
and (2) to nominate the Director of DIA, after consulting with the Director
of Central Intelligence?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I support the President and his plan to create a strong NID.

• Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations,
whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department.

Secretary Rumsfeld. The DOD and the CIA have embarked upon a study of this
question. The Department will report to the President by February 18, 2005.

• The NID would manage this national effort [managing the national intel-
ligence program and overseeing the component agencies of the Intelligence
Community] with the help of three deputies, each of which would also hold
a key position in one of the component agencies." (NOTE: The organization
chart in the Commission's report implies that these deputies, including the
one for Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, would be
responsible for all hiring, training, acquiring, equipping, and fielding of in-
telligence capabilities within their respective departments.)

Secretary Rumsfeld. I support the position put forward by the President.

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE COMMENTING ON PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

5. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, in responding to my question about the
difference between the internal intelligence assessment on the likelihood that Sad-
dam Hussein would give a weapon of mass destruction to terrorists, you said, "I just
don't think it's our job to comment on the public statements of the administration
or of Congress. There are times, as we've explained in the past, when we will take
someone aside, either a Member of Congress or a member of the administration, and
quietly tell them there's new information on this and I would describe it differently."

In an October 7, 2002 letter, the DCI, George Tenet, to Senator Bob Graham,
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said:

"Saddam for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terror-
ist attacks with conventional or chemical or biological warfare (CBW)
against the United States.

"Should Saddam conclude that a U.S. -led attack could no longer be de-
terred, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terror-
ist actions. Such terrorism might involve conventional means, as with Iraq's
unsuccessful attempt at a terrorist offensive in 1991, or CBW.

"Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terror-
ists in conducting a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack against the
United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large
number of people with him."
But the same day, October 7, 2002, in a speech in Cincinnati, the President said:
"Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical
weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliances with terror-
ists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fin-
gerprints."
Are you aware of any attempts to inform the President that the intelligence as-
sessment of Saddam Hussein sharing weapons of mass destruction would likely be
done as "his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of people with
him" rather than, "on any given day?"

Director McLaughlin did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer
will be retained by in committee files.

6. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, in an October 8, 2002, interview with the
New York Times, Director Tenet said "there is no inconsistency" between the CIA
views in the letter and those of the President. Is such a public statement by Director
Tenet consistent with a policy not "to comment on the public statements of the ad-
ministration or of Congress?"

Director McLaughlin did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer
will be retained by in committee files.

CONSOLIDATING PERSONNEL AND BUDGET CONTROL TO IMPROVE INFORMATION FLOW

7. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, Director McLaughlin, and General Myers,
there apparently was a number of instances where components of the Intelligence

171

Community possessed information that might have helped other agencies take ac-
tion before the September 11 terrorist attacks. The 9/11 Commission has rec-
ommended giving a new NID control of personnel and budget of the national intel-
ligence program, which I assume would equate to the NFIP. A large portion of the
NFIP funding currently supports organizations that work for both the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

One specific example of failure to share information was the CIA's failure to share
information on the presence of two of the September 1 1 plotters with the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) or the FBI. This was despite the fact that the
CIA staff and budget were operating under the control of the DCI (the current ver-
sion of the proposed NID). Will each of you indicate if you believe that there are
currently impediments to sharing data that can only be broken down by changing
organizational relationships, and if so, what laws need to be changed?

Secretary Rumsfeld. DOD strongly supports improving information sharing and
supports the President's proposal on this subject.

Director McLaughlin. [Deleted.]

General Myers. I do not believe there are currently any impediments to sharing
information that can only be solved by changing organizational relationships. The
information-sharing problems we have experienced are, for the most part, rooted in
cultural bias, not structural obstacles.

8. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, is there any reason to believe that the
CIA's failure to share data with the INS or FBI was influenced in any way by the
DCI's personnel and budget execution control of the CIA?

Director McLaughlin did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer
Avill be retained by in committee files.

9. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, Director McLaughlin, and General Myers,
are any of you aware of any evidence that DOD agencies had unshared data that
might have helped prevent any of the September 1 1 attacks?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I am not aware of any evidence that there was unshared
data in a DOD agency which could have prevented the September 11 attacks.

Director McLaughlin. No, CIA is not aware that any of the DOD agencies, or
for that matter, any U.S. Government entity, had any unshared data that might
have helped prevent any of the September 11 attacks. It is likely that CIA, FBI,
and NSA all had bits and pieces of information that were somehow related to one
or more of the 19 hijackers, but none of that information, even if it had all been
amalgamated prior to September 11, would have been enough to have prevented the
September 11 attacks. We still would have been missing the answers to the who,
what, when, or where questions.

General Myers. No. I am not aware of any evidence that DOD agencies had
unshared data that might have helped prevent any of the September 11 attacks.

NCTC authority TO ASSIGN OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE MILITARY

10. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, the 9/11 Commission
recommended the following: "Lead responsibility for directing and executing para-
military operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Department
of Defense. There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direc-
tion, and execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Oper-
ations Command." Tasking for counterterrorism paramilitary operations would be
from the NID through the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to the oper-
ational force. The Commission report is silent on tasking for paramilitary activities
other than on behalf of counterterrorism. If the NCTC were to have the authority
to "assign operational responsibilities" to combatant commanders to conduct
counterterrorist operations, how could we avoid creating conflicting or confusing
chains of command?

Secretary Rumsfeld. The shape and functions of the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) are presently being addressed in accordance with the President's ex-
isting executive order and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 by an interagency task force in which DOD is participating. We are also ad-
dressing the 9/11 Commission's recommendation on paramilitary operations under
a November 18, 2004, presidential directive for a joint review by myself and the Di-
rector of the Central Intelligence Agency. On both the NCTC and the Paramilitary
question, DOD, the CIA, and other elements of the interagency are working together
closely to provide a coordinated set of responses and recommendations to the Presi-
dent. As to the suggestion that operational taskings should flow directly from the

172

NCTC to the operational force, if the taskings were intended for execution by DOD,
such a construct would be unacceptable due to its infringement on the chain-of-com-
mand responsibilities inherent to the Department and its military forces.

General Myers. If the NCTC were to have the authority to "assign operational
responsibilities," it would violate the chain of command and lead to confusion and
loss of unity of effort. If the NCTC were to have such responsibility, it is imperative
that the NCTC recommend any requirements for combatant commanders to the Of-
fice of the Secretary of Defense for Secretary of Defense approval and military ad-
vice. This would be the only way to keep the chains of command clear.

11. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, how would a combat-
ant commander resolve conflicting directives from the DOD chain of command and
from the NCTC? Wouldn't such an arrangement be violating the fundamental prin-
cipal of unity of command?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Routing all military directives via the Office of the Secretary
of Defense would mitigate any potential conflicts and would ensure unity of com-
mand. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff ensure that mili-
tary advice is provided to the President and coordination is effected for all oper-
ational directives.

General Myers. Routing all military directives via the Office of the Secretary of
Defense would mitigate any potential conflicts and would ensure unity of command
remains intact. As stipulated by law, the military chain of command originates with
the President of the United States, through the Secretary of Defense to the combat-
ant commanders. Furthermore, this arrangement permits the Secretary of Defense
to get military advice from the CJCS and JCS as well as permits combatant com-
manders to address perceived conflicting guidance directly with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense without injecting confusion within the NCTC.

12. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, would the President
and the Secretary of Defense have to approve each such assignment?

Secretary Rumsfeld. As the principal assistant to the President in all matters re-
lating to the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense would approve the
assignment of operational responsibilities to combatant commanders in support of
counterterrorist operations coordinated by NCTC.

General Myers. As the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating
to the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense would approve the assign-
ment of operational responsibilities to combatant commanders in support of
counterterrorist operations.

The NCTC should not have command authority and should not inject itself in the
chain of command by directing commanders to perform actions. As suggested by the
9/11 Commission's report, the NCTC will likely work through existing government
agencies. The 27 August 2004 executive order directing the establishment of the
NCTC states the NCTC shall be "implemented in a manner consistent with the au-
thority of the principal officers of agencies as heads of their respective Agencies",
and heads of agencies "shall keep the Director of the Center fully and currently in-
formed of [their] activities." The declared goal of creating NCTC is to strengthen in-
telligence analysis, strategic planning against global terrorist threats and to ensure
intelligence support to operations.

13. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, what effect would such operational as-
signment authority within the NCTC have on the counterterrorist operations of the
CIA?

Director McLaughlin. [Deleted.]

LEAD FOR ALL PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS

14. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and Director McLaughlin, the government
is currently operating in foreign areas with a clearly defined separation of functions
between the DOD and the CIA. The CIA is responsible for conducting covert action
operations, where the government has the ability to deny involvement in such ac-
tivities if they are compromised. The DOD is responsible for conducting other clan-
destine or secret operations where the potential revelation of U.S. Government in-
volvement would not be so sensitive. Under the current system, this possible covert
action would be approved through the normal executive branch approval process
and the President would submit a finding to Congress before executing such an op-
eration. Upon approval and appropriate notification, the DCI would task the CIA
to conduct this mission. Under the 9/11 Commission recommendations, the process

173

for presidential approval and congressional notification wovdd presumably be simi-
lar, but the NID would task someone within DOD. It is not exactly clear whether
the Commission intends that the tasking would be to the Secretary of Defense or
directly to the Special Operations Command or to one of the combatant command-
ers. Then forces working for the Special Operations Command or forces working for
the combatant commander would execute the mission. I would like to ask each of
you, do you agree that this is the way such operations would be changed?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not support direct taskings of U.S. Special Operations
Command or any other combatant command outside the channels constituted by the
legally prescribed chain of command which runs from the President, through the
Secretary, to those commanders. Current statutes and the military chain of com-
mand preclude direct tasking of the U.s. Special Operations Command or any other
combatant command by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) or the Direc-
tor for National Intelligence.

Director McLaughlin did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer
will be retained by in committee files.

15. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and Director McLaughlin, do you believe
it would be appropriate, and consistent with our obligations under the Geneva Con-
ventions, for U.S. military personnel to become involved in conducting covert oper-
ations pursuant to presidential findings?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Pending the completion of the presidentially directed study
on the 9/11 Commission paramilitary recommendation, it would be inappropriate for
me to comment.

Director McLaughlin did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer
will be retained by in committee files.

USDri) REPORTING TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR RATHER THAN SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE

16. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, Director McLaughlin, General Myers, and
Under Secretary Cambone, the 9/11 Commission recommends that the new NID
should approve and submit the nomination to the President for the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence, who would then report to the NID. Currently the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is recommended by, and reports to, the Sec-
retary of Defense. I'd like to ask each of you, what are the pros and cons of having
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence selected by and reporting to the
NID, vice the Secretary of Defense, and do you agree with this recommendation?

Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Cambone. The position of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence was created by law (section 137 title 10) to be the prin-
cipal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary
of defense on intelligence-related matters, counterintelligence and security. I sup-
port the President's position on this subject.

Director McLaltghlin. While it may be implicit in the context of its recommenda-
tions for appointing the other two Deputy NIDs for Foreign and Homeland Intel-
ligence, the 9/11 Commission report does not explicitly spell out who would approve
and submit the nomination of the Deputy NID for Defense Intelligence (the USD(I)).
But the commission is clear in making the point that the three Deputy NIDs would
also hold key positions in their component department or agency. So even if the NID
were to "approve and submit" the nomination for the USD(I), the Secretary of De-
fense would still play a major role in selecting this official. The fundamental prob-
lem with the proposal is less a question of who appoints the three deputies than
it is of potential for conflict inherent in a situation where officials are asked to wear
two hats.

While I understand the commission's position, I do not support the recommenda-
tion. One of the reasons behind the commission's proposal to create an NID was the
judgment that the Director of the CIA wears too many hats. Creating a structure
where key intelligence officials also wear departmental hats is, I believe, the wrong
approach. Even more important in my view, the Deputy NIDs as proposed by the
commission, would constitute an unnecessary layer of management interposed be-
tween the NID and the heads of the major IC agencies. To be effective in today's
environment, the NID needs to be able to direct and guide the activities of the CIA,
DIA, NGA, NRO, NSA, and other agencies. Placing a deputy layer between the NID
and those agency heads would actually have an effect opposite to the one the com-
mission intended.

General Myers. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is a key member
of the Secretary's staff. It is not clear how an official in this position would be se-

174

lected by someone other than the Secretary. I do not agree with this recommenda-
tion.

17. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, would you have con-
cerns about inserting the Under Secretary of Defense into the chain of command for
tasking the intelligence activities within the Department of Defense?

Secretary Rumsfeld. In current law, the Secretary of Defense has the authority
to task collection elements within the Department of Defense. In practice, the Under
Secretary generally does not engage in the day-to-day operations within the Defense
Intelligence Community. USD(I) serves as the staff assistant and advisor to the Sec-
retary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and has as a principal duty the overall su-
pervision of all intelligence and intelligence-related affairs of the Department of De-
fense. These responsibilities and functions do not equate to being engaged in the
substantive side of tasking, processing, exploiting, ad disseminating intelligence.

General Myers. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is a vital staff
position. As a principal of the Secretary's staff and a key figure in the policy process,
USD(I) clearly has intelligence needs that must be supported; however, this position
is not in the military operational chain of command nor should it be.

REVEALING SOURCES AND COMPROMISING INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS

18. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, press accounts suggest that revealing
the name of the Pakistani individual who was cooperating with U.S. officials search-
ing for al Qaeda operatives compromised the mission after the public disclosure of
his name. Is that an accurate impression?

Director McLaughlin. [Deleted.]

19. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, a USA Today article from August 10,
2004, quotes National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice as saying that the name
of the individual had been disclosed to reporters in Washington "on background."
Should the name of any such cooperating individual be released under any cir-
cumstances?

Director McLaughlin did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer
will be retained by in committee files.

20. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, were you asked and did you approve the
decision to reveal the source's name publicly or on "background" to a reporter?

Director McLaughlin. No, the DDCI was not asked to approve the decision to re-
veal the source's name publicly or "on background" to a reporter.

EFFECT OF A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR ON COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS

21. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, during the development of the National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's WMD capabilities, which was prepared prior
to the war and which proved to be so inaccurate in its judgments, a number of intel-
ligence analysts in the U.S. Government held views that differed from the prevailing
CIA view. Notable examples of this include the Department of Energy and State De-
partment Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR) assessments on whether the now-
famous aluminum tubes were intended for centrifuges, and the Air Force Intel-
ligence Agency assessment of whether Iraqi unmanned aerial vehicles were intended
to deliver WMD. Both of these differing assessments have been validated since, but
were overruled by the CIA in developing the NIE. The 9/11 Commission rec-
ommends consolidating control and budgeting responsibility for national intelligence
activities under a new NID. If Congress were to give a National Intelligence Direc-
tor that authority, what steps should we take to encourage competing analyses and
ensure differing views and debate within the Intelligence Community to improve the
quality of our intelligence?

Director McLaughlin. The views of the Department of Energy and INR were
fully presented in the NIE on Iraq's WMD.

Striking a balance between greater centralization of authority, including authority
over resources, while retaining healthy competitive analysis, is one of the critical
issues in intelligence reform. Almost every committee (or commission) that has
looked into this matter has come out in favor of greater authority at the center of
U.S. intelligence, whatever the title of the official occupying that center. At the
same time, these same studies and proposals have warned against the danger of
"group think."

175

There is a major difference between empowering an individual to give central di-
rection to the Intelligence Community and allowing that individual to impose his
or her views on the community. No one is suggesting the latter formulation. There
must always be a healthy competition of views on major issues.

Encouraging competitive analysis and ensuring differing views will involve one
part internal mechanisms such as analytic training that emphasizes personal integ-
rity; management that fosters competitive and alternative analyses; and the willing-
ness to "tell it like we see it" to policymakers, along with effective evaluation and
"lessons learned" mechanisms — and one part active oversight in both the executive
and legislative branches. One key component of oversight will be an active effort to
ensure that objectivity remains the cornerstone of any and all analytic efforts.

22. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, what steps should be taken to ensure
that the Intelligence Community provides independent, objective, and accurate anal-
yses?

Director McLaughlin. Again, we start with a sense of the values of the profes-
sion, the first of which is that our job is to provide accurate, timely information be-
cause our national security is dependent on it as are the lives of the American peo-
ple we serve. We must continue to train our employees on the centrality of this mis-
sion from their first day on the job, and we must continue to emphasize this, in
word and in deed, throughout their careers. Beyond that we can build internal
mechanisms to reinforce this sense of integrity. We need the benefit of active exter-
nal oversight to ensure that we are always meeting our standards in this area.

23. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, would consolidation of budget control of
most of the intelligence analysts, as well as hiring and firing authority over national
intelligence agency leaders under a single official, support or hurt this aim?

Director McLaughlin. We simply must accept one basic fact: One consequence of
consolidating budget control, along with personnel (hiring and firing) over the entire
community in the hands of a single official will be the need for active, ongoing ef-
forts to ensure that a desirable consolidation on the resource side does not make
inevitable the homogenization of analysis or of anal3^ic perspectives. I emphasize
the word "ongoing;" this cannot be a "set it and forget it" approach to the processes
that ensure that honest, competitive analysis remains the hallmark of U.S. intel-
ligence.

DCI AUTHORITIES COMPARED TO NID AUTHORITIES (BUDGET)

24. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, the 9/11 Commission has recommended
giving a new NID sole responsibility for budgets of the national intelligence agen-
cies. As I understand the process now, the DCI is responsible for developing and
submitting the budget for the NFIP to the President, but, since Executive Order
12333 confers authority for fiscal management for the DOD combat support agencies
to DOD, the DCI would have to obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense
before requesting 0MB approval of any reprogrammings involving the DOD combat
support agencies. If the Commission's recommendations were implemented, would
this change in reprogramming authority be the principal difference between the
DCI's current budgeting authority and what the budgeting authority of the NID
would be?

Director McLaughlin. No, other changes would be necessary to enhance the
DCI's or NID's authority over the NFIP budget to address the recommended actions
of the 9/11 Commission. The DCI or the NID would need:

• Authority to decide independently the content of the NFIP budget request
to the President. In the past, the DCI, under the National Security Act, had
the authority to "develop" the NFIP budget, but Secretary of Defense ap-
proval was needed to incorporate DCI decisions into the Defense budget be-
fore submission to the President, and ultimately, to Congress. The Presi-
dent recently gave this authority to the DCI in Executive Order 13355.

• Authority to manage the allocation of enacted appropriations to Intel-
ligence Community components. Making appropriations for the NFIP to a
single appropriation to be allocated by the DCI, after apportionment by
0MB, would further enhance the NID's ability to control the NFIP budget.

• Authority to transfer appropriations or personnel within the NFIP with-
out the approval of the Secretary of Defense or any other head of a depart-
ment with NFIP resources. The National Security Act currently requires
that the head of the affected department(s) "not object" to transfers.

The President's proposal would provide the NID:

176

• Authority to decide independently the content of the NFIP budget request
to the President.

• Authority to manage NFIP appropriations through the comptrollers of
cabinet departments.

• Authority to transfer appropriations after consultation with the Secretary
of Defense or any other head of a department with NFIP resources.

The President's proposal also would prevent disclosure of the total amount of in-
telligence funding.

25. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, what would the consequences for DOD be
of giving the new NID the authority to reprogram funds out of DOD programs and
activities without the approval of the Secretary of Defense?

Secretary Rumsfeld. My understanding is that NID authority to reprogram funds
would be for designated programs, not all DOD programs, and would be after appro-
priate consultation with the Secretary of Defense.

26. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and Director McLaughlin, who would re-
solve any potential conflict between supporting DOD requirements and supporting
broader requirements of decisionmakers and other agencies?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Under the President's proposal, the NID.

Director McLaughlin. It is not yet certain what the authorities of the proposed
NID will be. Under current law (section 103 of the National Security Act), the DCI
establishes the requirements and priorities to govern the collection of national intel-
ligence by Intelligence Community elements. He also approves collection require-
ments, determines collection priorities, and resolves conflicts in collection priorities
levied on national collection assets, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary
of Defense pursuant to the direction of the President. The new Executive Order on
intelligence (EO 13355) contains similar language.

It seems likely that the NID will have at least as much authority as the DCI cur-
rently has in this area. It also bears noting that, as a practical matter, the DCI and
the Secretary of Defense have always been able to work out their differences over
the tasking of national collection assets, and have never had to refer such a dispute
to the President for resolution.

DCI AUTHORITIES COMPARED TO NID AUTHORITIES (PERSONNEL)

27. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, as I understand the process now, the
Secretary of Defense must obtain the concurrence of the DCI in appointing anyone
to head the NSA, the NRO, or the NGA. For the head of the DIA, the Secretary
must only consult with the DCI on that appointment. The 9/11 Commission has rec-
ommended giving a new NID sole responsibility for hiring and firing of leaders of
the national intelligence agencies, including the head of DLA. Is there any indication
that the heads of the DOD combat support agencies have been unresponsive to the
direction or tasking of the DCI?

Director McLaughlin. First of all, I would note that the "combat support" agen-
cies are national intelligence agencies. The inclusion of the word "national" in the
names of the three agencies was not an accident; it clearly signaled the intent of
Congress, and the administration at the time of their formation, that a principal
role of NGA, NRO, and NSA was to support the national intelligence mission as de-
fined by the National Security Council and carried out by the DCI. Although the
NRO is not a combat support agency and NSA is not a combat support agency for
all purposes, each agency has a combat support role, a function that becomes pri-
mary when U.S. forces are engaged in combat operations and combat support be-
comes, in effect, the highest national intelligence priority. Non-DOD agencies, nota-
bly the CIA, also have combat support roles that they have always carried out with
distinction.

In my view, the Directors of NGA, NRO, and NSA do an excellent job of balancing
their national missions with their combat support functions. They all have resources
in the DOD, JMIP, and TIARA programs that help them respond to specific tactical
needs, but a considerable portion of their national programs is used to support the
military as well.

The ability of these agencies to successfully carry out both sets of responsibilities
does mean that serving two masters is the ideal way to operate. NGA, NRO, and
NSA must participate in strategic planning, program and budgeting, requirements
definition, and policy development processes in both the Intelligence Community
and the Department of Defense. While we have made efforts to minimize redun-
dancy where possible, the fact remains that the agency heads now must respond to

177

two bosses, with all the potential for redundancy and conflict that entails. Establish-
ing a strong NID would help to reduce this redundancy and conflict, thereby mini-
mizing overhead and enabling these agencies to devote more of their resources to
both the national and military support missions.

28. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, do you have concerns
about any effects on support to military operations or otherwise of transferring this
authority (particularly for DIA) to a new NID?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I support the President's proposals.

General Myers. At this stage of the intelligence reform process, without knowing
or working out all the necessary agreements between the Department of Defense
and the NID that establish intelligence support priorities, it is difficult to address
all concerns. In broad terms, every commander requires timely and accurate intel-
ligence to support decisionmaking across all missions, ranging from combat to thea-
ter security cooperation. Regardless of the final Intelligence Community structure,
combatant commanders must have the ability to influence national intelligence pri-
orities and intelligence asset allocation. Any initiative or reform that creates gaps
between the intelligence agencies or that dilutes the DOD's ability to influence intel-
ligence resource allocation and prioritization of intelligence efforts or removes and/
or transfers senior DOD intelligence analysts outside of the Department causes me
concern because of the impact on the warfighter and the ability to successfully exe-
cute the mission.

29. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, do you believe there
is a way to do so and still ensure that military requirements for intelligence are
satisfied?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I support the President's proposals.

General Myers. The heads of defense intelligence agencies are properly appointed
by the Secretary of Defense. Current statute requires DCI concurrence for the ap-
pointments of the heads of the NSA, NGA, and the NRG. Appointment of the Direc-
tor of the DIA requires consultation. We have worked very hard for a number of
years to develop synergy from integrating defense and national requirements and
activities. Over these years, a reasonable state of balance has been achieved be-
tween defense and national requirements. As combat support agencies in the Sec-
retary of Defense chain of command, military requirements receive an emphasis
that could be lost under an alternate arrangement.

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Dayton

PRESIDENTIAL "SHOOT-DOWN" AUTHORITY

30. Senator Dayton. General Myers, was the presidential shoot-down request
withheld from the pilots by the Northeast Air Defense Sector, as identified on page
43 of the 9/11 Commission report?

General Myers. The pilots were not informed of the presidential engagement au-
thority. However, direct, positive command and control was maintained between the
commanders and the pilots at all times on September 11, 2001, and the authority
would have immediately been relayed had there been a target.

31. Senator Dayton. Secretary Rumsfeld, was there an investigation into the deci-
sion not to forward this order to the pilots? If an investigation or after-action review
was conducted, identify the investigation/review officer and provide a written copy
of the report to the committee for review.

General Myers. No, an investigation was not required and therefore not con-
ducted into the decision regarding forwarding presidential engagement authority to
the pilots.

32. Senator Dayton. Secretary Rumsfeld, a statement on page 17 of the 9/11
Commission report indicates that the Defense Department and National Command
Authority considered the need to shoot down a commercial airliner prior to Septem-
ber 11, 2001:

"Prior to September 11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a
commercial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Au-
thority (a phrase used to describe the President and Secretary of Defense).
Exercise planners also assumed that the aircraft would originate from out-
side the United States, allowing time to identify the target and scramble
interceptors. The threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within

178

the United States — and using them as guided missiles — was not recognized
by North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) before September 11."

Did NORAD conduct exercises or develop scenarios, prior to September 11, 2001,
to test a military reaction to an aircraft hijacking which appeared destined to result
in a suicide crash into a high-value target? If so, identify the five exercises con-
ducted on, or immediately prior to September 11, 2001; include dates, participants,
scenario, and sjTiopsis of exercise results.

General Myers. Prior to September 11, 2001, NORAD exercises were not designed
to exercise or develop procedures to shoot down civilian airliners. Pre-September 11
exercises were designed to practice command and control procedures, rules of en-
gagement, external agency coordination and hijack shadow and/or escort procedures.

The following five exercise hijack events included a suicide crash into a high-value
target. Synopses of exercise results are not available. They were discarded in accord-
ance with DOD directives.

Exercise Name: Vigilant Guardian 01-1

Exercise Date* 23 Oct 00

Participants: HQ NORAD/Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR)/Sectors

Scenario: Weapons of Mass Destruction directed at the United Nations — an indi-
vidual steals a Federal Express aircraft and plans a suicide attack on the
United Nations Building in New York City.

SjTiopsis of actions: Conducted an interception, exercised command and control
and coordinated with external agencies.

Exercise Name: Vigilant Guardian 01-1

Exercise Date: 16 Oct 00

Participants: HQ NORAD/Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center/CONR/Cana-
dian NORAD Region/Sectors

Scenario: Due to recent arrests involving illegal drug trafficking in Maine, an in-
dividual steals a Federal Express plane and plans a suicide attack into the
United Nations Building in New York City.

Synopsis of actions: Exercised command and control, coordinated with external
agencies and followed hijack checklists.

Exercise Name: Falcon Indian 99-3

Exercise Dates: 5 Jun 00

Participants: CONR/Sectors

Scenario: Learjet hijacked maintaining tight formation with Canadair airliner,
loaded with explosives. Learjet planned to crash into the White House.

Synopsis of actions: Exercised command and control, coordinated with external
agencies and followed hijack checklists.

Exercise Name: Falcon Indian 00-1

Exercise Dates: 5 Jun 00

Participants: CONR/Sectors

Scenario: Communist party faction hijacks aircraft bound from western to eastern
United States. High explosives on board. Intends to crash into the Statue of
Liberty.

Synopsis of actions: Cross-sector hand over. Exercised command and control, co-
ordinated with external agencies and followed hijack checklists. Federal Avia-
tion Administration requested assistance.

Exercise Name: Falcon Indian 00-1

Exercise Date: 6 Nov 99

Participants: CONR/Sectors

Scenario: China Air fi-om Los Angeles to JFK airport hijacked east of Colorado
Springs by five terrorists. If not intercepted, intends to crash into United Na-
tions building.

S3Tiopsis of actions: Cross-sector hand over. Exercised command and control, co-
ordinated with external agencies and followed hijack checklists.

Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

QUESTIONS from THE SURVIVORS OF THE VICTIMS OF SEPTEMBER 11

33. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, before today's
Armed Services Committee hearing, I attended a hearing of the Senate Govern-
mental Affairs Committee where representatives of the September 11 families testi-
fied about the 9/11 Commission report. Specifically the Governmental Affairs Com-
mittee heard testimony from Mary Fetchet, the Founding Director, Voices of Sep-
tember 11 and Member, Family Steering Committee; Stephen Push, Co-Founder

179

and Board Member, Families of September 11; and Kristen Breitwieser, Founder
and Co-Chairperson, September 11 Advocates Member, Family Steering Committee.
During that hearing, I asked the family representatives if they wanted me to ask
you any questions during the hearing. They asked me to convey the following ques-
tions to you.

One family member stated it is unacceptable for the Department of Defense to
claim it cannot both take care of the boots on the ground as well as reorganize their
departments to be more effective, because al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are
doing a thousand things at once. How would you respond to that concern?

Secretary Rumsfeld. The DOD has not taken such a position. To the contrary,
that family member should be reassured that we are doing things simultaneously
every day. We are deploying military forces to fight and win the global war on ter-
rorism, we are transforming departmental organizations and capabilities to deal
with the threats of the 21st century, and we are devoting extraordinary energy and
resources to support the training, protection, health, welfare, and morale of the he-
roic men and women in uniform that so diligently serve their nation. I view these
efforts as inseparable and mutually supporting. Each is a necessary component of
and adjunct to the others.

General Myers. It is a fundamental responsibility of the Department of Defense
to take care of servicemembers and their families while meeting our security obliga-
tions and ensuring we are prepared for the future. The Department dedicates the
appropriate level of effort to every aspect of these responsibilities. This includes im-
proving quality of life for families and assisting them in dealing with the demanding
operational tempo of their servicemembers. It also includes ensuring that members
of the military receive the best possible training and equipment available. At the
same time, we are involved in an extensive effort to transform departments to be
more effective. This effort is designed to prepare us to better succeed in the chal-
lenges we face today while ensuring the U.S. military is ready for the security chal-
lenges of the future.

34. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, another family
member asked you to imagine there is a NID as proposed by the Commission — what
assurances does the Department of Defense need to be secure that the existence of
a NID won't negatively effect military operations?

Secretary Rumsfeld. DOD must have the authority and capability to conduct or
task, and to receive all-discipline information (HUMINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, etc.)
and to return all-source analysis to support defense needs, including military oper-
ations.

General Myers. The Department of Defense relies extensively on national assets
for the planning and execution of military operations. In an era with a NID, the
Department needs processes and procedures that ensure the NID plans and budgets
for those assets (material and manpower) required for military operations and oper-
ates them against priorities that support military planning and operations, includ-
ing future threats that U.S. forces might someday face. We have worked hard over
the years to ensure a mutually supportive relationship between the Secretary of De-
fense and the DCI. We must ensure this rapport is not harmed.

35. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, another family
member asked for an explanation of the protocols for the military and NO RAD on
September 11 vidth respect to the hijackings. Can you provide a description of
NORAD's reaction on September 11?

Secretary Rumsfeld. In accordance with Department Defense directives in effect
on September 11, NORAD was to monitor and report the actions of any hijacked
aircraft, as requested by the Federal Aviation Administration. We had procedures
for potential air hijackings, which were based on the premise that a hijacked air-
craft would be used for ransom or political purposes, not as a weapon.

General Myers. On the morning of September 11, NORAD was conducting a com-
mand post exercise and was postured for "wartime conditions." Six minutes prior
to the first attack on the World Trade Center, the Federal Aviation Administration
informed NORAD of potential hijack of American Airlines Flight 11. Throughout the
attacks of September 11, NORAD responded by launching fighter aircraft and insti-
tuting airspace controls. Immediately after the attacks, armed fighters flew arovmd-
the-clock air patrols. Within a 24-hour period, NORAD had over 400 aircraft air-
borne and on ground-based alert to prevent additional attacks.

180

DOD INTELLIGENCE

36. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, although the 9/11
Commission largely focuses on national and strategic intelligence, tactical intel-
ligence for military personnel on the ground and coordination among agencies to
capitalize on that intelligence is also critical to winning the global war on terrorism.
The 9/11 Commission report details the issues surrounding the use of the Predator
unmanned aircraft to strike Osama bin Laden during the March to September 2001
timeframe. What caused the confusion that existed among CIA, OSD, and the Air
Force regarding the authority to strike Osama bin Laden (detailed on pages 210-
212 of the 9/11 Commission report)?

Secretary Rumsfeld. The 9/11 Commission report cites interviews with U.S. Gov-
ernment officials regarding discussions of the Predator during the March-September
2001 timeframe. Two main interagency policy issues arose regarding use of an
armed version of the Predator, then in development: (1) whether DOD or CIA was
liable for the costs associated with the operation, and (2) whether DOD or CL\.
should operate the system and other employment considerations (Was it legal to kill
Osama bin Laden? Who would authorize strikes? Who would pull the trigger?).

General Myers. There appears to be a slight factual misunderstanding concerning
this timeframe, since no armed Predators were in Afghanistan during March to Sep-
tember (armed Predators were being modified and tested through the summer of
2001). However, the 9/11 Commission report accurately captures the djTiamic envi-
ronment within the National Security Council during spring and summer 2001 as
policy options were explored to counter the al Qaeda threat. The Air Force was al-
ready in the early stages of developing an armed Predator and had their first mis-
sile launch from a Predator in February 2001. As this technology was proving to
be promising, CIA was considering the desirability of deploying this capability as
soon as it was viable. While the technology was being developed and tested, the pol-
icy direction was being evaluated and crafted. As Director Tenet stated, "this was
new ground," and there were serious policy and statutory issues to reconcile. The
open discourse and range of opinions captured in the 9/11 Commission report reflect
a robust policy development forum for use of a new technology rather than confu-
sion. There were no missed opportunities by unmanned Predators to strike Osama
bin Laden during the period of policy resolution as the armed Predators were not
yet ready for deployment.

37. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, is there a clear de-
termination on how this operation would happen if the opportunity presented itself
again today?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes. By August 2002, a more detailed Concept of Operation
and Memorandum of Agreement were established between DOD and CIA that re-
solve the lines of authority and implement decisionmaking on armed Predator oper-
ations.

General MYERS. If the opportunity to strike Osama bin Laden presented itself
today where we have military forces deployed, we have clear authority to act.

38. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, are there clear
rules of engagement and release authority for striking other targets that need im-
mediate approval authority?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, there are clear rules of engagement and release author-
ity for striking other targets that need immediate approval authority.

General Myers. Yes. Combatant commanders (CBTCDRs) have been provided
clear rules of engagement (ROE) and release authority to strike emerging and/or
time sensitive targets. In broad terms, ROE promulgated to the CBTCDRs:

1. Clearly establishes the identity of hostile forces.

2. Identifies what type of force and/or weapons are authorized for use.

3. Identifies categories of targets and authorizes strikes against those tar-
gets.

4. Identifies areas of operation.

5. Defines high collateral damage targets and restrictions against those
targets (if any).

[Deleted.]

39. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, near the end of
major combat operations in Afghanistan it appeared as if Osama bin Laden was re-
stricted to the Tora Bora mountains and possibly within our grasp. Did readily
available intelligence get to the soldiers on the ground quickly to possibly assist

181

them in his capture or were there problems with the tactical intelligence provided
to our forces that helped him escape?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Joint Task Forces conducting combat operations routinely
utilize all intelligence data provided by both defense and national intelligence enti-
ties. These range from tactical reconnaissance data gathered by maneuver forces,
to DOD airborne ISR platforms, to geospatial and other overhead collection capabili-
ties. DOD has made significant strides in recent years in ensuring that tactically
relevant data, from both defense and national sources, is pushed to the lowest eche-
lon of military units as rapidly as possible, and many of those capabilities were em-
ployed in the Tora Bora operation (e.g. live overhead video feeds of the tactical en-
gagements were used by multiple tactical consumers across the depth of the
battlespace). While we acknowledge that more work needs to be done to make this
intelligence sharing and distribution even more robust in the future, there is no reli-
able way for DOD to calculate whether the survival of a given combatant is a direct
or indirect result of a particular intelligence shortfall. Tactical engagements, par-
ticular ground combat, are far too chaotic and complex for such links to be drawn.

General Myers. At that point in our Afghanistan operations, all-source intel-
ligence reports gave us a high level of confidence that Osama bin Laden was in the
Tora Bora area; however, his presence there was never confirmed. Tora Bora quickly
became CENTCOM's main operational effort and the primary focus of all national,
DOD and CENTCOM intelligence collection and reporting. From CENTCOM's
Tampa headquarters, CENTCOM J-2 and J-3 operated a co-located operations and
intelligence fusion cell that provided direct and continuous support to the forces de-
ployed in the Tora Bora area. Intelligence fusion was facilitated by interagency, spe-
cial operations, and other government agency representation in the Tampa cell that
was reporting directly to the commanders on the ground in Tora Bora. Intelligence
dissemination to U.S. forces was continuous and direct, bypassing other layers of
command in order to enhance the agility of the warfighter.

Questions Submitted by Senators Mark Dayton and Hillary Rodham Clinton

NORAD'S performance on SEPTEMBER 11

40. Senator Dayton and Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld, we have a ques-
tion posed by April Gallop, a September 11 survivor, that we would like answered
for this hearing's record. Your testimony on August 17, 2004, indicates the North
American Air Defense Command's mission structure on September 11, 2001, was de-
signed to defend our country from external threats. Was an investigation or after-
action review conducted regarding NORAD's activities/actions on September 11,
2001? If an investigation or after-action review was conducted, identify the date of
investigation, the investigating/review officer, and provide a written copy of the re-
port to the committee for review.

Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense did not conduct an after-action
review regarding NORAD's actions on September 11, 2001. However, during the
course of the 9/11 Commission's investigation, NORAD provided thousands of docu-
ments and numerous personal accounts of NORAD's response to the terrorist at-
tacks. In the aftermath of September 11, NORAD has strengthened its ability to de-
tect, assess, warn, and defend against threats to North America. Today, NORAD
forces remain at a heightened readiness level. Pilots fly irregular air patrols over
metropolitan areas and critical infrastructure facilities. NORAD has partnered with
the FAA to enhance its ability to monitor air traffic within the interior of the coun-
try. We have established a system of conference calls to facilitate the sharing of in-
formation among the White House, DOD, FAA, U.S. Customs, and law enforcement
agencies. In addition, the President and the Secretary of Defense have approved
rules of engagement to deal with hostile acts within domestic airspace.

41. Senator Dayton and Senator Clinton. General Myers, who was held account-
able for NORAD's inability to effectively respond to the airline hijackings and FAA
response requests?

General M^'ERS. The military chain of command is accountable for NORAD's ac-
tions on September 11. However, no disciplinary measures are warranted. Prior to
September 11, NORAD's aerospace warning and control missions were oriented and
resourced to detect and identify all air traffic entering North American airspace. On
the morning of the attacks, existing rules of engagement provided no guidance for
civilian aircraft participating in, or with clear intent to participate in, an attack
against our Nation. As the September 11 attacks unfolded, NORAD responded im-
mediately with fighters and appropriate airspace control measures. Unfortunately,

182

due to late notification and the constraints of time and distance, they were unable
to influence the tragic circumstances.

[Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

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Full text of "Implications for the Department of Defense and military operations of proposals to reorganize the United States intelligence community : hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, August 16 and 17, 2004"

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